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Abstract 
When we consider regional differences in air safety, a call for regional solutions is 
needed. This research probes the current situation in Taiwan and part of Asia from a 
regional perspective, aiming to better understand safety management in this region. Data 
was drawn from an extensive survey involving both airline pilots and aviation authority 
officers. The research investigated respondents' perceptions in airline safety 
management, and examined at their opinions about the role of aviation regulatory 
authorities and language disadvantages when exchanging safety information. 
The results demonstrated that there were key differences between the Captains and the 
First Officers surveyed in many aspects of airline safety management. The First Officers 
were more eager to have a blame-free and information-shared culture in current 
bureaucratic systems than were the Captains. Most pilots expected airline top 
management and aviation regulatory authorities to take more information responsibility 
for circulating safety related messages and information. 
It is believed that a confidential incident reporting system is one of the most appropriate 
tools for improving safety. It would be sensitive enough to provide early identification 
and warning for rooting out underlying causal factors, and allow constant tracking of 
hazards and evaluation of risks they involve. Hence, the second part of the thesis 
discusses the feasibility of establishing a national-level confidential incident reporting 
system in Taiwan from the viewpoints of the airline pilots and the air traffic controllers. 
The survey showed that there was great expectation for the introduction of a national- 
level confidential reporting system. However, there was need to undertake a high profile 
promotional period within the aviation community, followed by a two-year trial period. 
This would help to motivate potential reporters, eliminate their fear of punitive action, 
and enable consensus and support to be sought from the airlines. Initially, it is advised to 
begin with the participant of flight crew and air traffic controllers only. At the end of the 
trial period, an evaluation of the system achievements was recommended. After two 
years of successful operation the system might be extended to include maintenance 
personnel, cabin crews and other relevant parties. 
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PART I 
A General Background and Theoretical Framework 
As early as the first powered flight was made, safety has been the major concern. The Wright 
Brothers had their first powered airplane built in Dayton, Ohio, but made that famous first 
flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina over 504) miles away. Kitty Hawk was chosen because it 
was a stretch of sandy land, safe enough for test flight. As Wilbur stated in a letter to his father, 
"I do not intend to take dangerous chances, both because I have no wish to get hurt and because 
a fall would stop nay experimenting. " 
As we near the end of the 20th century, the issue of safety remains crucial in meeting public 
desire for risk-free travel. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
" Tile progress of technology is not a natural process, like the growth of a tree. It is not 
automatic. Air transport makes progress only because man or a group of men does 
something. " 
----- ------ Edward Warner, 1958 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
1.1.1 General background 
About three decades ago Marshall McLuhan, the master of communications, 
observed the rapid development and expansion in electronic telecommunications and 
predicted that the world was being turned into a "global village". With the increased 
growth in world commercial aviation, air travel has made all of us each other's 
neighbour. We have become, and we are becoming ever more so, a real global 
village, as opposed to just an electronic one. 
Thanks to economic links and the efficiency of communication systems, the people of 
this village have become more interdependent than before. Commercial aviation is 
experiencing rapid growth and, this looks set to continue into the next century. The 
airline industry is becoming more energised and more competitive, for more people 
are flying, more airlines are eager to meet the demands of sophisticated customers, 
and more modern planes are being built to meet the multifunctional needs of the 
commercial aviation business. In other words, we have complicated passengers, 
complicated planes, and a complicated aviation business. The question is, do we have 
better airline safety to meet the more complex demands of air travel? 
1.1.2 Background to the study area 
Throughout the 1980s and up until present, driven by the rapid economic growth of 
the Asia Pacific' region, people in Asia Pacific Rim countries, such as Japan, South 
! In ICAO classification, Asia Pacific region is a huge area stretching from Afghanistan in the North-West to 
Tahiti in the South-East, and from the Indian Ocean in the South-West, to the North Pacific Ocean in the 
2 
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Korea, Taiwan`, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, are 
experiencing tremendous air traffic growth (see Figure 1.1). Gross National 
Production in these countries is rising and thus more and more people have disposable 
income available for travel. The relaxation of travel restrictions in Taiwan and Korea 
is another significant factor. Passengers are flying on business, on vacation, for 
studying, and for visiting relatives. With long term stability in politics, accompanied 
by the sustained economic growth, and with half of the world's population, Asia has 
become a potentially huge market in the field of air transport business over the next 
twenty years. 
60 
50 
40 
30 ö 
2R 
20 
10 
0 
1985 1990 1994 2000 2010 
Source: WTO & ATAG 
'includes Australia & New Zealand 
"international scheduled passenger traffic 
Figure 1.1 Asia Rising: Asia's* share in world trade and 
air traffic (includes forecasting) 
According to 1995 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) annual civil 
aviation report, more than 1,203 million passengers were carried by the scheduled 
airlines of I('AO Contracting States, equivalent to approximately 25% of the world's 
population By the year 2000, it is expected that 1,800 million passengers will travel 
by air, equivalent to about 30% of the world's population at that time. Demand for 
air transport in Asia Pacific region is growing faster than in any other world region. It 
grew at an average of 10.3% per annum between 1985 and 1993. It will grow by an 
North-last. The terns Asia Pacific countries includes all the countries in this region with the exception of 
Australasia. 
'Though strictly a geographical term, The name Taiwan is used by most people in the world when referring to 
the countn culled the Republic of'China. For consistency, the author adopts the name Taiwan in this study. 
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average of 8.6% per annum between 1993 and 2000 and 7.1% per annum between 
2000 and 2010. The region's share of world-wide scheduled passenger traffic was 
26.4% in 1985. It increased to 35.5% in 1993. It will reach 41.2% by 2000 and 
50.5% by 2010 (ATAG, 1995) 
Demand for air transport in Taiwan is growing as fast as that in other Asia Pacific 
countries. Long-term prospects are enhanced by the following positive factors. First, 
the expectation of direct air and/or sea links with China will be fulfilled as relations 
with China eventually normalise. It is expected that mainland China will present 
major new market opportunities. Second, considering that Hong Kong is going to be 
taken over by China in 1997, The Taiwanese government has been engaging in 
expanding and improving Taipei airport to replace Hong Kong airport as a future 
gateway to China and a regional hub. Third, Taiwan has bilateral relations with only 
about 31 countries at present, so the potential for the acquisition of new traffic rights 
with the rest of the world is enormous (some already in varying stages of 
negotiation). The number of scheduled airlines has increased from 4 (one 
international, the remainder domestic ) in 1987, just before raised the rise of the 
"open sky" policy, to 9 at present. Passengers were carried 12 million in 1987 and 
32.6 million in 1994 (Civil Aeronautical Administration-Taiwan, 1994). 
The rapid air transport growth in Asia Pacific countries has resulted in some changes: 
First, the reduction of profitability. Due to the growth in capacity outstripping 
demand and the influence of world recession, the profits of airlines continues to fall. 
The high profits achieved in the late 1980s seem impossible to be achieved again. 
According to Oriental Airlines Association (OAA) statistics, though the OAA 
airlines' growth in capacity continues to exceed the rise in traffic, profit levels and 
load factors are back to levels experienced in the early 1980s. Second, 
modernisation of aircraft. Capacity of aircraft continue to increase and flight decks 
become more automated. Third, change in customers' demands. Passenger 
expectations and demands increase more than ever. Their demands have shifted from 
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hard3 values to soft and brand values (Simons, 1994). For examples, they ask for 
competitive pricing but qualified service, they desire more flights and more routes, 
they expect on-time takeoff and landing, and they cannot stand any delay. In 1995, 
there were several instances of passengers refusing to step off the aircraft due to the 
schedule delay in Asia (see Table 1. l). 
Table 1.1 : Events Involving Passengers Occupying Aircraft Due to Flight Delay 
Date Operator Flight No. Contributing factor Settlement 
1 Jan. 1995 Cathay CX 511 Collision of cabin door Arrange another flight 
Airlines and bridge 
21 Feb. 1995 Vietnam Nose gear malfunction US$ 200 compensation 
fee for each passenger 
23 Apr. 1995 Cathay CX 434 Mechanical malfunction Arrange accommodation 
Airlines 
7 May 1995 Eva BR 061 Undercarriage abnormal Arrange accommodation 
Airways 
26 Aug. 1995 China Cl 008 Engine malfunction One-way ticket from 
Airlines Taipei to LA for each 
passenger 
26 Aug. 1995 Northwest NW 012 Engine malfunction Arrange transfer flight or 
Airlines accommodation 
19 Oct. 1995 Canada CP 017 Undercarriage US$ 200 compensation 
Airlines malfunction fee and a return ticket 
from Vancouver to Taipei 
25 Dec. 1995 Indonesian GA 980 Flight dispatch problem US$ 200 compensation 
Airlines fee for each passenger 
14 Feb. 1996 Cathay CX 460 No. 4 engine Formal apology letter and 
Airlines malfunction a box of chocolate for 
each passenger 
Source: Compiled from Central Daily News, United Daily News, and China Weekly 
Data from Jan. 1995 to March 1996 
The one thing that does not change is that passengers cannot accept the occurrence of 
aircraft accidents as shown in Figure 1.2. Because of the threat of competition in the 
market and the demands of passengers, airlines have to strive to be the very best they 
can be both in terms of safety and service. 
3 hard values are the fundamental physical requirements of running an airline, such as aircraft, schedules, 
infrastructure, and management. Soil values are the tactile areas of flying aircraft, such as cabin staff, food, 
interior design etc. Iliand values arc the often deeply rooted characteristics or image of an airline. 
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Figure 1.2 Safety is a Paramount Aviation Value 
Source: revised from Simons, 1994 
It is undeniable that safety has become the trademark of the airline industry. In 1994, 
the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted a safety audit program for 
30 countries (out of 183 ICAO Contracting States) in the world and consequently 
banned nine Latin American and African airlines from entering the USA. Of these 
four Latin American airlines were permitted to enter again conditionally after a 
recheck by FAA. A country's rating is based on an evaluation of the laws that enable 
the aviation regulatory authorities to adopt regulations in order to meet ICAO 
standards, current regulations, procedures to carry out regulatory requirements, air 
carrier certification and inspection programmes and available organisational and 
personnel resources. During the same year, in order to ensure aviation safety, the 
International Air Carrier Association (IACA) banned European Union (EU) nations 
from renting ageing aircraft from less safety-conscious countries for charter flights. 
Moreover, a "Safety Oversight Programme" was designed in 1993 by ICAO to help 
its member states to monitor air transport safety and ensure compliance with ICAO 
safety standards. The primary objective of the programme is to identify deficiencies 
and offer advice and assistance until progress is confirmed. 
The commercial aviation business is an international business. In Asia-Pacific, many 
new entry airlines are about to initiate or have just initiated flying international routes. 
From an international viewpoint, any aircraft accident involving one airline in one 
area will affect the image of many other airlines. Therefore, methods to establish 
high standards of safety and a qualified service management system will be addressed 
this study. 
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1.1.3 Reasons for choosing the study area 
Most studies of airline safety have been implemented in, or developed in western 
countries. They have focused on airlines in these countries and chosen western pilots 
and/or accidents/incidents as their research subjects. Although the findings of these 
studies have benefited some countries, they may not accurately reflect the situation in 
other regions of the world. 
World-wide airline safety rates have not improved for twenty years (Oster, 1992, 
Weener, 1993; Hayes, 1994). Facing the challenge of improving safety rates, research 
on accident prevention strategies (Boeing, 1994) has shown that solutions deriving 
from previous western studies may not be practical in regions with different cultures. 
In order to be successful in lowering the accident rates, regional programmes that 
reflect localised characteristics and differences should be designed. Also with regard 
to regional differences, more precise methods of analysing of regional studies are 
needed. 
1.2 Obieclives of the thesis 
The overall purpose of this research was to investigate regional airline safety 
management. In order to achieve the purpose, the study was carried out in three parts: 
Part 1: 
To probe into contemporary issues in aviation safety 
" To analyse accident / incident contributing factors in the Asia-Pacific region and 
Taiwan 
Part 2: 
" To understand pilots' viewpoints regarding airline safety management 
To survey and investigate the factors that pilots believe will influence airline 
safety management 
Part 3: 
To review current confidential incident reporting systems in the UK, USA, 
Canada, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand 
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" To administer and analyse a feasibility study for implementing a national 
confidential incident reporting system in Taiwan. 
1.3 Data sources and their limitations 
1.3.1 Aspects on the data sources 
The following table shows the data sources of accident reports and the subjects of the 
survey. 
Table 1.2 Sources of Accident Reports and Subjects of the Survey 
Data Sources Reports / Subjects 
International accidents: Summary, Reviews 
Flight International, Air Safety 
Week, UK CAA WAAS, ICAO 
ADREP* 
Asia accidents: ICAO circular, AAIC Accident investigation reports 
Japan, CAA Taiwan, Boeing, MCD, (official and unofficial) 
Part 1 Fokker Airbus, British Aerospace. 
Taiwan accidents / incidents: Accident / incident investigation 
CAA Taiwan reports 
Questionnaires: 
Asia: 
12 international airlines Management Captains 
8 civil aviation authorities CAA staff 
Part 2 Taiwan: 6 scheduled airlines Captains / First Officers 
Interview: Captains / First Officers 
Taiwanese airlines 
Questionnaires: 
Part 3 5 Taiwanese airlines Captains / First Officers 
Interviews: Airline operation managers, CAA 
Airlines, CAA, officials, 
* All these abbreviation, please reter to list or abbreviation. 
Details of data collection together with some main difficulties encountered in each 
part are as follows: 
Part 1: 
4The accident investigation reports which apply to this research are mostly Asian aircraft accident cases. The 
purpose is to do the research and promote aviation safety only. In no case, it is intended to imply bias or 
blame. 
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Data collection: The empirical findings for the first part are based on three different 
information sources i. e. 1) published material, 2) unpublished reports, and 3) 
compilation data from the above sources. 
Published material refers to ICAO documents, accident investigation reports of each 
country, articles and books. Unpublished reports were gained from aircraft 
manufacturers. These accident investigation reports were obtained by special requests 
to a number of companies, such as British Aerospace, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, 
Airbus, and Fokker. Some other data were created through compilation of the airline 
industry journals, such as Flight International, Interavia, Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Air Safety Week, UK CAA's WAAS, and ICAO ADREP. 
Difficulties in data gathering: This part of the research process has encountered two 
problems. The first was related to the general availability of information, and the 
second was associated with language. 
Most Asian civil aviation authorities and airlines have been very reluctant to offer any 
information, not only because they tend to be conservative and self-protective, but 
also because they might have still not accepted that academic research is 
advantageous for their safety. Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore are the three 
exceptions, for their airlines and civil aviation authorities provided the author with 
better responses to the research requests. Another possible reason might be that some 
Asian civil aviation authorities and airlines have not built up detailed data bases of 
their own and thus have been used to adopting western research results when dealing 
with their safety matters. 
Therefore, the practise of information sharing cannot be expected from them. In 
these cases, it has been necessary to rely mainly on information obtained through 
compilation of data from aircraft manufacturers, ICAO published papers, and airline 
journals. 
The other inevitable, (though not insoluble) difficulty encountered was the problem of 
language. Some of the formal Asian accident data or reports were written in native 
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languages. If they were to be translated into English, it would require many people, 
take a great deal of effort, cost a great deal of money. Consequently this option was 
unfeasible. The information obtainable from manufacturers and airlines, on the 
contrary, is informal and apt to be biased. 
Information on international Asia-Pacific airline operations and safety is not as 
comprehensive as that for the UK, USA, Canada, or even most Western European 
countries. The ICAO, collects data and conducts accident and incident analyses, for 
its member countries. As of 1993, there were 92 member nations in ICAO, 
representing 146 international scheduled airlines, 60 domestic scheduled airlines, and 
26 charter operators. 
Safety data collected by ICAO is known as the Accident, Incident Reporting 
(ADREP) System. A significant problem, however, is the lack of current data. The 
ADREP annual statistics and corresponding accident summaries appear with a lag of 
at least two years. This lengthy delay occurs because initial data. reporting from some 
nations is inconsistent and often sketchy, which then requires substantial follow-up 
effort to obtain more reliable data. As of mid 1996, the most recent publicly available 
ICAO ADREP safety data covered 1993. 
However, information on international airline safety is available from other aviation 
publications. Flight International and UK CAA WAAS (from the same source: 
Airclaims) provide an annual summary of fatal and nonfatal accidents for the world's 
airlines and includes information on date, airline, aircraft, fatalities, passengers, and a 
brief summary of the accident. For this analysis, information was also supplemented 
by reports on each accident available in other aviation publications, including Air 
Safety Week, Aviation Week and Space Technology and Interavia. To evaluate the 
accuracy of these various data sources, the information was compared with that 
produced by ICAO's ADREP system for the 1984-1993 period. The data from Flight 
International covers a slightly higher number of accidents over the period, with little 
year-to-year variation. Virtually all the accidents in the ICAO ADREP data appear in 
the Flight International series; the only noteworthy exceptions are accidents in Russia 
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(CIS) and China. Thus, although some reporting biases, and some differences in 
numbers remain, the available data allows an adequate assessment of the international 
aviation safety record to be made. 
Parts 2 and 3: 
Data collection: Data was collected from questionnaires and interviews. In Asian 
countries, it took longer than anticipated to have questionnaires delivered to the 
subjects. A few returned questionnaires were received two months after the 
reminding letter was mailed. Upon asking for the reason for late reply, it was found 
to be caused by language problems of mail carriers' and the busy flight schedule of 
the pilots concerned. 
In order to maximise the number of subjects questioned and gain better access to 
them, three field trips were made to several Taiwanese airlines headquarters and 
training centres in Taipei and Kaohsiung during September 1994, May 1995, and 
December 1995, respectively. In addition to meeting many flight operations 
managers, flight training managers, Captains, First Officers, and safety staff of 
airlines (including expatriate Captains), the research work has, of course, also been 
carried through by extensive writing of letters, and facsimile transmissions, as well as 
making telephone calls to companies, managers, and pilots, requesting different kinds 
of information. 
Difficulties of data gathering: With the limited resources of Asian international 
airlines, the questionnaire was only distributed to the management Captains such as 
directors of flight operations, chief pilots, and check pilots of each airlines. 
As mentioned at Section 1.3.2, the research questionnaires in Taiwan were distributed 
with the help of some management Captains. In some cases , they requested 
permission to preview the completed questionnaires before returning them back to the 
author. Obviously, this affects the confidentiality of the questionnaires. 
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In the case of the Taiwanese airline questionnaire survey, there was one airline that 
participated in the part 2 survey but refused to participate in the part 3 survey. The 
reason for this was that the conductor (a check pilot) asked for top manager's 
permission to distribute the part 3 survey, but did not get any response. Unfortunately, 
silence is always taken to mean "no" in Chinese culture. In this situation, the 
conductor decided not to distribute the follow-up survey. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The study (see Figure 1.3) starts by providing an overview of contemporary issues in 
airline safety. It then undertakes an analysis of the possible contributing factors that 
cause accidents/incidents in the Taiwan/Asia-Pacific region. Finally, it implements a 
survey of airline safety to provoke thought about future options for improving safety 
performance, and undertakes a feasibility study for implementing a confidential 
incident reporting system in Taiwan. 
The thesis is divided into three parts with 8 chapters. In part 1, the universal trend of 
aviation safety is reviewed and the regional differences are examined. Chapter 1 
provides an introduction to the study. Chapter 2 examines airline safety records and 
their measurement, aiming to show how safety management can influence safety 
performance. Chapter 3 discusses contemporary safety theories and their 
applications, and presents a general discussion of recent aviation safety issues, such as 
human failures, the use of a systemic approach to analyse accident causes, incident 
reporting, safety culture, aircraft automation, etc. 
Part 2 focuses on the survey of airline safety management to Twelve international 
Asian airlines and six scheduled Taiwanese airlines. Chapter 4 presents the 
demography and the process of the survey, while Chapter 5 deals with the results and 
discussion of the survey in terms of organisational structure, corporate culture, flight 
training, operating standard, and company resource management. 
Part 3 examines the possibility of implementing a national confidential incident 
reporting system in Taiwan. Chapter 6 explores the existing reporting systems in use 
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world-wide, their effectiveness and the difficulties they have encountered. Chapter 7 
focuses on the feasibility study for a national confidential incident reporting system in 
Taiwan. It discusses the opinions that people in the field hold about establishing the 
system and their willingness of using an Internet-based system to report incidents. 
Finally, summaries and the suggestions from the empirical findings are given in 
Chapter 8. 
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1.5 Publications during the period of this study 
There are four papers related to this research published by the author during the study 
period. 
"Airline Pilot Training: Today and Tomorrow" paper was published in December 
1994. The covered topics include pilot selection methods, currently prevailing 
practices and limitations, ah-initio pilot training, and various other current 
programmes of airline pilot training. The second paper was titled "Prospects for Safer 
Skies: A Study of Airline Safety Management" published in October 1995. Most of 
the content was adapted from chapters 2,3,4 and 5 of the present thesis. 
"The Feasibility Study for Implementation of a Confidential Aviation Incident 
Reporting System in Taiwan" was published in May 1996. "Pilots' Expectations of 
Airline Safety Management " was presented at the ISASI Asia/Pacific Regional 
Seminar held on 29 and 30 May 1996. 
The first three papers were supported by a research grant from China Aviation 
Development Foundation, Taiwan, and 50,110,80 copies have been re-printed 
respectively. These have been distributed around most Taiwanese airlines and the 
Taiwan CAA for their references. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AIRLINE SAFETY RECORD AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
If you don't know where there is a problem until an accident occurs, you 
are a part of that problem. " 
-------- C. 0. Miller 
2. Overview 
The past is an invaluable resource because it allows us to know how to face the 
future. The purpose of aircraft accident investigation is, therefore, for us to prevent 
past disasters from happening again. The chapter compares several organisations in 
terms of the definitions of accidents and incidents, describes how safety records are 
measured, points out the differences of world-wide accident rates by regions, and 
analyses the contributing factors of incidents and accidents in Asia for the past ten 
years and in Taiwan after the open policy was implemented in 1988. 
2.1 Aircraft accident definitions and categories 
An aircraft accident usually causes a different degree of aircraft damage, casualty or 
injury, and property loss. Though there are several variations, the most widely used 
definition is the one developed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO, Annex 13,1994). Its definitions of aircraft accident, serious incident, and 
aircraft incident are listed below: 
2.1.1 ICAO's classification 
AIR('RAh7' A('cIDENT- An occurrence associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft 
with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have 
disembarked, in which: 
a) a person is fatally or seriously it jured as a result of. - 
" being in the aircraft, or 
" direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which 
have become detached from the aircraft, or 
" direct exposure to jet blast. 
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EXCEPT when the injuries are from natural causes, self inflicted or inflicted 
by other persons, or when the it juries are to stowaways hiding outside the 
areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
" adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight 
characteristics of the aircraft and 
" would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected 
component. 
EXCEPT for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the 
engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, 
wing tips, antenna, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in 
the aircraft skin; or 
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. 
Note 1. For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within 
thirty days of the date of the accident is classified as a fatal injury by ICAO. 
Note 2. A serious it jury is one which: 
a) requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 
seven days from the date the it jury was received; or 
b) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, 
toes, or nose); or 
c) involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle 
or tendon damage; or 
d) involves it jury to any internal organ; or 
e) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more 
than 5 percent of the body surface. 
In order to effectively prevent accidents and promote aviation safety, ICAO revised 
the content of annex 13 in March of 1994. It suggests its state members to define 
"serious incident" and to thoroughly investigate them. 
"SERIOUS INCIDENT is an incident involving circumstances indicating that an 
accident nearly occurred" (Annex 13, P. 2). Namely, the difference between accidents 
and serious incidents is the result. For example, at about 1050 local time on February 
11,1991, an Interflug A310 while conducting an approach to Moscow's 
Sheremetyevo airport runway 25L initiated a go-around after being requested to do so 
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by Sheremetyevo tower. The go-around procedure was initiated with the No. 1 
autopilot in the "command" mode at an altitude of approximately 1,500 feet. The 
aeroplane experienced five stalls during the next several minutes of flight. This is a 
serious incident. 
Attachment D of ICAO Annex 13 lists 15 typical examples of incidents that are likely 
to be serious incidents as guidance to the definition of a serious incident. 
a) Near collisions requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision 
or an unsafe situation or when an avoidance action would have been 
appropriate. 
b) Controlled flight into terrain only marginally avoided. 
c) Aborted take-offs on a closed or engaged runway. 
d) Take-offs from a closed or engaged runway with marginal separation 
from obstacle(s). 
e) Landings or attempted landings on a closed or engaged runway. 
Gross failures to achieve predicted performance during take-off or 
initial climb. 
g) Fires and smoke in the passenger compartment, in cargo compartments 
or engine fires, even though such fires were extinguished by the use of 
extinguishing agents. 
h) Events requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew. 
i) Aircraft structural failures or engine disintegrations not classified as an 
accident. 
j) Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems seriously affecting 
the operation of the aircraft. 
k) Flight crew incapacitation in flight. 
1) Fuel quantity requiring the declaration of an emergency by the pilot. 
M) Take-off or landing incidents. Incidents such as undershooting, 
overrunning or running off the side of runways. 
11) System failures, weather phenomena, operations outside the approved 
flight envelop or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties 
controlling the aircraft. 
o) Failures of more than one system in a redundancy system mandatory for 
flight guidance and navigation. 
Although the 15 examples of incidents listed above are intended to define what 
serious incident is, they are not all encompassing and are subject to interpretation and 
judgement. 
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INCIDENT: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the 
operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. 
The definition of incident is adopted by many aircraft accident investigation 
organisations, such as the Air Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) in the UK; the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the USA; the Transportation Safety 
Board (TSB) in Canada; the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) in Australia, 
and the Air Accident Investigating Committee (AAIC) in Japan. 
2.1.2 Classification by Monetary Cost 
United States military services uses aircraft mishap to describe either accidents or 
incidents. The property damage includes the official estimate of damage to non- 
military property and is classified in terms of dollar costs as below (USAF 1990): 
Class A Mishap. A mishap resulting in: 
a) Total cost of $1,000,000 or more for property damage, or 
b) A fatality, or permanent total disability, or 
c) Destruction of, or damage beyond economical repair to, a military 
aircraft. 
Class B Mishap. A mishap resulting in: 
a) Total cost of $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000 for property 
damage, or 
b) A permanent partial disability, or 
c) Hospitalisation of five or more personnel. 
Class C Mishap. A mishap resulting in: 
a) Total damage which costs $10,000 or more, but less than $200,000. 
b) An it jury or occupational illness which results in a lost work-day case 
involving days away from work (i. e., 8 hours or greater). 
c) A mishap which does not meet the criteria above, but which requires 
reporting. 
There are standard injury, illness, and fatality costs showing the cost standards for 
military and civilian injuries and occupational illness. These standards are used to 
account for mishap cost and analysis. For example, the loss is calculated as 
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$1,100,000 if a rated officer dies, and $1,300,000 if he becomes a permanent total 
disability. Whereas the standard costs for the death of a civilian employee is 
$460,000, and for his permanent total disability, $385,000. The military definition of 
injury (fatal, permanent total, permanent partial) follows those adopted by the US 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). 
Airclaims, a leading insurance company in the UK, also uses cost loss to classify, 
what it called, "major partial losses" from the other categories, such as, fatal accident, 
total loss and passenger fatalities. The definition of major partial losses is as follows: 
An accident which so far as Airclaims has been able to ascertain, resulted in 
repair cost of not less than: 
a) $ 1,000,000 or 
b) 10% of the insured value of the aircraft (or in certain cases the 
estimated value of the aircraft). 
2.1.3 Accident definition of a selected Asian developing country5- Taiwan 
To suit their own needs and situations, developing countries usually adapted the 
aviation rules, regulations and codes of the developed countries, especially those with 
aircraft manufacturers. 
The following definition of aviation events in Taiwan was abstracted from the 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Code, Chapter 1, Articles 2 and 3. 
a) Accident: The same as the definition of ICAO. 
b) Incident: An aircraft occurrence with damage but no fatality. The six 
types of incident are: 
" an if jury or aircraft damage while engine is running; 
" in-flight fire without causing any damage; 
" engine failure or ma/fl ruction in flight; 
" flight control system malfunction or failure; 
" inability of any required flight crew member to perform normal flight 
duties as a result of it jury or illness; 
S Standard World Economic Outlook Groups classify countries into three groups by their aggregate 
Gross Domestic Production, total exports of goods and services, and total debt outstanding. The 
three major groups are industrial countries, developing countries, and countries in transition. In Asia, 
Japan and Singapore (taking effect on Jan 1,1996) are the only industrial countries, and the rest of 
them are developing countries, including Taiwan. 
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" an it jury or property damage of any ground crew member due to the 
falling of aircraft components or objects in flight. 
c) Hazard: An occurrence, other than an accident or an incident, associated 
with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety 
of operation. 
d) General event: Referring to general operational violation. 
It is obvious that the ICAO definition of damage and the US military classification of 
damage are totally different. ICAO uses the term "accident' 'to refer to major damage 
or serious injuries, whereas the US military adopts "mishap". To the latter, 
"accident" is used to describe the unavoidable "Acts of God". Taiwan's definition, 
though similar to that of ICAO, is not the same. Further discussion will be provided 
later in this Chapter about the problems resulting from the organisational or 
geographical variations in the definition of accidents. 
It is fairly simple to determine accident cost by adding all reportable damage, injury, 
and illness cost. Its disadvantages, as Wood (1992) argued, are that the dollar 
amounts need to be regularly adjusted to reflect the rate of inflation, and the figure 
reported is probably low in terms of the actual value. 
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2.2 The economics of safety 
2.2.1 A tremendous price: Cost of accidents 
The impact of an accident is striking; it can inflict on an airline's reputation, 
productivity and other commercial obligations. It is not possible to estimate the loss 
these effects bring forth. The consequences of any accident not only cannot be 
quantified but vary from case to case. What is certain is that these effects cannot be 
underestimated and that they have a major impact on any operation. 
There are two basic categories of accident costs: insured costs and uninsured costs. 
Traditionally safety specialists classified as direct and indirect costs. The older 
concept of indirect costs may be used interchangeably as the uninsured costs, but 
direct costs meant actual claims paid by insurance companies, commonly 
compensation payments and medical expense, and overlooked the difference between 
insurance premiums and recovered payments. Accordingly, safety specialists 
abandoned the old expressions and use the more precise terms "insured" and 
"uninsured" costs. 
Insured costs are the cost of workers' compensation insurance, usually referring to 
those covered by insurance companies against hull losses, property damage and 
personal liability. In general, the insured costs are simply the net amount of the 
insurance premiums. 
On average, the net insurance premiums will be large enough to cover the 
money paid for medical expenses on compensatory cases and compensation 
to the injured employee, as required by law, phis the expenses and profits of 
the insurance company in connection with that insurance. (Grimaldi and 
Simonds, P111) 
Unlike insured costs, uninsured costs must be estimated and cannot be recovered, but 
they may result in the raising of premiums. Typical insured and uninsured costs of an 
accident include: 
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INJURIES 
" Compensation for lost earnings 
" Medical and hospital cost 
Awards for permanent disabilities 
Rehabilitation costs 
Funeral charges 
" Pensions for dependants 
Insured Costs 
PROPERTY DAMAGE 
" Fire 
" Loss and damage 
" Use and occupancy 
" Public & Liability 
Uninsured Costs 
Insurance deductibles " Increased operating costs on remaining equipment 
Lost time and overtime " Cost of hiring and training replacements 
Legal fees resulting " Loss of spares or specialised equipment 
Increased insurance premiums " Loss of business and damage to reputation 
Cost of restoration of order " Reaction by crews leading to disruption of schedules 
Fines and citations " Loss of productivity of injured personnel 
Morale " Liability claims in excess of insurance 
Cost of corrective action " Cost of rental or lease of replacement equipment 
Loss of use of equipment " Corporate manslaughter/criminal liability 
Cost of the investigation " Overhead costs while production is stopped 
Unfavourable public relations " Time spent on injured workers welfare 
Training replacement worker " Decreased production of replacement 
Increased labour conflict 
Source: adapted from Flight Safety Digest, Dec. 1994, p. 3. and Beaty, 1995, p. 215 
Though tangible costs may be quantified, some intangible costs can acquire greater 
importance than the tangible costs. The intangible costs of accidents vary greatly 
from country to country, and their importance is not solely determined by economic 
consideration. When political consideration overrides the economic one, the 
monetary value is not the most critical factor. In countries where the overriding 
consideration is to avoid damage to the national image among the international 
community, the cost of an accident of the flag carriers is perceived as greater than the 
direct financial loss. Here is a good example. Due to the poor safety performance of 
Air China, China's flag carrier, most Asian businessmen would rather fly the more 
expensive and crowded Dragon Air to avoid risk when they are conducting their 
business in China. In some situations, schedule disruption following the damage of 
aircraft and equipment in an accident also might override the loss measured by 
accounting methods. In other situations, the impact of accidents on airline's 
passenger traffic, such as the public image and the chain effect on the loss of sale, is 
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considered more difficult to recover than the loss in accidents. For example, the 
monthly Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPKs) growth rate of China Airlines 
dropped dramatically for almost 25% after the accident at Nagoya, Japan, and it took 
approximately six months to return to normal (Airline Business 1994-95). There are 
two fundamental points that should be noted in relation to the cost of accidents: 
firstly, there are economic consequences of aviation safety; secondly, the costs and 
benefits of safety cannot be measured only in economic terms. 
2.2.2 Insurance cost for safety 
In 1994, some 340,000 clients from the aeronautics industry paid approximately $5 
billion in premiums to insure themselves against hull, liability and business 
interruption risks. Of the total premium volume, 1,750 millions dollars was paid by 
airlines (Swiss Reinsurance, 1996). It is more than one third of the direct premium 
volume. Over 50% of total volume derives from 460 clients who paid in excess of $1 
million per annum, and 200 of the clients are from major airlines. 
Though passenger liability settlements vary from developed countries to Third World, 
the costs remain an equally massive portion of the underwriting risk and will continue 
to grow if the accident curve cannot be turned down. Nowadays, increased claims 
made by passengers or their dependants who seek compensation from an airline, 
aircraft manufacturer or another associated party, not only will result in increased 
aircraft insurance premiums, but in turn will result in high purchase and operating 
costs. 
Figure 2.1 shows the world airline underwriting results from 1980 to 1994. British 
Aviation Insurance Group forecasts by the end of the decade $2 billion will be made 
to underwrite passenger liability costs. As a result, even aircraft insurers and 
underwriters could face $3 billion recovering losses in 10 years. 
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Figure 2.1 World Airline Underwriting Results (1980-1994) 
Source: British Aviation Insurance Group & Swiss Reinsurance 
Whether it is realised or not, it is the customers that are paying for the overall 
accident costs, including insurance premiums, product liability costs, as well as the 
lawsuits and settlements following many accidents. Singleton (1987) indicated that 
the overall cost of accidents in society is in the order of magnitude of 2 per cent of 
Gross National Production and that the costs of frequent lawsuits consume more than 
10 per cent of the gross earnings. 
In brief, the cost of accidents is far beyond to be afforded, not only because it is 
growing faster than the rate of inflation, but because it heightens the cost of safety, 
especially when an accident investigation is called for. 
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2.3 Treatment after aircraft accident 
2.3.1 The challenge for accident investigation 
Not only because global interdependence is gradually formed, but because many 
aircraft manufacturers and airlines are in alliance with their counterparts, aircraft may 
be designed, manufactured, and assembled, and served in different countries. It is 
also possible that an aircraft is based in one country, registered in another country, 
leased to a third country, and maintained and serviced in other countries (see figure 
2.2). 
ri: -- . ý. ýy1ý. 
:.. -i 
}' 
Wing final assembly/equipping: Deutsche Airbus 
Figure 2.2 A330/A340 production sharing 
Source : Airbus Industrie 
Therefore, it may be difficult to identify precisely where operational control and 
where responsibility for safety lies. In addition to aircraft, aircrews, such as pilots, 
first officers, and flight attendants, probably come from different countries. Aviation 
is such a global industry, you cannot really solve safety problems by just working in 
your own country. Once an accident happens, the accident investigation authority of 
the State of Occurrence might need to be prepared to work effectively with other 
accident investigation authorities from several nations, and to share information and 
experiences with one another. International co-operation is required to undertake a 
complete accident investigation, otherwise, the findings will be suspect and the 
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investigation may not produce credible recommendations to correct safety problems. 
In other words, the investigation can not extract useful lessons from the aeroplane 
accident to develop improvements and prevent future accidents. 
2.3.2 Notification of an accident 
In today's increasingly globalised environment, no matter contracting or non- 
contracting states of ICAO should understand international treaty and obey its 
standards and recommended practices. Chapters 4 and 5 of ICAO Annex 13 in the 
eighth edition amended in 1994 provide important notification about responsibilities 
of the states of occurrence, design, and manufacture. The notification is listed as 
follows: 
The Stale of Occurrence shall forward a notification of an accident or 
serious incident with a minimum of delay and by the most suitable and 
quickest means available to: 
a) the State of Registry; 
b) the State of the Operator; 
c) the State of Design; 
d) the State ofMan fachire; and 
e) the International Civil Aviation Organisation, when the aircraft involved 
is of a maximum mass of over 2,250 kg. 
However, when the State of Occurrence is not aware of a serious incident, 
the State of Registry or the State of the Operator, as appropriate, shall 
forward a notification of such an incident to the State of Design, the State of 
Manufacturer and the State of Occurrence. 
Upon receipt of the notification and a request by the State of Occurrence for 
participation, the State of Design and the State ofManufacture shall: 
a) in the case of an accident or serious incident to an aircraft of a 
maximum mass of over 100,000 kg, inform the State of Occurrence of 
1) the name of its accredited representative; and 
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2) whether the accredited representative will be present at the 
investigation and, if in the affirmative, the expected date of his or her 
arrival; and 
b) in the case of an accident or serious incident to aircraft other than those 
specified in a) above, inform the State of Occurrence whether it will 
appoint an accredited representative. If such a representative is 
appointed the same information required under a) 1) and 2) shall be 
provided. 
If accidents or serious incidents occur outside the territory of any state, the State of 
Registry is responsible for the conduct of the investigation. However, it may delegate 
the whole or any part of the investigation to another State by mutual arrangement and 
consent. States nearest the scene of accident in international waters are obliged to 
provide assistance to the State conducting and controlling the investigation. The 
ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation (Doc 6920) provides information in 
investigation procedures and technical guidance. Furthermore, its appendix lists the 
countries which may provide expert assistance and facilities for major accident 
investigation. 
2.3.3 Cross-border co-operation 
Generally speaking, countries which have large aviation manufacturers own relatively 
large safety organisations and accident investigation agencies. Countries with limited 
budgets and resources should consider what capability they have and give priority to 
what is urgent and important, such as regulating aircraft accident emergency 
operational procedures and maintaining good working relationships with foreign 
investigation authorities. 
What maintaining relationships means is a recognition of the need for taking the time 
and effort to work together. It includes an acknowledgement of sharing mission and 
responsibility in dealing with both international and domestic accidents, a willingness 
to establish the necessary channels of communication, and a commitment to 
participate in the development of the required procedures. As to domestic accidents, 
such international co-operation is needed, especially in those countries with 
insufficient facilities and fewer experts. The act of interconnection essentially shows 
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a recognition and understanding of the global interdependence. However, developing 
countries or countries with poorer safety performance are apt to act conservatively on 
sharing safety information. Thus, the initial contact with colleagues from the 
investigation agencies of other countries all too often begins with the notification of 
an accident. 
2.4 Application of ICAO documents 
Besides ICAO Doc. 6920 mentioned in the previous part, ICAO Doc. 7603, 
Information on National Civil Aviation Departments, is also a referential manual. It 
provides an informative directory of aviation authorities in member states of ICAO. 
It gives the names, position titles, telephone and facsimile numbers, mail and telex 
addresses and, in many cases, considerable information on the organisation structure 
for key civil aviation offices in each state. This information helps aviation authorities 
to know how counterpart agencies in other countries are organised, who their key 
officials are, and how to contact them. Their organisation structure also exposes 
whether or not the agency in question is independent of the civil aviation 
administration and that state's department of justice, for autonomy in civil aviation 
accident investigation authorities can ensure a position of objectivity. This may have 
an important influence on the way the agency carries out its investigation when a 
serious accident occurs. 
The aim of international co-operation is to establish a robust conduit through which 
investigators may share information and experiences. By studying ICAO Doc 7603, 
an investigating agent can decide which countries are of primary interest. Then, 
formulating action plans, such as opening a dialogue, developing understanding of 
each other's mission and objectives, can be followed. Because the main purpose of 
co-operation is to advance aviation safety, in many cases the initial contact is mainly 
to facilitate mutual understanding and discuss assistance likely to be needed and 
provided in the future. 
Once an accident or incident occurs, and if the country of occurrence knows about the 
other countries' facilities and capabilities and has built up confidence with their 
investigation authorities, the investigators of both sides are likely to contact in person, 
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or over the phone, and sincerely discuss where problems lie with the course of 
investigation. Problems needed to be discussed are, for example, how to deal with 
the press and TV media especially on releasing information apt to be sensitive and 
possibly misinterpreted, how to conduct the investigation and what procedures should 
be given priorities. This is an ideal situation, but if it can be achieved, it will greatly 
benefit the progress of investigation and assist accident prevention in the future. 
2.5 Measurement of airline safety 
Constructing a measurement of airline safety is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it 
provides information about comparative safety performance among regions or 
airlines, and helps both aviation personnel and passengers to assess the possibility of 
flying risk in terms of regions and types of aircraft. Secondly, it serves as a useful 
starting point for more detailed analysis of why safety performance varies so much 
across carriers, nations, and regions. 
2.5.1 Sources of possible error in the collection of accident statistics 
Statistics play an important role in accident prevention. To prevent misleading and 
misrepresentation, some sources of error hindering a uniform system of accident 
reporting should be noticed: 
a) Geographical or organisational variations in the definition of certain 
accidents. 
Different definitions, as described in section 2.1, may yield different 
statistics. The obstacle will not be overcome until all jurisdictions 
employ similar definition for classifying accidents. 
b) Deliberate or negligent suppression. 
There are several forms of suppression, one of which is administrative 
self-protection. In an organisation or country with a higher accident 
rate, the purpose of keeping the accident rate down might distort 
accident statistical analysis. However, most of these errors are either 
partly or totally unavoidable because there are certain problems peculiar 
to data gathering. 
c) Lack of uniformity in collecting and recording techniques. 
Tallying the number of known accidents is more complicated than it 
would seem to be. Conceivably, reports from under developing 
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countries might reveal a lower rate of accident occurrence than do 
reports from developed countries. 
2.5.2 Measurement of accident rate 
Traditionally, airline safety statistics have used (1) flying-hour measurement, (2) 
departure-based measurement and (3) seat-kilometre measurement as exposure bases 
to calculate accident rates. 
The first measurement constructs accident rates by flying hours, while the second and 
the third measurement construct accident rates respectively by the number of flights 
and the distance of available seats travelled. When calculating rates, sets of data used 
must be compatible and statistics must be used with caution in order to provide valid 
means of comparison. With the advent of wide-bodied aircraft, not only the number 
of available seats has increased but the duration of each flight has been lengthened. 
Moreover, if flying hours and seat/kilometres are measured to compare accident rates, 
short-haul flights will have higher accident rates than long-haul flights. Take the 
Taiwan case as an example, all domestic flights are less than 300 miles, the 
adaptation of flying hours or aircraft-kilometres to calculate accident rates will not be 
reasonable when compared with world-wide accident rates. In addition, most 
accidents occur on phases of takeoff, initial climb, final approach, and landing, 
irrespective of how long each flight has been airborne, how far it has flown, or how 
many seats it has. Accordingly, it may be more appropriate to compare numbers of 
accidents with numbers of flights than the numbers of flight hours or seat/kilometres. 
Boeing's statistics of world-wide commercial jet accidents for 1959-1993 (see figure 
2.3) shows that taking off and landing are the most dangerous moments during the 
flight time. These phases are what we call "time to cross your fingers". Although 
takeoff, initial climb, final approach, and landing comprise 6% of the flight time, 70 
% of accidents occur during these four phases. This is called the "Window of 
Safety". When we safely pass the Window of Safety, flying danger is reduced 
substantially. As a result, most aviation safety professionals adopt one million 
departures rather than total flying hours or seat/kilometres to calculate accident rates. 
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World Commercial Jet Accidents 
All Accidents 1959.1993 
Exposure percentage based on an average flight duration of 1.6 hours. 
Excludes: Sabotage, Military and Action, Turboprop Aircraft and Aircraft of former USSR 
Percentage of accidents 
Load, Takeoff 
taxi, 12.8% 
unload 
5.0 
Initial Climb Cruise Descent Initial Final 
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5.8% 6.4% approach approach 
78% 6.6% 19.8% 
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Source: Boeing 
Figure 2.3 Ratio of Flight Time and Accidents 
2.5.3 Risk in air travel 
Table 2.1 shows the fatal accident record of the world-wide "scheduled" commercial 
airlines for 1977-1993. The data does not include CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) and China. The first three columns give the region, the number 
of fatal crashes, and the number of fatalities. The fourth column gives the average 
percentage of passengers killed in these fatal accidents. The fifth column in the table 
shows the odds per 1 million flight departures of being involved in an accident in 
which someone is killed. The final column gives the resulting chances per 1 million 
flight departures of an individual passenger being killed in airline travel. As shown in 
the table, there is considerable variation among regions. Australia and New Zealand 
have the best safety record, with the chances of being killed in an aircraft crash about 
0.7 in a million. For North America, the chance of being killed was about 0.8 in a 
million, exemplary safety records. Unfortunately, safety performance is markedly 
worse in some regions of the world. The chances of being killed in an aircraft crash 
in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America were 4.3,4.7 and 6.6 times worse than in 
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Australasia. Africa had the worst safety record, with a death risk per flight of about 8 
per 1 million, more than 10 times worse than Australasia. 
Table 2.1 
Accident and Fatality Record by Region, Scheduled Passenger Flights 
1977-1993 
Percent of Fatal Death Risk 
Number Number Passengers Accidents per 
of Fatal of Killed per 1 Million 1 Million 
Region Accidents Fatalities in Crash Departures Departures 
Asia 76 3281 72 4.96 3.47 
North America 72 2092 66 1.25* 0.82** 
Latin America 71 2614 81 6.16 4.91 
Europe 73 3303 68 2.69 1.82 
Australasia 5 31 72 1.04* 0.74** 
Middle East 19 1432 67 4.61 3.18 
Africa 35 1185 74 10.88 8.05 
Source: Compiled from Flight International, WAAC, ICAO's ADREP, various years, and 
Oster, 1989. 
* The North American and Australasia accident rate is lower than the Latin American, Asian, 
African, and Middle Eastern rates at the 90 percent confidence level. 
** The North American and Australasia death risk is lower than the Latin American, Asian, 
African, and Middle East rates at the 90 percent confidence level. 
Figure 2.4 shows the statistics of the accident rates of "international scheduled" 
passenger flights from 1984 to 1993 in the major geographic regions of the world as 
compiled from ICAO, Flight International, and World Airline Accident Summary of 
UK-CAA. The total of 259 accidents were counted, not including CIS and China. 
The accidents rates are computed by per million departures. There is also a 
considerable variation in the safety record among regions. Four sets of figures are 
listed under each region. The first set of figure is the accident rate of operator's home 
country. The second, the accident rate of operator's region. The third, the accident 
of other regions. And the forth, the accident rate of foreign aircraft accidents. Take 
Japan Airlines (JAL) as an example, the accident rate of JAL occurring in Japan, the 
operator's home country, was 6.21. The accident rate of JAL occurring in any Asian 
countries other than Japan, such as Singapore or Hong Kong, was 2.98. The accident 
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rate of JAL occurring in other regions, such as North America or Europe, was 2.25. 
The accident rate of airlines from other regions occurring in Asia was 7.95. 
According to the figure, North American (3.83), Australasian (3.76), and European 
(3.53) accident rates in the operator's home country from 1984 to 1993 were lower 
than the Latin American (13.12) and African (21.31) accident rates. Also, 
international scheduled passenger flights to/from North America (0.28) and 
Australasia (1.88) had better safety records than any other region. The accident rate 
of Australasian airlines occurring in other regions was 1.88, the best record among 
those of the other regions. With regard to foreign airline accidents, the rate for North 
America (1.73) was much lower than any other regions' rates. The last set of figures 
also showed that foreign airline accidents were more likely to occur in developing 
regions than in developed regions during that period. 
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2.5.4 Jet carriers safety performance by regions 
The data of figures 2.5 and 2.6 is extracted from "The Jet Operator" of Airclaims, an 
insurance company in the UK. These figures indicate the commercial jet aircraft 
accident rates covering the 5-year period from 1990 through 1994 and the 10-year 
period from 1985 through 1994 among regions of the world and especially in the 
areas of Taiwan (main study area) and China. 
It must be pointed out that there are differences among the safety data collected by 
ICAO, IATA, aircraft manufacturers, or insurance companies. As mentioned before, 
these data sources have their own limitations and disintegration, because initial data 
reporting from some nations is inconsistent and often sketchy and there are some 
reporting biases and differences in numbers. Also, the wide disparity in accident 
definitions and measurements often causes statistical variation and makes it dubious 
to compare data from different sources without evaluating the accuracy and 
limitations of the various data first. 
Aircraft accidents have been highlighted by the media, and this makes the public 
sensitive to the high-visibility accidents rather than to the actual accident rates. 
Despite the almost 100-fold improvement in safety, there was still about 1,000 
fatalities and 40 fatal accidents in an average year for the last decade (Flight 
International, January 1994). 
It is expected that the growth of air traffic will continue to expand in the next decade. 
Based on past ten years' accident rate for expected traffic growth, the forecasting of 
fatal accidents and fatalities by the year 2010 are presented in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. 
The number of fatal accidents are predicted to increase from 57 in 1995 to 85 
maximum in 2010, and fatalities are expected to grow from 1143 to 2156 maximum 
during the same period. Boeing also shows a "pessimistic" forecasting. It predicts 
that the annual hull losses will reach up to 53 times by the year 2000, about once a 
week. Therefore, if accident rates do not continue to improve, fatalities are likely to 
be higher and much unacceptable by the public. 
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Figure 2.5 Airline Accident Rates in Various Regions 
Western-built Jet Airlines (Major Accidents, 1985-1994) 
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Figure 2.6 Airline Accident Rates in Various Regions 
Western-built Jet Airlines (Fatal Accidents, 1985-1994) 
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2.5.5 The safest way to travel: Air transport 
Although the growth of air travel may increase accident rates, air transportation 
remains the safest form of commercial travel available today in terms of travelling 
mileage. The statistics of transport gives a clear comparison between the safety of the 
various types of travel. The first column in table 2.2 gives the modes of air and road 
travel, the second column shows the fatality rates per 100 billion kilometres, and the 
final column gives the fatality rates per 100 million hours. Obviously air travel is 
safer than any form of road travel in terms of kilometres travelled. Though the 
fatality rates of air travel is not so distinct as compared by travelling hours, air travel 
is still as safe as car travel and 20 times safer than travelling by motorcycle. 
Table 2.2 Passenger Fatality Rates by Mode 
Mode 
Passenger 
kilometres 
Passenger 
hours 
Air 0.03 15 
Bus or coach 0.04 0.1 
Rail 0.1 5 
Car 0.4 15 
Water 0.6 12 
Pedal cycle 4.3 60 
Foot 5.3 20 
Motor cycle 9.7 300 
Fatality rate per 100 million km/hours 
Source: Collings, Transport Statistics UK 1994 
Data period: air, rail, water 1975-1992; bus or coach 1988/9- 
1992/3; others 1992 
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2.6 Analysis of accident contributing factors 
2.6.1 Analytical methods to accident investigation 
Overall safety records are a useful index to identify safety performance between 
regions or airlines of the world and can be useful for assessing whether safety is 
improving or worsening over time. However, little understanding is provided about 
why safety has been worse in some segments than in others, and so is little guidance 
about where to focus efforts to improve safety. Thus, there is a need to select a more 
critical approach beginning with classifying accidents according to their cause and 
comparing the distribution of causes both over time and across segments of the 
industry. 
For many years, focus has been on assigning a single cause for accidents, but the 
problem is that many accidents have several contributing factors and these factors, 
though not the last link in the chain of events, are more reliable to reflect actual 
causes. Nowadays, most advanced aircraft and aviation systems have functions of 
redundancy and fool-proof systems to avoid the occurrence of accidents. Therefore, a 
single failure is unlikely to cause an accident. Despite the primary cause, the 
occurrence of an accident must involve other system malfunction or failure. Consider 
the example where an aircraft engine fails during a take-off, running on a wet 
runway, and the pilot fails to take the proper action to land the plane safely, resulting 
in its veering off the runway. Obviously, both the engine failure and the pilot error 
caused the accident, and the wet runway made the situation worse. There would have 
been no accident if either the engine had not failed or the pilot had acted correctly. 
The most common accident analytical approaches are "Events Sequencing" and "All 
Cause/Multiple Cause". The approach of "Events Sequencing" is to select the cause 
that initiated the sequence of events leading up to an accident - in this case engine 
failure. While the other approach of all cause/multiple cause emphasises the need to 
identify the primary cause which is most responsible for the accident or after which 
the accident was inevitable - in this case the failure of the pilot to take proper action. 
It is obvious that both approaches oversimplify accident situations. Ferry in his book 
of 1988, Modern Accident Investigation and Analysis, distinguishes over twenty 
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types of accident analysis approaches. However, there is no one approach better than 
another. It is a matter for the investigation agencies to seek better approaches to suit 
their needs and capabilities when conducting an investigation. Below is the list of 
analytical methods used in accident investigation: 
" Events sequencing. 
" Known precedent. 
" All cause/multiple cause. 
" Codes, standards, and regulations (CSR's) 
" The four M's of man, machine, media, management (add mission for a 
fifth). 
" Re-enactment. 
" Reconstruction (of wreckage). 
" Simulation. 
" Epidemiological. 
" Hazard analysis documentation. 
" Inferential conclusions. 
" Program evaluation review technique (PERT). 
" Critical path method (CPM). 
" Failure mode and effect analysis (FEMA). 
" Technique for human error rate prediction (THERP). 
" Fault tree analysis (FTA). 
" Change analysis. 
" Management oversight and risk tree (MORT). 
" Multilinear events sequencing (MIES). 
" Technique of operations review (TOR). 
" Scenario modelling. 
" Preliminary hazard analysis. 
2.6.2 Causal factors in accidents in Asia and Taiwan 
The occurrence of accidents are mostly caused by multiple factors- either active or 
latent factors. Though for each accident a judgement has been made of the apparent 
or probable causal factors, it should be noticed that the judgement on such limited 
reported details cannot be assumed always reliably to reflect the actual causes but a 
useful indicator of the relative importance of the various factors. 
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Table 2.3 and 2.4 indicate for each category the ranking causal factors to fatal 
aviation accidents in Asia from 1983 through 1992, and aviation accidents and 
incidents in Taiwan from 1989 through 1994. The number of accidents where a given 
factor has been judged to have occurred is shown in the last column. The accident 
investigation reports of Asia are taken from aircraft manufacturers, related CAA and 
international civil organisations. As to Taiwan, its source is from the CAA, Taiwan. 
The data of Asia includes commercial jets only, and the accident abstract is listed in 
appendix A. 
Table 2.3 
Causal Factors Attributed to Fatal Accidents 
(1983-1992) 
Category Factor No of Accidents 
where factor 
occurs 
Crew Failure to follow regulations or procedures 21 
Failure to cross-check / co-ordinate 19 
Lack of situational awareness 17 
Omission of action / inappropriate action 13 
Flight handling 9 
Fast / high on approach 7 
Lack of qualification / training 6 
Language barrier 3 
Action on wrong control / instrument 2 
Slow / low on approach 2 
ATC / Ground aids Incorrect or inadequate instruction / advice 4 
Failure to provide separation 1 
Lack of ground aids 1 
Aircraft systems / System failure - reduce controllability 3 
Engine / Structure System failure - other 3 
Engine failure 1 
Structural failure 1 
Environment Runway condition (slippery, standing water etc. ) 11 
Thunderstorm / heavy rain 9 
Poor visibility 7 
Wind shear / turbulence 1 
Bird strike 1 
Failings leading Collision with level ground / airport 6 
to impact with Collision with high ground 3 
terrain 
Each accident may have more than one Causal Factor. 
The total number of accidents is 48 and the average of causal factors per accident is 3.38. 
Source: ICAO, Asian CAAs and aircraft manufacturers 
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Table 2.4 
Causal Factors Attributed to Accidents. Incidents 
Category Factor No of Accidents 
where factor 
occurs 
Crew Failure to cross-check / co-ordinate 17 
Failure to follow regulations or procedures 15 
Lack of situational awareness 14 
Omission of action / inappropriate action 6 
Lack of qualification / training 6 
Flight handling 4 
Fast / high on approach 3 
Failure in look-out 2 
Slow / low on approach 1 
Environment Poor visibility 5 
Runway condition (slippery, standing water etc. ) 3 
Engine / Engine failure 2 
Structure 
Structural failure 1 
Each accident may have more than one Causal Factor. 
The number of accidents is 3 and the average of causal factors per accident is 2.82. The number of 
incidents is 25. 
Source: CAA, Taiwan. 
A total of 48 accidents has been considered in Asia and 162 causal factors allocated in 
all, an average of about 3.38 per accident. With regard to Taiwan for 1989-1994, 
there were 28 accidents and incidents with an average of 2.82 allocated causal factors. 
"Failure to follow regulations or procedures", "failure to cross-check/co-ordinate", 
"lack of situational awareness" and "omission of action / inappropriate action" are the 
most frequently occurring factors, all of which are listed by the "Crew" category. 
"Failure to follow regulations or procedures" is judged to have been a factor in 21 out 
of the 48 accidents (44%) in Asia and 15 out of 28 accidents (54%) in Taiwan. 
"Failure to cross-check / co-ordinate" is also striking with a total of 19 accidents 
(40%) in Asia and 17 accidents (61%) in Taiwan. All of these suggest that Crew 
Resource Management and training, human factors, professionalism, flight deck skills 
and operational procedures are the key areas to consider in reducing the number of 
accidents. 
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2.6.3 The relationships between aircraft accidents and pilot performance 
It is well known that human error, especially pilot error, accounts for the majority of 
aircraft accidents. In order to explain the relationships between aircraft accidents and 
pilot performance, a conceptual model was created as shown in Figures 2.9-2.11. The 
left curve of the twin-peak model represents the environmental demands of pilot 
performance, and the right curve represents the actual pilot performance.. 
Environmental demands refer to the weather, aircraft condition, air traffic control, 
airport facilities, etc. (Figure 2.9) Whereas actual pilot performance include training, 
pilot's physical and psychological condition, crew co-ordination, and so on (Figure 
2.10). The shaded area shows the possibilities of occurring accidents/incidents 
(Figure 2.11). In other words, accidents/incidents occur when pilot's performance 
does not meet the demand of the environment. 
f(e, ) f(e2) f(e, ) ............. f(eo) 
Weather 
Low High 
Figure 2.9 Environmental Demands of Pilot Performance 
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2f(Pý) 
f(P2) f(P, ) 
Training Pilot's Physical Pilot's Psychological 
Condition Condition 
Low High 
Figure 2.10 Actual Pilot Performance 
Environmental v Actual Pilot 
Demands Performance 
Risk Area 
" Accidents / Incidents " may occur when environmental demands 
exceed actual pilot performance. 
f(PQ) 
Figure 2.11 The Twin-Peak Model: An Explanation of Why Aircraft 
Accidents Occur 
Mathematically, the twin-peak model can be expressed as follows: 
f (R): The shaded area where the f (E) and f (P) distributions overlap is the chance 
of "accident" or "incident"; 
f (E) -f (P) > 0, or 
45 
Chapter 2 Airline Safety Record and its Measurements 
f (el, e2, e3, ... en) -f 
(PI) p2, p3, ... pn) >0 
f (E) °f fei, e2, e3, ... en) 
f (P) =f (Pi) P2, P3, ... Pn) 
where 
f (E) = Environmental demands for pilot performance 
f (P) = Actual pilot performance 
On 4 November, 1993 at about 0336 a China Airline Boeing 747-409B ran off the 
runway and entered the sea while landing. On the day of the accident, Hong Kong 
International Airport was affected by a strong gusty wind. In addition, it was raining 
and the runway was wet. Nevertheless, the airport didn't close and many aeroplanes 
had landed successfully. The investigation report (CAD, Hong Kong, 1995) found 
that the aircraft was capable of being landed normally under the weather conditions, 
and concluded that the captain might be the contributing factor to this accident. 
This accident explains that when the environment's demand is almost the same, the 
pilot's performance can result in different outcomes. Pilot's performance is a 
variable; different pilots have different performance variance. 
According to the model, there are two ways for safety management to reduce the risk 
of accidents/incidents. The first is to promote pilot performance and the other is to 
reduce environmental demands. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTEMPORARY SAFETY THINKING AND ITS 
APPLICATION 
"There are truths on this side of the Pyrenees which are falsehoods on the 
other. " 
----------- Blaise Pascal 
3. Overview 
The previous chapter of accident analysis highlights the fact that pilot error has 
directly contributed to the majority of accidents. However, if pilot error is assumed 
to be the only contributory factor in these incidents, the lessons learnt are too narrow 
to reveal the underlying root cause(s). In consequence, many warning signs are likely 
to be neglected and numerous opportunities for making safety improvements are lost. 
Past accident investigations tend to explore the extent of technical causes and seldom 
look deeply into the contributions of management and organisation. A better 
approach is to adopt a broader and more penetrating investigation procedures. 
How do management and organisation affect airline safety? Scientists have made 
great efforts when dealing with human factors, but the focus has always been on 
exploring how individual behaviour and attitude influence safety. Even though safety 
professionals in both civil and military aviation have perceived that management and 
organisation influence to accidents, it is not until recently that studies have confirmed 
that these issues have a profound role in the occurrence of accidents, especially in 
today's high-tech industry. 
This chapter addresses the role of individual mistakes as being the indicators of more 
general these failures, and emphasises the importance of incident investigation and 
reporting in detecting system failure. The remaining sections of the chapter discuss 
the characteristics of safety culture, their links with accident rates. The necessity for 
the coherent safety documentation for ensuring system safety is also indicated. 
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3.1 Human failures in performance 
Accident investigation is concerned with locating the cause or causes of accidents. 
Traditionally, these causes are defined as unsafe acts or unsafe conditions (see figure 
3.1). In Chapter 2, the analysis of accident contributing factors has shown clearly that 
a high percentage of accidents are caused by unsafe acts. Precisely, most accidents 
are contributed to by human error. Hence, it is a reasonable supposition that 
understanding the primary causes of human error or unsafe acts, will greatly facilitate 
accident prevention. After all, accidents are intimately bound up with planned actions 
that fail to achieve their intention. If more details of how such failures occur were 
known, lessons could be applied to organisational planning and accident prevention 
programs in general. 
Event Accident event I 
Causes 
Unsafe act II Unsafe condition 
Figure 3.1 Backtracking of Accidents 
Errors mean different things to different people. From a theoretical aspect, errors 
should be collected, cultivated and categorised, as they offer important clues about the 
covert control processes underlying routine human actions. In other words, a better 
understanding of mental processes can help in predicting and reducing dangerous 
errors. Ernst Mach (1976) put it well: "Knowledge and error flow from the same 
mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other. " 
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3.1.1 Classification of human failures 
Human failures are errors or violations committed by those in direct contact with the 
air transport system: pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance mechanics and the 
like. 
Error, in general, can be described as being of three primary types: slips, lapses and 
mistakes. Slips and lapses refer to actions deviating from current intention due to 
execution failures and/or storage failures, whereas mistakes occur when an intentional 
plan is inadequate for achieving its desired outcome. Slips and lapses stem from the 
unintended activation of largely automatic procedural routines; however, mistakes 
Primary Error Type Performance Level 
Mistakes 
Rule-based Level 
Knowledge-based Level 
Lapses 
Slips 
Skill-based Level 
Figure 3.2 Relating Three Primary Error Types To 
Rasmussen's Three Performance Levels. 
arise from failures of the higher-order cognitive processes involved in judging 
available information, setting objectives and deciding upon the means to achieve 
them. Essentially, slips and lapses are routine actions, and mistakes are problem- 
solving activities. However, the use of a simple slips/mistakes distinction is not 
sufficient to capture all of the basic error types. Some errors fall between the simple 
slip and mistake categories. They possess properties common to both. To resolve 
this problem, mistakes can be subdivided into rule-based mistakes and knowledge- 
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based mistakes. Figure 3.2 proclaims the relationship between the three error types 
and Rasmussen's three levels of performance. 
Errors are unintended and arise primarily from information problems. They can be 
reduced by improving the quality and the delivery of necessary information within the 
workplace. Differing from errors, violations are deviations from safe operating 
practices, procedures, standards or rules. Most of the time, such deviations are 
deliberate and associated with motivational problems. Violations, thus, require 
motivational and organisational remedies. 
The three performance levels, addressed by Rasmussen also provide a principled basis 
for classifying procedural violations (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Relating error types and violation types to performance 
levels 
Performance levels Error types Violation types 
Skill-based Slips and lapses Routine violations 
Rule-based RB mistakes Situational violations 
Knowledge-based KB mistakes Exceptional violations 
Notwithstanding that there is no universally agreed classification of human failures, 
the existing taxonomies can be used in an attempted to identify causal mechanisms. 
" Skill-based slips (and lapses): Skill-based behaviour occurs when an incoming 
piece of information is connected directly to an automatic response which can be 
stored patterns of pre-programmed instructions. Errors at this level can be 
grouped into two modes: inattention (omitted checks) and overattention 
(mistimed checks). Inattention refers to the failure to make an attentional check at 
critical nodes, particularly when the current intention is to deviate from common 
practice. Overattention occurs when an attentional check is made at an 
inappropriate moment during a routine action sequence. Such mistimed 
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monitoring is most likely to occur immediately following a period of `absence' 
from the task in hand. 
Slips and lapses are associated with the following three kinds of executive failure: 
- Attentional slip is the failure to monitor the current intention and proceed 
along the customary routine actions, often following a change in either 
intentions or the surrounding circumstances. 
- Memory lapse is the failure to execute an intended action, usually after some 
delay intervenes. In other words, it is an absent-minded error. 
- Perceptual error occurs because the recognition schemata accept look-alike 
for the intended object. In a highly routinised set of action, such a perceptual 
error is likely to occur because of the unnecessity to invest the same amount of 
attention in the matching process. 
On the 10th January 1992, for example, an inexperienced first officer of the 
Boeing 737 made a hard landing at Madras, India, resulting in the right main gear 
collapsing and the right engine being dragging on the runway for about 6000 feet 
(Boeing, 1994). 6 This accident was the result of a skill-based slip. 
" Rule-based mistakes: Rule-based mistakes involve the application of pre- 
packaged but inappropriate solutions to problems that people have either 
encountered many times before, or which they have been trained to handle. 
Errors at this level are associated with the misclassification of situations leading to 
the application of the wrong rule, or with the incorrect recall of procedures. 
Problem can occur here when anything requires some alternation of the current 
routine behaviour. Rule-based mistakes divide into two broad categories: the 
misapplication of normally good rules, and the application of bad rules (Maurino 
et al, 1995) 
6 Because of the limitation of data collection, some accident investigation reports collected from aircraft 
manufacturers are unofficial and used on a restricted basis in the thesis. However, where conflicts occur 
between the unofficial information and the final official reports, the official reports must be considered 
authoritative and take precedence. 
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- Misapplication of good rules. A `good rule' is one that has proven perfectly 
adequate in a certain circumstance. The chances are that it is wrongly applied 
on a significantly exceptional condition sharing many common features with 
the usual problem situation. In other words, the misapplication of good rules 
arises from a failure to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate 
problem situations. 
- The application of bad rules. Bad rules arise from encoding difficulties or 
from deficiencies in the action component. In the case of the former, features 
of a particular situation are either not encoded or are misrepresented in the 
conditional component of the rule. The latter is the application of wrong, 
inelegant or inadvisable rules to solve a problem. Though use of a less-than- 
ideal way of tackling problems reach its aims most of the time, it can lead to a 
more acute problems later. 
The accident at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on the 18th December 1983 resulted 
from rule-based mistakes. The Airbus A300 impacted trees and terrain 120 
metres short of the runway during final approach. It was concluded that the flight 
crew not only failed to follow procedural requirements, but these was insufficient 
monitoring during the approach in VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions), so 
that the approach was continued to below the MDA (Minimum Descent Altitude) 
without having positive visual references. (ICAO Circular 196-AN/119) 
Knowledge-based mistakes: Knowledge-based mistakes occur when a person is 
attempting to solve a novel problem (i. e. one for which his or her training and/or 
experience has not provided a pre-programmed solution). This entails using 
conscious analytical processes and stored knowledge to reason what the problem 
is and what will solve it. Errors at this level stem from the limited capacity of 
working memory and the use of incomplete or inaccurate mental models of the 
problem situation. 
The following example illustrates a knowledge-based mistake. In August 1994, 
an Airbus 300-600 overran the runway at Cheju, Korea whilst landing in flap 
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configuration 15/20 from an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to a 
9,800 feet runway7. The captain failed to recognise that a hazardous situation 
would be created by touching down coupled with significant windshear and heavy 
turbulence, so he selected a lower than normal Slat/Flap setting and increased the 
approach speed (Airbus, 1995). 
" Violations at the skill-based level: Violations at the skill-based level often 
involve the application of something quickly and simply rather than following the 
proper procedure or rules. The routine use of such violations are promoted when 
they are rarely punished or compliance with rules is seldom rewarded. 
" Violations at the rule-based level: Situational violations occur when current but 
unallowable actions are still carried out to achieve their ends, in the belief that 
they will not result in bad consequences, despite the fact that the actions have 
been prescribed and some modifications have been made to incorporate the 
lessons learned in the past incidents and accidents. Rule-based violations are seen 
very often when their benefits outweigh the possible costs. 
" Violations at the knowledge-based level: Exceptional violations involve 
unexpected activities taking place in a novel or rare situation, especially where 
there is unlikely to be any procedural guidance or training to solve the problems. 
For example, on 4th August 1984, a BAC 1-11 overran into shallow seawater at 
Tacloban, Philippines, because the captain deviated to the right of the final 
approach track in order to show a war shrine to a passenger whom he had invited 
into the cockpit (British Aerospace, 1985). 
The aircraft encountered landing/touchdown difficulties due to strong wind or possibly windshear. It landed 
long on runway and overran the runway, crashed through turf and impacted a drainage ditch. Just prior to 
touchdown and just before the aircraft overran the runway, it was found that the First Officer (PNF) 
interfered with the Captain's (PF) ability to control the aircraft by making inputs on the controls. The 
outcome was that all 150 passengers egressed the aircraft without injury, and that all 10 crew members 
escaped the aircraft. However, 8 cabin crew members sustained minor injuries. 
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Figure 3.3 A Summary of the Varieties of Unsafe Acts 
Besides the basic classification of human failures based on Rasmussen's performance 
levels, a more heuristic classification is used in the Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction (THERP). In its data base, unsafe acts are classified into the following 
taxonomy: 
. Errors of Omission: Failures to perform actions to maintain the defences, such as 
act or step omitted, failing to start emergency equipment, a failure to carry out the 
required action or entire task. For instance, on 19th June 1988 at Delhi, India, a 
Boeing 737-200 made a normal, straight-in visual approach in VMC weather but 
landed with all landing gear retracted. The crew subsequently admitted pulling 
the gear warning circuit breaker and omitting portions of the landing checklist. 
" Errors of Commission: Actions that cause or exacerbate the abnormal event, such 
as initiating a sequence of events/incidents, act carried out inadequately, act 
carried out in wrong sequence, act carried out at the wrong time (too early or too 
late), error of quality as too little or too much. 
- Selection error (selects wrong control, misposition control, issue wrong 
command) 
- Sequence error (action carried out in wrong order) 
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- Time error (too early or too late) 
- Qualitative error (too little or too much) 
" Violations: Unrequired actions carried out instead of, or in addition to, what is 
required. On the 2nd June 1983, a Fokker 28 ran off the end of the runway 
following a rejected takeoff refusal at Tanjung Karang, South Sumatrera, 
Indonesia. The reason for the takeoff aborted was that the crew did not follow the 
checklist, leaving the elevator trim at 1 unit nose down, which caused elevator 
control forces to be excessively heavy during rotation (Fokker, 1984). 
3.1.2 The last cause of aircraft accident: Pilot factor 
Active failures are unsafe acts associated with the performance of those in direct 
contact with the system. Usually, pilots are at the sharp end of the aviation system. 
Statistics clearly suggest that among human failures, pilot error accounts for the 
majority of accidents, and that the repeated finding of pilot factors as being the cause 
of accidents seems to have little effect on the prevention of future accidents. 
In some parts of world, the focus of accident investigations has too often been on 
apportioning the possible cause to those closest to the accident, especially when 
everything else has been ruled out except for the pilot. Even though slips, lapses and 
mistakes are found to explain the unsafe acts which might trigger the accident, little is 
done to explain how and why these errors occur. The real question, however, is 
whether the root causes are actually initiated by pilots - the front-line operators or 
whether they stem from wider considerations. 
Unlike technological causes of accident, pilot factor causes are not apt to be proved 
scientifically. They are often based upon conjecture and speculation, because pilot 
error seems to occur randomly and investigators have found it difficult to understand 
why these qualified and experienced pilots had difficulty coping with the 
circumstances leading to the accident. Hence, efforts to reduce or eliminate such 
random events may be ineffective. An alternative approach is to focus the accident 
prevention effort on investigating all aspects, that is, on determining the root causes 
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rather than on locating the active causes. Additionally, the repetition of pilot errors 
also reveals that the safety system has failed to prevent a reoccurrence and suggests 
that these errors are more a symptom of a root cause, rather than the cause itself. 
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3.2 The Underlying Factor: Latent Failures 
In considering the human contribution to accidents in large-scale, technically based 
systems and organisations8, it is important to distinguish two kinds of failures: active 
and latent failures. Latent failures differ from active failures in a number of ways: 
" Active failures are explicit; they have an immediate and direct impact upon 
the system. Latent failures, on the other hand, are implicit; they may lie 
dormant for long periods, only making their presence felt when they combine 
with active failures and local triggering events to breach the system's 
defences. 
" Active failures are associated with the performance of `front-line' operators: 
pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance mechanics and the like. Latent 
failures, on the other hand, are generated by those at a higher level in the 
system: designers, high-level decision makers, operation managers, etc. 
These are people in the managerial and organisational spheres. In other 
words, active failures are related to individuals, whereas latent failures are 
associated with organisations. 
Whereas active failures are categorised according to their psychological 
/physical origins, latent failures are intimately bound up with the socio- 
technical systems. 9 
In the past, accident investigations often have not determined all the underlying 
causes of accidents. They focus essentially upon the primary causes of unsafe acts and 
unsafe conditions, such as active operator errors and equipment failures. When most 
causal factors are repeated over and over, and when the system has failed to prevent 
reoccurrence, it becomes, more often than not, a failure of the underlying system, e. g. 
$ Within the aviation system, organisations include airlines and other operators, manufacturers, airports, air 
traffic control, weather services, civil aviation authorities, safety investigation agencies, international 
organisations and professional associations . 
9 The term socio-technical systems, coined in 1960, refers to organisations which use high technology on a large 
scale. The aviation industry, nuclear power generations, marine and railroad transportation and the chemical 
processing industry are examples of socio-technical systems. 
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equipment design problems, poor operating procedures, communications failures, 
organisational deficiencies, personnel selection, training and scheduling problems, 
etc. Detailed analyses of recent accidents in technological systems have clearly 
indicated that these latent failures pose a greater threat to aviation safety than the 
active failures. Many of the root causes of the emergencies are usually present within 
the system long before usually active errors were committed, and these preconditions 
to accidents can be traced back to identifiable organisational deficiencies. 
Reason (1993) puts it well, "individual errors at the sharp end are like mosquitoes. 
You can swat them, but there will still be plenty more to plague you. The only 
effective and long-lasting remedy is to drain the swamps in which they breed. In this 
case, the `swamps' are unfriendly designs, conflicting goals, `clumsy technology', 
and corporate cultures that do not learn from precursor incidents or share information 
effectively either internally or with related organisations. " 
In order to emphasise the significance and influence of the latent failures, Reason 
used the "resident pathogen" metaphor to describe the preconditions for accidents. 
Just as resident pathogens exist in the human body, latent failures are present in large- 
scale technological systems. Although their effects are not immediately apparent, they 
can promote active failures, weaken the system's defence mechanisms, and precipitate 
catastrophic failure once they have accumulated to a large extent and interact with 
trigger events. 
Turner (1978) also points out that large-scale accidents have an "incubation period" 
in which a number of undesirable events that may contribute to an accident can lie 
unnoticed for years until a trigger event precipitates an accident. 
Since the aviation industry involves high-hazard activities, the consequences of safety 
breakdowns are catastrophic in terms of loss of life and property. Safety efforts 
should attempt to discover and eliminate latent failures in the system, in addition to 
directing attention towards minimising and preventing active or front-line failures. 
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3.2.1 Accident recognition 
From using their physical strength, employing natural resources, to developing 
technologies, human beings have been trying in various ways to optimise their use of 
energy for the purpose of improving their quality of life. However, if energy is not 
controlled or utilised correctly, it is likely to generate incidents or accidents. For 
instance, aircraft overrun the runway due to high approach speeds, car brake fail, 
nuclear energy are released accidentally, etc. 
Before the beginning of industrial era, these incidents were recognised and explained 
as being Acts of God. As civilisation progresses, people gradually learn that incidents 
are caused by human error, engineering defects, or management deficiencies. From 
the remote past to the present, it has been a lengthy learning course. 
Ever since the first aircraft accident occurred on 18 September 1908, causing the 
death of Lt. Thomas Selfridge, human factors has been playing an important role in 
accident events. Statistics from military and civil aviation also shows that more than 
sixty per cent of the aviation accidents involve human factors. Hence, one of the 
greatest challenges for aviation safety is to control and avoid human error. 
Traditionally, accident investigation confines itself to the unsafe acts of either pilots, 
maintenance personnel, or air traffic controllers. Nowadays, the scope of aviation 
safety has broadened to include managerial and organisational spheres. Detailed 
analysis of past significant event reports confirm that the root causes of many large- 
scale accidents were mostly initiated by bad decisions taken within the organisational 
and managerial domains (Wiener, 1993; Reason, 1990). 
Close examination of past accidents indicates that many catastrophic events arise 
from the adverse conjunction of several distinct causal chains. Accidents like 
Tenerife, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Challenger demonstrate the complexity 
of interactions between technology and people (Perrow, 1984; Fennell, 1988; Reason, 
1990). Thus, it is natural for complex, tightly-coupled systems to suffer 
unforeseeable socio-technical breakdowns. Accident investigations may search for 
both contributing human failures and organisational/managerial deficiencies. The 
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purpose of such retrospective searching should be to find out how and why the 
accidents occurred rather than who caused the accident. 
3.2.2 Systematic approach to accident causation 
As mentioned in the previous section, the investigation of aircraft accidents usually 
lays emphasis on tracing a plausible chain of causation in order to determine what 
unsafe acts triggered the event, instead of finding out why these human factors were 
associated with that accident. Following this approach, most accident prevention 
efforts concentrate on how to minimise and prevent the front-line unsafe acts. 
However, these unsafe acts not only seem to occur randomly but they also may 
previously have been repeating over and over without ill effect. Hence, the attempt to 
reduce or eliminate intermittent events has no effect on the prevention of future 
accidents. 
Moreover, pilots in the aviation system are "the inheritors of system defects" rather 
than the main instigators of an accident. Pilots are selected and specially trained in 
the aviation system. Their actions and attitudes are a reflection of the circumstances 
surrounding them. In the broader perspective of the organisational and managerial 
domains, pilots should not be blamed for an accident or incident (unless they 
deliberately commit the error), as it is natural for human beings to make technical 
errors or mistakes of judgement. Besides, an unsafe act is more than just an error or a 
violation - it is a triggering event provoking the pre-existing and often long-standing 
latent failures within a complex technology-based system. Pilots are the last frontier 
in accident prevention. That is, accidents happen at the time they fail to defend the 
system, whereas systematic deficiencies may occur days, months or years after an 
error was made. Though the occurrence of a man-made accident leads inevitably to a 
search for human culprits, aviation safety can be significantly improved by detecting 
and correcting situational factors - the organisational and managerial failures that 
facilitate the pilot error. 
In 1990, James Reason proposed a theoretical framework of accident causation to 
illustrate how active failures and latent failures interact to produce accidents, and 
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indicate where and how more effective remedial measures might be applied. He 
emphasises the significance of the insidious and often unforeseeable situation when 
the unsafe acts were committed. This latent situation contains many weaknesses at all 
levels of the aviation system, such as design deficiencies, policy problems, undue 
time pressure, maintenance inadequacy, miscommunication, poor training and 
scheduling, personal problems, etc. Accidents arise when the damaging but 
underlying weaknesses combine with local triggering events to breach the system's 
defences. David Beaty put it well (1991): "Modern aircraft accidents result from 
collective mistakes rather than individual errors. " Accidents are defined by the 
triggering of events or unsafe acts, while the occurrence of the accidents are 
determined by the underlying situational context. Safety efforts, therefore, should 
focus on discovering and eliminating the latent weaknesses in the socio-technical 
system that precipitate and exacerbate triggering events or unsafe acts. 
3.2.2.1 Applying Reason's model to accident causation 
The aviation industry is a complex socio-technical system, a system involving a high 
degree of interaction between technology and people. Because human factors have 
been analysed as the major root cause in the past accidents, the principal concern 
within the aviation system is with the human contribution to system accidents. 
Reason's framework may be a good way to explain accident causation in such a 
complex system. Figure 3.3 identifies the basic elements and presents them 
diagrammatically as aircraft, one behind the other. These elements are respectively 
decision makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and defences. 
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Figure 3.4 Reason's Model: Human Contributions to the Breakdown of 
an Aviation System 
Source: Revised from J. Reason, 1990 
1. The decision makers 
The decision makers include the manufacturer, airline top management and the 
civil regulatory authorities. Their aim is to survive competition and deploy 
available resources to maximise both on-time and cost-effective transportation as 
well as safety. Failures at this level are fallible decisions. For example, 
conducting flight crew simulator training for the Ground Proximity Warning 
System (GPWS) on an aircraft simulator differently equipped from the actual 
aircraft. 
2. Line management 
Line management are responsible for implementing the strategies of the decision 
makers. They make sure that the line personnel execute and complete the 
decisions made by the upper management. Human failures in this element are 
62 
Chapter 3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
management deficiencies. For example, the operator's procedures for responding 
to GPWS do not provide sufficient guidance to the crew. 
3. Preconditions 
Appropriate upper-management decisions and effective line-management actions 
are needed but not sufficient for successful production. Certain preconditions 
must exist, such as available and reliable equipment, a skilled, knowledgeable and 
motivated workforce, safe environmental conditions, etc. Out-of-service ILS 
(instrument landing system) and high stressed captains suffering are examples of 
preconditions for unsafe acts. 
4. Productive activities 
These are the integration of humans and machines. In the cockpit, they refer to 
pilot's performance when operating the aircraft. Underestimation of the danger 
posed by slippery runway conditions, late recognition of auto brake 
unintentionally being turned off and lack of positive, timely brake application 
exemplify unsafe acts in this element. 
5. Defences 
Defences are safeguards against injury, damage, or costly interruptions of service 
in the event of some unsafe act being committed. For example, cases of 
inadequate defences include extremely poor inter-relationships and 
communication between the captain and the first officer, crew listening to the 
loudspeakers instead of using headsets, and co-pilot not passing all information to 
captain. 
In aviation strict rules, high standards and sophisticated monitoring equipment are in 
place to protect against accidents happening. These excellent defence systems 
coupled with technological progress, mean that accidents rarely originate from single 
errors or isolated component failures. Instead, accident breakdowns arise from the 
interaction of a series of insidious failures within the managerial and organisational 
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spheres. Many of these failures are not apparent, and their damaging consequences 
can lie dormant for a long time until they are triggered by external events. Also, they 
are unlikely to be detected unless a thorough investigation is conducted. 
Reason distinguishes failures into two types, depending on the length of time it takes 
for these failures to reveal their adverse effect upon the integrity of the system. An 
active failure has an immediate and direct effect. These errors are usually committed 
by pilots, maintenance personnel and air traffic controllers. For example, a crew's 
response to the GPWS warning is not in accordance with the manufacturer's 
procedures. A latent failure refers to a fallible decision or incorrect action made 
before an accident. Such failures are usually present in a system for a long time and 
derive from those who are separated in both time and space from the event, such as 
decision makers, regulators, or line-management. Failures can be introduced at any 
level of the system by the human condition, e. g., airlines do not review present 
training policies with a view towards improving cockpit discipline and flying 
competency, civil aviation authorities do not review the adequacy of the operational 
supervision exercised by each airline, flight officer and flight engineer fail to follow 
the captain's instructions, crew alertness and mental concentration are affected due to 
jet-lag, emergency doors are not used, no evidence of the cabin crew's contribution to 
saving lives after a crash, etc. 
Very few active or latent failures result in actual damage or injury if they occur 
individually; even though they will interact, they will rarely breach the defences of a 
well guarded system. However, latent failures can create `windows of opportunity', 
loopholes in various layers of defences over time. On some occasions, a complex 
interaction between latent failures and a variety of local triggering events may occur. 
This can lead to one set of causal factors finding an appropriate trajectory to penetrate 
all of the defences and lead to the occurrence of an accident. Thus, the front-line 
operators may become the inheritors of all the system's defects. They are the ones 
that face the consequences when their actions, together with technical problems and 
adverse conditions reveal the latent failures present in the aviation system. In highly 
protected systems, a concurrence of active and latent failures may result in an 
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incident; whereas in relatively unprotected systems, human actions interacting with 
the latent failures are likely to cause an accident. Here follows an example of how 
active and latent failures can interact to cause an accident. 
At 1406 Yukon standard time, on the 23rd December 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) 
Flight 084, a scheduled cargo flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Los Angeles, 
California, collided head-on with South Central Air (SCA) Flight 59, a scheduled 
commuter flight from Anchorage to Kenai, Alaska, on runway 6L-24R at Anchorage 
International Airport. Both flights had filed instrument flight rules flight plans, and 
instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The South 
Central Air Piper PA-31-350 was destroyed by the collision impact, and the Korean 
Air Lines McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 was destroyed by impact and post-impact 
fire. Of the eight passengers aboard Flight 59, three were slightly injured. The pilot 
was not injured. The three crew members on Flight 084 sustained serious injuries. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of the 
accident were the failure of the pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to follow 
accepted procedures during taxi, which caused him to become disoriented while 
selecting the runway; the failure of the pilot to use the compass to confirm his 
position; and the decision of the pilot to take off when he was unsure that the aircraft 
was positioned on the correct runway. Contributing to the accident was the fog, 
which reduced visibility to a point that the pilot could not ascertain his position 
visually and the control tower personnel could not assist the pilot. Also contributing 
to the accident was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs at several intersections 
passed by Flight 084 while it was taxiing. (NTSB, 1984) 
Detailed analysis of the accident shows how the conjunction of active and latent 
failures led to the event. 
1. The decision of KAL 084's captain to use runway 32 for departure was not in 
accordance with KAL operating specifications (unsafe act). While the captain's 
decision did not directly bear on the accident since he attempted takeoff on a 
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runway other than the runway to which he was cleared, it was an operational 
deficiency and indicates performance not in keeping with that expected of an air 
carrier captain (management deficiencies & decision makers). 
2. The flightcrew of KAL 084 did not cross-check their heading indicators to 
confirm their position (unsafe act & inadequate defence), not only because the 
KAL checklist did not require a pre-takeoff heading check (management 
deficiency), but also because the initial, or recurrent training the crew received or 
the operating procedures established for KAL crew members are deficient 
(management deficiency). 
3. The restricted visibility, due to the heavy ice fog (poor pre-condition) and a lack 
of legible taxiway and runway signs at several intersections (poor pre-condition), 
caused the flightcrew of KAL 084 to experience difficulties while operating on 
taxiways and runways and adversely affected their operational performance 
(unsafe act). Besides, the airport was not equipped with ASDE (Airport Surface 
Detection Equipment), so that ground controllers could not assist the aircraft crew 
members by providing information on their location (poor pre-condition). 
4. The captain failed to exercise proper decision-making responsibility by relying 
too heavily on the first officer's belief that the aircraft was on the correct runway. 
In this instance, the crew concept broke down because the flightcrews were not 
being adequately trained in managing cockpit resources, and co-ordinating their 
responsibilities when operating in marginal ground manoeuvring conditions that 
require intense concentration (inadequate defence & management inadequacy). 
5. Based on the estimated takeoff gross weight of KAL 084, the runway length 
required for takeoff was 8,150 feet. Since the actual length available to KAL 084 
on runway 24R was about 2,400, an accident would have resulted even if KAL 
084 had not collided with SCA 59. (Poorpre-condition) 
In brief, an accident is not solely the result of unsafe acts or unsafe conditions; the 
potential for an accident is created when human actions interact with other incorrect 
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actions or fallible decisions that breach all the defences. The task of investigation is, 
therefore, not only to locate the unsafe acts made by the front-line personnel, but to 
determine why these actions are not caught by the system defences before causing 
damaging consequences. This requires identification of the related latent failures, 
from an operational level through to upper-management within the aviation system. 
Fortunately, most latent failures are revealed and identified by investigating incidents. 
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3.3 Importance of Incidents 
3.3.1 Early recognition 
Human beings have devoted their efforts towards improving technology in order to 
achieve greater aviation safety. In the aviation industry, radical changes and 
developments in technology have eliminated lots of hazards in hardware elements. 
As a consequence, the presence and magnitude of human error as a causal factor in 
accidents has come to light and been indelibly impressed on those who are 
responsible for minimising the risks associated with aviation operations. 
As early as 1958, William A. Patterson, the President of United Airlines, mentioned 
the need for accurate safety-trend-information during a testimony before the US 
Senate. In 1966, Bobbie R. Allen, the Director of the US Civil Aeronautics Board, 
emphasised the importance of accumulating aviation safety incident information. 
3.3.2 Potential disincentives for incident investigation 
The lack of retrieval technology and the non-fatal or low-damage characteristics of 
incidents might appear to make incident investigation unnecessary or not worthwhile. 
Additionally, government regulations may use injury levels or dollar value of damage 
suffered to determine if an event calls for an investigation. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the dollar value and the level of injuries are still the determining factors for 
instigating reporting and the investigation in many countries. 
3.3.3 The shortcomings of using accident data 
Safety investigators and researchers have successfully traced the chain of causation in 
accidents to determine the "what" of the event, but sometimes they are not as 
effective in explaining the "why" of the event. Accident analyses reveal that at least 
92 per cent of all root causes are man-made (Reason, 1990). As a result, the why of 
an event very often needs to deal with a very large subject, human error. In aviation, 
human factors involve machines of growing complexity, producing ever greater 
difficulties in the investigation of human performance issues. In addition, the nature 
68 
Chapter 3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
of accidents causes several problems when addressing human contribution their 
occurrence. 
Firstly, accidents occur very seldomly and, thus, provide relatively little data for 
safety investigators and researchers to validate a safety hazard (see Figure 3.3). 
Secondly, pilots are often unable to be of much help even though they are usually at 
the scene of aircraft accidents. They either do not survive accidents or are not willing 
to share their experience due to the threat of legal and financial liability for the 
events. Thirdly, despite the existence of various kinds of data recorders and some 
very skilled and experienced investigation teams, it is unlikely to be certain that all 
the causal factors have been discovered, and that the chain of causation determined by 
reasoning process precisely reflect actual situation. Even when the truth is disclosed, 
too often it has been the case that remedial action has been directed at the symptoms 
rather than the cause. 
1 major accident, 29 minor injuries 
300 no injury incidents (Source: Heinrich, 1950) 
Figure 3.5 Accident / Incident Ratio 
As accident investigation is a "post hoc" reasoning process, safety investigators must 
rely on factual findings to explore and determine the most likely causation. 
Inaccurate and unreliable information is particularly likely to be human errors. 
It is universally accepted that before every accident there will have been incidents, or 
precursors of the accident. If detected and reminded early enough, these incidents 
will not have the potential to result in an accident. The precondition for taking 
appropriate preventive action is, therefore, to recognise these indications before they 
breach the system. 
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3.3.4 The characteristics of incidents 
Prevention actions can start with small improvements in the everyday processes 
involved in air transportation, as their effect on aviation safety is far from small. The 
involvement of individuals working in air transport design, operations, and support 
may form a means to ensure comprehensive implementation of prevention strategies. 
In addition, the more feedback personnel offer, the more opportunity there is for 
pragmatic improvements to be promoted. 
Few accidents will occur if humans learn from incidents. Hence, a highly effective 
means of accident prevention is to report, investigate and analyse incidents. 
The most important characteristics of incidents are: 
1. They can reveal the same hazards as accidents, but their extent of severity is not 
as heightened as those of accidents (see figure 3.4). That is, they lack the terminal 
event which causes the injury or damage in an accident. 
2. Incidents outnumber accidents, so they provide more data for analysis and 
investigation. 
3. Additional information is available from the people involved in incidents. Pilots 
and crew members survive incidents and, with the assurances of protection, they 
are more willing to share their experience. 
4. The majority of incidents do not result in serious damage, so there is no threat of 
adverse legal or financial consequences. 
frequency severity visibility 
of accidents of of 
occurence event event 
incidents 
errors(recoverd) 
Figure 3.6 The Relationship Between Accidents, Incidents & Errors 
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3.3.5 Investigation of incidents 
The decision to call for an investigation often depends on the severity of the outcome 
of the event. In other words, an investigation will be more likely to be ordered if 
there is significant loss of life or property. In some less serious events, however, the 
underlying causal factors may be just as hazardous and meaningful. Judging on the 
basis of potential to lead to accidents and the possible effectiveness of remedial 
measures, safety investigators and researchers should treat incident investigation at 
least as importantly and urgently as accident investigation. 
Most accidents originate as a result of unintended actions committed by technically 
competent individuals who were merely doing their duties. They might have 
committed these same unsafe acts before without ill effect because the existing 
conditions at that time did not trigger the latent failures in the system. Under 
different circumstances, committing of unsafe acts might result in different 
consequences; some might result only in less serious incidents, while others might 
lead to severe loss. 
Many incidents occur each day, most of which may appear too trivial to report to an 
investigatory authority, but which may have the potential for being accidents. 
Incidents are unlikely to be investigated on the basis of the magnitude of loss, but 
detailed analysis of incident data can often reveal the latent failures in the system and 
provide a significant insight into accident prevention. 
The investigation of aviation accidents is a process of systematic reasoning. It is a 
continuous, selective and analytical process to validate safety deficiencies in human 
performance. Although investigators are seldom human factors specialists, they learn 
to continuously formulate significant events to make reasonable inferences. They 
selectively determine what particular human factors condition influenced the 
sequence of events leading to the occurrence, and analytically draw conclusion on the 
basis of empirical knowledge and verifiable evidence. Therefore, the more evidence 
that is accumulated, the more meaningful and supportable conclusions can be drawn. 
The essential task of finding causal and contributory factors is to explain how they 
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were initiated and why they were not prevented before the mishap rather than to find 
out who was to blame. In short, its purpose is to prevent accidents. If the analysis 
and conclusions can not contribute to recurrence prevention, the investigation is 
meaningless. 
3.3.6 First utilisation of incident data 
In 1947, Fitts and Jones' pioneer work in developing the "critical incident technique" 
helps to establish the value of investigating incidents (Nagel, 1988). They used 
interview and written surveys to examine errors made by hundreds of crew members 
in utilising cockpit controls and instruments. The research pointed out that a total of 
270 errors were made by pilots in reading and interpreting flight instruments (Degani 
and Wiener, 1991), as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Pilot Error in Utilising Cockpit Controls & 
Instruments 
Display-related errors Control-related errors 
Incorrect interpretation Control substitution 
Legibility problems Adjustment errors 
Substitution errors Memory errors control reversals 
Undetected failures Unintentional activation 
Illusions, disorientation Anthropometry-related errors 
Failures to monitor 
19 reversal errors in angle of bank were made by the pilots, when they used the 
moving horizon attitude indicator to correct an undesirable bank angle. Though these 
errors occur in relatively small numbers, they may result in serious outcomes, 
especially under circumstances when a pilot is disoriented or the aircraft is in a 
spiralling descent. 
Fitts and Jones' research not only validated many ergonomic concepts which had 
been previously demonstrated only in laboratory research, but also systematically 
showed the significance of poor human engineering in incident generation and 
accident causation. 
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3.3.7 Incidents lead to accidents 
The purpose of incident reporting is to transform the context of accident investigation 
from "incidents lead to accidents" to "reporting incidents prevent accidents". The 
following two cases are the examples of "incidents lead to accidents". 
United Airlines incident and Trans World Airlines Boeing 727-231 accident 
At 1110, East Standard Time, on the 1st of December 1974, Trans World Airlines 
(TWA), Inc., Flight 514, a Boeing 727, crashed 25 nautical miles north-west of 
Washington-Dulles airport, Washington D. C. The accident occurred while the flight 
was descending for a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles during instrument 
meteorological conditions. The 92 occupants (85 passengers and 7 crew members) 
were killed and the aircraft was destroyed. Investigators found out that the aircraft 
descended below the minimum safe altitude. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the 
accident was the crew's decision to descent to 1,800 feet before the aircraft had 
reached the approach segment where that minimum altitude applied. The crew's 
decision to descend was a result of inadequacies and lack of clarity in the air traffic 
control procedures which led to a misunderstanding on the part of the pilots and of 
the controllers regarding each other's responsibilities during operations in terminal 
areas under instrument meteorological conditions. Nevertheless, the examination of 
the plan view of the approach chart should have disclosed to the captain that a 
minimum altitude of 1,800 feet was not a safe altitude. (NTSB, 1975) 
In fact, about six weeks earlier, a United Airlines flight encountered the same 
situation at about the same place during the same approach procedure but was lucky 
enough to escape the lethal trap. The crew reported immediately to United Airlines' 
internal reporting system: the "Flight Safety Awareness Program". 10 After 
loin January 1974, an air carrier in the United States initiated a Flight Safety Awareness Program. The purpose 
of the program was to encourage the carrier's pilots to report to the company any incident, or any suggestion, 
that could have safety implications, so that required remedial action could be taken. Under this program, an 
individual could make a report without identifying himself or his fellow crewmembers. The pilots were 
assured that the carrier would not take any punitive action as a result of information procured through this 
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investigating this incident and informing FAA at the Dulles tower, the carrier 
published a notice to all flight crews and informed them of the dangerous 
characteristics of flying this particular approach. In the course of the investigation of 
the TWA accident, the NTSB discovered that FAA had no formal system enabling 
such important information to be widely and urgently disseminated. 
The probable cause of the accident was the crew's decision to descend below the 
minimum safe altitude. However, the failure of the FAA to take timely action to 
resolve the confusion and misinterpretation of air traffic terminology, although the 
problem had been aware for several years, apparently contributed to the occurrence of 
the accident. If the warning had been spread to other operators flying to Dulles 
airport, and if there had been a formal reporting program enabling pilots and 
controllers to report operational incidents, the accident might not have occurred. 
Interflug Airbus A-3 10 incident and China Airlines A300-600R accident 
At about 1050 local time on the 11th of February 1991, the former East German 
airline Interflug A3 10 D-AOHC while conducting an approach to Moscow's 
Sheremetyevo airport runway 25L initiated a go-around after being requested to do so 
by Sheremetyevo tower. 
The A3 10 crew was on autopilot approach to Moscow and the crew pressed the go- 
around buttons because of an obstructed runway. Air traffic control wanted them to 
remain at pattern altitude, below the go-around altitude selected in the autopilot, so 
the crew turned the autopilot off to manually obtain the desired altitude. 
But the autopilot was not off and it applied trim to continue the go-ground. As the 
aircraft climbed through 1,500 ft, the control column force resulted in disconnection 
of the autopilot, with the aircraft grossly out of trim. This led to five cycles of pitch 
excursions, up to 88 degrees and in amplitude the speed decreasing to 30 kt. At 
program. The carrier would not voluntarily divulge information secured in this program to any outside 
agency which would permit identification of any individual involved. The carrier undertook to protect 
vigorously individual anonymity unless this protection was waived by the individual involved. 
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times, a recovery was made after a six-minute period, once thrust was reduced 
(AAIC, 1996). 
After investigation of this complex sequence of events, Airbus Industrie published a 
(recommended) "cautionary operational advisory" regarding "Autopilot Override" in 
the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) for A300-600 and A310 in January 
1991. 
Here are excerpts from the Airbus Service Bulletin 6021: 
"Autopilot Override" is a safety device required by the airworthiness authorities 
to allow the flight crews to regain control from the Autopilot in the event of 
Autopilot anomalies. Autopilot remains engaged but inactive except for the 
autotrim function. However, when override effort is released the Autopilot is 
reactivated 
The bulletin cites the "approximate triggering threshold from a flight control 
neutral position expressed in loads to the control column, control wheels and 
pedals, all of which, experienced Airbus pilots said, are quite small. " 
The following is quoted from the bulletin about the pitch axis: 
Any action on the pitch trim control wheel disconnects the Autopilot with the 
autopilot in command, if the pilot counteracts the Autopilot (elevator order), the 
Autopilot will move the trim horizontal stabiliser (autotrim order) so as to 
maintain the aircraft on the scheduled flight path. 
Therefore, in pitch Go Around (GA) mode, the following scenario might occur: 
During the GA procedure if the pilot immediately pushed the control column in 
order to limit the pitch up order, (after a few seconds) this situation would lead to 
a simultaneous inverse movement of the elevators (due to pilot action) and the 
stabiliser (due to autotrim orders). 
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In such a configuration since the stabiliser efficiency is greater than that of the 
elevator, the aircraft could reach an abnormal pitch-up angle leading to an 
airspeed decay. 
Just a little more than three years later, at about 2016 local time on the 26th April 
1994, at Nagoya, Japan, a China Airlines Airbus A300-600R11 had an accident 
involving similar circumstances. 
During the manually flown ILS approach at Nagoya, the go-around mode was 
inadvertently activated. In an apparent attempt to continue the approach, the 
autothrottles were disengaged, the throttles were retarded, both autopilots were 
engaged, and the copilot made a progressive nose down input to the elevators. 
These actions overrode the autopilot go-around commands, drove the stabiliser trim 
to the full nose-up position, and caused the speed to decrease. The autopilots were 
disconnected, and the Captain decided to go-around. Unfortunately, a maximum nose 
down elevator input could not compensate for the combined pitch-up effects of full 
nose-up stabiliser trim and high thrust. The pitch attitude increased to 52° nose-up 
and the aircraft entered into a stall and crashed. 
The final report from Japan's Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee determined 
that one of the factors causing the accident was (AAIC, 1996): 
"the aircraft manufacturer did not categorise the SB (Service Bulletin) A300-22- 
6021 as `Mandatory', which would have given it the highest priority. The 
airworthiness authority of the nation of design and manufacture did not issue 
promptly an airwothiness directive pertaining to implementation of the above 
SB. " 
11 China Airlines Airbus Industrie A300 took off from Taipei International Airport at 1753 local time on the 
26th April 1994 and continued flying according to its flight plan. About 2016 local time, while approaching 
Nagoya Airport for landing, the aircraft crashed into the landing zone close to taxiway of the airport. On 
board the aircraft were 271 persons: 256 passengers (including 2 infants) and 15 crew members, of whom 
264 persons (249 passengers including 2 infants and 15 crew members) were killed and 7 passengers were 
seriously injured. The aircraft ignited, and was destroyed. 
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If aircraft manufacturers12, airlines and aviation regulation authorities had been more 
concerned with the incident of the Interflug Airbus A3 10 or the previous similar 
incidents (1st of March 1989 A300-600; 9th of January 1989 A300B4-203FF), as 
well as with safety information sharing and dissemination, the China Airline accident 
might have been prevented. 
12 On the 13th December 1994, Airbus Service Bulletin 6021 was revised from "Recommended" to 
". "Mandatory 
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3.3.8 Risk management loop 
Operational feedback obtained through the operator's internal safety information 
system is of importance for upper- or middle- management to effect the control of 
operations that policies and procedures support. Figure 3.7 portrays the four feedback 
loops constituting the safety information system. Loop 1 feeds back information 
from accident rescue and investigation. In most cases, the information is too little and 
too late for safety management to effectively eliminate the hazardous factors that have 
already occurred. The only function of the feedback is to reduce the severity of 
property damage and life loss. Loops 2 and 3 carry information about the unsafe acts, 
unsafe conditions or incidents observed in daily operations. As in the tip of an 
iceberg, these unsafe acts, unsafe conditions or incidents will probably result in 
significant accidents though at first they may not be recognised and may not have 
immediate ill effects. Since such information is usually disseminated at lower levels, 
it is likely to be ignored over time and cause accidents if left untreated. All loops 
provide the opportunity to improve safety; so-called risk management, for they allow 
management to assess the level of operational risks and to determine the best 
prevention approach. The basic function of incident reports is accident prevention 
because the feedback obtained offers upper management timely information to react 
effectively and modify the company's policy and procedures appropriately. 
As the majority of aviation incidents, no matter whether they occur often or 
occasionally, do not cause serious damage or loss, most carriers do not think they are 
worth reporting and pilots, also, are unwilling to have them publicised. Further 
understanding and investigation are consequently rare. Under these circumstances, 
civil regulatory authorities and airlines cannot under emphasise their importance, 
since the investigation of an incident arguably provides better accident prevention 
results than an investigation of an accident, in terms of frequency and severity. 
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Figure 3.7 Risk Management Loop 
Source: Adapted frone Reason, 1990 
In order to learn the right lessons from incidents, a safety management system should 
clarify the processes for identifying and evaluating potential hazards, for following-up 
incidents and for communicating safety-related matters. 
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3.4 Safety and Culture 
It has yet to be confirmed whether an important connection exists between culture and 
safety, yet excellent safety performance is usually witnessed in an organisation with a 
good safety culture. 
The influence of culture on pilot performance has gradually attracted the attention of 
safety researchers and practitioners. Improved cockpit controls and new training 
procedures can help to improve safety, but these are not root remedies, especially for 
those mistakes induced by cultural factors. It might be necessary to scrutinise and 
modify the entire corporate culture of an airline, as this is what shapes pilot decision 
making, maintenance practices and other human elements of safety performance. 
3.4.1 Cultural characteristics 
The concept of safety culture referred to above is just one facet within the area of 
culture. The term "culture" originally comes from social anthropology and is defined 
broadly and variously. Basically, it is regarded as the collection of beliefs, values, 
norms, rituals, attitudes, roles and practices of a given group, organisation, institution 
or society. In its most general sense, culture refers to the shared patterns or style in a 
group that are difficult to change. It is about how people think, what they value and 
how they behave, these characteristics are present at a fundamental level, and yet 
people are often unaware of many of the values that bind them together. 
3.4.2 Culture classification 
There are many levels of culture, and each of these has a natural tendency to 
influence the other. At the broadest level, perhaps, is the national culture, that is the 
primary values and practises that characterise a particular country. There are also 
organisational and occupational cultures, relating to where one works and the kind of 
work one performs. 
In most industrial situations, excellent performance is associated with strong 
organisational cultures because they create a surprising amount of consensus, which is 
80 
Chapter 3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
usually valued by employees. Robbins (1989) described organisational culture as "a 
common perception held by the organisation's members; a system of shared 
meaning", and listed ten characteristics to explain the issue of organisational cultures. 
These are as follows: 
" Individual initiative 
" Direction 
" Management support 
" Identity 
" Conflict tolerance 
" Risk tolerance 
" Integration 
" Control 
" Reward system 
" Communication patterns 
After examining British, French and German (as well as Arabic, Japanese and 
American) organisational cultures, Pugh (1988) argued that even though the context 
and the structure of an organisation may be the same, people behave differently in 
different cultures. This accords with Chute and Wiener's (1994) study, in which they 
conclude "despite sharing the same objectives, the flight deck and cabin crews have 
evolved into two distinct cultures with different perspectives and approaches. " A 
reasonable corollary of this is that flight and ground crews might also have similar 
problems. 
3.4.3 Difficulty of cultural transformation 
An organisation's safety culture cannot be changed as quickly by management decree 
or legislative prescription as many had at first assumed; culture change involves a 
long-term process of organisational learning. 
Culture, as referred to above, has two characteristics: visibility and resistance to 
change. Kotter et al (1992) found that "at the deeper and less visible level, culture 
refers to values that are shared by the people in a group and that tend to persist over 
time even when group membership changes; at the more visible level., culture 
represents the behaviour patterns or style of an organisation that new employees are 
automatically encouraged to follow by their fellow employees. " (see figure 3.8) 
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Invisible Harder to Change 
Shared Values: Important concerns and goals that 
are shared by most of the people in a group that 
often persist over time even with changes in group 
memberships. 
Examples: Operations managers are strongly 
involved in the safety events; Crews are willing to 
report hazards/incidents. 
Group Behaviour Norms: Common or pervasive 
ways of acting that are found in a group and that 
persist because group members tend to behave in 
ways that teach these practices (as well as their 
shared values) to new members, rewarding those 
that fit in and sanctioning those that do not. 
Examples: The awareness of safety is_good in the 
organisation; Flight and ground crews co-ordinate 
well in the organisation. 
Easier to Change 
Visible 
Figure 3.8 Culture in an Organisation 
Source: Revised from Kotter & Heskett, 
Conceptualised in this way, culture in an organisation is not the same as a corporate's 
structure or strategy. However, these terms (and others such as "vision") are 
sometimes used almost interchangeably because they can all play an important part, 
along with the competitive and regulatory environment, in shaping people's 
behaviour (see Figure 3.9). 
The Corporate Formal Structure, Leadership - Efforts to The Competitive 
Culture Plans, Policies, and Articulate and Implement a and Regulatory 
Training Corporate Vision and Strategy Environment 
The Behaviour of Airline Safety Management 
Figure 3.9 Four Factors that Shape Airline Managerial Behaviour 
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Other difficulties, such as what happens when cultures are congruent and in conflict, 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.4.4 Characteristics of safety culture 
3.4.4.1 Development of safety culture 
Traditional human factors approach to safety has changed in recent years. 
Increasingly, wider organisational factors have been considered significant in 
enhancing or undermining safety. The change derives in part from a number of 
prominent accidents13 that occurred over the past decade, especially in the aftermath 
of Chernobyl. The Chernobyl accident was caused by a combination of poor reactor 
design and operator errors. Subsequently, the serious human errors and violations of 
procedures were interpreted as evidence of a poor safety culture. Accidents are, 
therefore, described as resulting from the breakdown of an organisation's safety 
culture. 
The term `safety culture' is initially characterised as the set of beliefs, norms, 
attitudes, roles, social and technical practices that are concerned with minimising the 
exposure of individuals to dangerous or injurious conditions. 
A broader definition is provided below (Pidgeon, 1991): 
Safety culture can be conceived of as the constructed system of meanings through 
which a given people or group understand the hazards of the world, Such a 
constructed meaning system specifies what is important and legitimate to them, 
and explains their relationship to matters of life and death, work and danger. A 
culture is created and recreated as members of it repeatedly behave in ways that 
seem to them to be the natural, obvious, and unquestionable ways of acting, and 
as such will serve to construct a particular version of risk, danger, and safety. 
13 Examples of significant accidents, across a wide variety of large-scale hazardous systems, include: in nuclear 
power generation, the Chernobyl explosions (26th April 1986) ; in marine and railroad transportation, the 
King's Cross underground fire (18th November 1987) and the Zeebrugge ferry capsizing (6th March 1987); 
in the chemical processing industry, the Bhopal chemical disaster (2-3rd December 1984); and in aerospace, 
the Space Shuttle Challenger ( 28th January 1986). 
83 
Chapter 3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
Although the majority of the research work prompted by these events has been 
concerned with safety in contexts other than aviation, the hard lessons learned 
concerning the role of organisational factors and safety cannot be ignored by aviation 
practitioners. 
Organisational causes of accidents are not a new phenomenon in aviation. They have 
been present since the earliest days of civilian and military aviation, but attention has 
been diverted away from them more immediately visible causes of accidents. 
However, it is now clear that many of the individual causes of accidents can be 
traced as resulting from deeply rooted deficiencies in the organisational and 
managerial domains surrounding the operations of the aircraft. 
Turner was the first to identify unseen background preconditions to failures in socio- 
technical systems. His accident incubation period model focuses, in particular, upon 
information difficulties associated with the attempts of both individuals and 
organisations to deal with uncertain and ill-structured safety management problems 
(Pidgeon and O'Leary, 1994). Similar conclusions are drawn by other researchers in 
the area, who argue that large-scale accidents do not originate solely from individual 
failures, but from a chain of unanticipated interactions of technical, individual, 
managerial and organisational failures. The overall contribution of organisational and 
managerial aspects to accidents is often crucial and must be dealt with in order to 
enhance safety culture. 
3.4.4.2 A good safety culture 
Understanding the nature of accident causation in socio-technical systems implies that 
safety improvement may be more desirable when efforts are expended in creating a 
good safety culture. The question now turns to what elements may characterise a 
"good" safety culture. Considering the culture/performance perspective, Pidgeon and 
O'Leary (1994) address four principle elements for aviation practice to enhance the 
development of a safety culture: location of responsibility for safety at strategic 
management level; distributed attitudes of care and concern throughout an 
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organisation; appropriate norms and rules for handling hazards; and on-going 
reflection upon safety practice. 
With respect to the accounts of accidents provided in the previous section, the first 
element emphasises that the responsibility for safety should move from an operational 
level toward a strategic management level. Top management commitment and 
involvement in safety will permeate through the entire organisation because 
employees will quickly sense where management's true priorities lie. Besides, the 
consequences of large-scale accidents require strategic planning and deployment from 
the top of the organisation to prevent their reoccurrence and to promote improved 
safety. 
A further requirement for safe operations is distributed attitudes of care and concern 
throughout an organisation. Pidgeon (1991) points out that "safety attitudes refer to 
individual and collective beliefs about hazards and the importance of safety, together 
with the motivation to act on those beliefs. " In other words, safety directives should 
be concentrated on caring for the outcome of how risks are dealt with and what 
effects they impose on people, so that organisation members will regard the policing 
of hazards more as a personal than a collective goal. 
The third necessary condition is the establishment of appropriate norms and rules for 
handling hazards. Complete and up-to-date norms and rules should be created as 
guidelines for organisation members to guard against all anticipated hazards. 
Additionally, organisation members should constantly monitor normal procedures and 
operating conditions to detect any unexpected risks. 
Ongoing reflexivity about current practices and beliefs is termed as Toft active 
learning. It is a process of reviewing accidents and acting accordingly to best guard 
against recurrence. In aviation, accident investigation as well as proactive incident 
reporting and feedback is found useful for locating unanticipated hazards. Open 
communication links between management and personnel, establishing a blame-free 
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environment and giving priority to safety have also been found to be associated with 
safe climates in industrial organisations. 
3.4.5 Transforming culture 
Many of the considerations discussed above suggest that a good safety culture will not 
only promote safer practices throughout the entire organisation, but also that it is a 
crucial element for the development of an organisation over the long term. Even 
though organisations actively avoid laying blame for mistakes and errors, there is no 
guarantee that operational personnel are willing to conform to the change. There 
tends to be a marked disparity between operational personnel's perception of how the 
change would affect their workload and operations compared with the views held by 
upper management. The reasons for these differences are not easy to understand, but 
the possibilities considered are that: 
" The culture in the workforce is resistant to change because employees are used 
to their old work habits and roles. They are unwilling or unable to leave the 
"comfort zone of competence" (Miller, 1992). 
" The effects and benefits that the changes will bring to individuals and the 
organisation are not adequately presented or addressed during training. 
" The effects or benefits presented are not accepted by operational personnel. 
The human side of change, as Miller argues, is neither logical nor reasonable and can 
involve feelings of doubt and fear. Employees are afraid of giving up the traditional 
norms and ways of doing things and feel uncertain about the effects and benefits that 
new changes will bring. Unfortunately, employees' fear of change is perceived as 
unwarranted resistance to change by managers, which may result in employees' 
reluctant to share their feelings openly for fear of being viewed as troublemakers. 
Rather than pushing harder to overcome resistance to change, artful managers may 
discern the source of the resistance by applying the following strategies (Ho, 1995): 
" Emphasising needs for change and information about changes at all times. 
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0 Providing transition training in new values and behaviour patterns. 
0 Building tangible symbols or targets in the new directions. 
9 Providing sufficient resource for the change process. 
" Starting with small projects and building up continuously. 
0 Insisting on the importance of security in transition. 
0 Giving visible support to all those involved with the change. 
0 Being sensitive to those who are at different stages in acceptance of the 
change. 
0 Providing a safety net for when people make mistakes. 
However, organisational cultures are resistant to change and recent attempts to 
manipulate corporate behaviour by changing organisational cultures have met with 
only limited success (Nord, 1985). Figure 3.10 shows the transformation of a human 
being in terms of difficulty levels and the time required to accomplish a change on the 
five levels: recognition, knowledge, attitudes, individual behaviour and group 
behaviour. 
High 
Culture 
influence `c} 
and 
Group 
Behaviour 
Difficulty Individual 
Levels 
' 
Behavior 
Knowledge I Attitudes 
Lo« 
Time Required 
Figure 3.10 Transformation of human being on five level 
Source: Adapted from Yamamori, 1993 
87 
_Chapter 
3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
The attainment of change in individuals takes time and is very difficult. It would take 
a much longer time and be more difficult for a group or an organisation to change its 
behaviour or culture. 
The establishment of major cultural change appears to be rare but is feasible. The 
most visible factor in distinguishing major cultural changes that succeed from those 
that fail is competent leadership at the top. Successful leaders know how to 
implement new visions and new strategies for achieving those visions. They are 
good at persuading key individuals in the organisation to commit themselves to that 
new direction and then are able to energise the entire workforce to make the change 
happen, despite all the obstacles that may be present. In Europe, two competent 
CEOs have successfully implemented major cultural changes in BA (British Airways) 
and SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System). They spent four years in bringing about 
successful results. Table 3.3 shows the background of these leaders and the 
circumstances of the two companies before and after cultural change. 
Table 3.3 Two Successful Cases of Cultural Change 
Company Scandinavian Airlines British Airways 
Size of organisation Medium Large 
Length of major 
cultural change effort 
Losses reported before 
change effort was 
instituted 
Leader 
Background 
4 years from 1980 to 1983 4 years from 1982 to 1985 
Small loss reported in 1980 Significant losses in 1981 
(2% of revenues) (7% of revenues) 
Jan Carlzon Colin Marshall 
Unconventional Insider Outsider 
Career path Grew up in SAS, but not in Became CEO at BA in 
the core business 1983. Came from Sears 
Holdings 
Source: Compiled from Kotter et al, 1992, pp. 91,93,95 & 105. 
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Even though leadership at the very top of an organisation seems to be an essential 
ingredient for major cultural change to occur, ongoing change is necessary for 
sustaining comparative advantage in a competitive environment. Permanent change is 
best addressed through, as Westrum (1987) advocates, establishing "generative" 
organisations, or what are more commonly called "learning organisations" 14 
nowadays. This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
14 Peter Senge, who popularised learning organisations in his book The Fifth Discipline, described them as 
places "where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and 
expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together. " 
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3.5 Safety Culture and Incident Reporting 
3.5.1 Learning occurred by openness 
As philosopher George Santayana says, "Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it. " The importance and value of past experience is beyond 
expression. Few companies, however, have established processes for their managers 
to review their successes and then failures and learn from their experiences. 
Boeing's case, for example, explains how the knowledge gained from failures can be 
used to achieve subsequent success. Soon after encountering problems with the 737 
and 747 plane programs, Boeing's senior managers commissioned a high-level 
employee group to examine the trouble products. The group produced hundreds of 
recommendations over a three year period, and the lessons gained in development of 
these earlier programmes helped to make the 757 and 767 the most "successful" jets 
in the company's history. 
Learning from past experience is of key importance, but is certainly not the only 
factor to account for the success of Boeing. The willingness of managers to listen 
attentively and their openness to criticism enabled safety information to be transferred 
quickly and effectively throughout the company and made the progress far more 
likely. These contributing factors accord well with the generative features of safety 
management discussed in the above section. 
3.5.2 Safety culture influences incident reporting 
In an ideal world safety culture would enable line pilots to discuss their technical, 
operational, crew and personal problems directly with their managers through 
reporting systems. This ideal world would greatly benefit safe management in two 
ways: firstly, a greater volume and diversity of information could be acquired; and 
secondly, the information could lead to more "accurate risk assessment and more 
thorough learning. In practice, safety culture in most large organisations is not robust 
enough to generate open communication links between management and personnel. In 
such organisations, the fear of blame and punishment can prevent reporters of unsafe 
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events from exchanging safety information openly. As advocated above, pilots are 
the inheritors of the defective system. When an incident occurs, they are often forced 
to take the full responsibility for the event even if they operate the aircraft to the best 
of their ability. From the other viewpoint, pilots tend to have a strong pilot's ego, so 
it is difficult to ask them to report their unsafe acts. Thus, the pilots' unwillingness or 
unlikeness to report incidents without assurances of protection and confidentiality is 
not unreasonable. Moreover, pilots are likely to have misgivings about the 
undesirable consequences which incident reporting might bring upon themselves or 
other crew members. In such unfavourable circumstances, the organisational culture 
that surrounds pilots becomes an important factor in determining the success of a 
reporting system, no matter whether it is mandatory, voluntary or confidential. 
(Confidential reporting will be discussed in Chapters 6&7. ) 
Based on the nature of their communication culture, organisations can be placed into 
three different categories: generative, bureaucratic, and pathological (see Table 3.4). 
These categories reflect the kind of support that an individual might expect from 
upper management after his or her problems are reported. 
Table 3.4 Basic Communication Styles 
PATHOLOGICAL BUREAUCRATIC GENERATIVE 
Information is personal Information is routine Information is seen as a 
power key resource 
Responsibility is shirked Responsibility is Responsibility is shared 
compartmented 
Messengers are shot Messengers are listened Messengers are trained 
to if they arrive 
(Departmental) bridging Bridging is tolerated Bridging is rewarded 
is discouraged 
Failure is punished or Organisation is just and Failure leads to inquiry / 
covered up fair learning 
New ideas are actively New ideas present New ideas are 
crushed problems welcomed 
Source: Westrum, 1993 
In an ideal world, management would support and build a `generative' culture within 
the organisation. The primary goal of a generative culture would be learning from 
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mistakes, rather than apportioning blame and taking punitive action. In other words, 
forgiveness should be practised in the learning organisation. Real forgiveness, as 
Senge (1990) addresses, includes both `forgive' and `forget' - forgiving the one who 
made a mistake and forgetting there was ever a mistake. As Cray Research's CEO 
John Rollwagen says, "Making the mistake is punishment enough. " Blame and 
punishment do not have any prevention value and they can often be 
counterproductive. There might be a social or psychological need but this need is 
meaningless in good risk management, which is essential in a high-technology, high 
risk aviation system. Neil Johnston (1994) argues that "Immediate failures on the 
part of an individual are thus irrelevant for all practical purposes, save for the 
identification of essential changes to the system. Feedback on the efficacy of system 
performance must be the primary focus - given that it is the principal means of 
controlling risk. " 
To err is human. The individual mistakes advanced above are the indicators of 
system failures. Pilots are specially selected and trained, and system failures are 
usually detected from the analysis of the feedback of on-line personnel. If 
management focuses on allocation of individual blame rather than the creation of a 
safety culture learning from past experience and locating root causes, no one will be 
willing to make incident reports. 
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3.6 Culture and Accident Rate 
The social environment in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences 
influence one's patterns of thinking, feeling and unconscious behaviour. These 
patterns of thinking, feeling and acting are culture. As mentioned earlier, cultures 
differ according to nation (region, ethnic background, religion and language), age, 
gender, social class and organisation. Pilots unavoidably carry several layers of 
culture and this deeply-rooted mental programming leads them to think and act 
differently in the cockpit. A frequent problem is that these various levels of culture 
are not always in harmony. Pilots' behaviour will be difficult to anticipate when 
these mental programs are in conflict. 
In aviation, understanding the differences in thinking, feeling and acting in people 
from around the globe is more likely to bring about solutions to help prevent 
accidents than improving mutual understanding among multi-national crews at a 
lower level. 
3.6.1 Hofstede's four measures of national cultures 
After conducting a systematic study of work-related values across more than 50 
countries, Geert Hofstede found that these subjects in different countries revealed 
common problems, but with solutions differing from country to country in four areas 
analysed- social inequality, the relationship between the individual and the group, 
concepts of masculinity and femininity, and ways of dealing with uncertainty. The 
empirical results correspond to the common basic problem areas found in Inkeles and 
Levinson's study 20 years ago. '5 Hofstede uses four dimensions of culture to 
represent the four basic problem areas. They are given the names Power Distance 
(PDI), Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), Individualism (IDV), and Masculinity (MAS). 
Countries, thus, can be scaled and differentiated across the four basic dimensions. In 
is In 1954 the sociologist Alex Inkeles and the psychologist Daniel Levinson published a broad survey of the 
English-language literature on national culture, and discovered common problems world-wide in the 
following areas: 1) Relation to authority, 2) conception of self, in particular about the relationship between 
individual and society, and the individual's concept of masculinity and femininity, and 3) ways of dealing 
with conflicts, including the control of aggression and the expression of feelings. (Inkeles and Levinson, 
1969) 
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the Hofstede study, more than 50 countries, on the basis of their four-dimensional 
scores (see table 3.4), were sorted into 13 clusters. That is because each country will 
share some characteristics of its culture with another country. For example, Taiwan, 
Korea, Japan are three different countries, but all of them are influenced by the 
Confucius culture. 
Table 3.4 Values of PDI, UAI, IDV, and MAS Indices for 50 Countries 
and 3 Regions' 
Country PDI UA 
I 
IDV MAS Country PDI UAI IDV MAS 
Arab* 80 68 38 53 Jamaica 45 13 39 68 
Argentina 49 86 46 56 Japan 54 92 46 95 
Australia 36 51 90 61 Korea (South) 60 85 18 39 
Austria 11 70 55 79 Malaysia 104 36 26 50 
Belgium 65 94 75 54 Mexico 81 82 30 69 
Brazil 69 76 38 49 Netherlands 38 53 80 14 
Canada 39 48 80 52 Norway 31 50 69 8 
Chile 63 86 23 28 New Zealand 22 49 79 58 
Colombia 67 80 13 64 Pakistan 55 70 14 50 
Costa Rica 35 86 15 21 Panama 95 86 11 44 
Denmark 18 23 74 16 Peru 64 87 16 42 
East Africa** 64 52 27 41 Philippines 94 44 32 64 
Ecuador 78 67 8 63 Portugal 63 104 27 31 
El Salvador 66 94 19 40 South Africa 49 49 65 63 
Finland 33 59 63 26 Singapore 8 74 20 48 
France 68 86 71 43 Spain 57 86 51 42 
Great Britain 35 35 89 66 Sweden 31 29 71 5 
Germany 35 65 67 66 Switzerland 34 58 68 70 
(West) 
Greece 60 112 35 57 Taiwan 58 69 17 45 
Guatemala 95 101 6 37 Thailand 64 74 20 34 
Hong Kong 68 29 25 57 Turkey 66 85 37 45 
Indonesia 78 48 14 46 Uruguay 61 100 36 38 
India 77 40 48 56 USA 40 46 91 62 
Iran 58 59 41 43 Venezuela 81 76 12 73 
Ireland 28 35 70 68 West Africa*** 77 54 20 46 
Israel 13 81 54 47 Yugoslavia 76 88 27 21 
Italy 50 75 76 70 
y -Key Indices - PDI, Power distance; UAI, Uncertainty avoidance; IDV, Individualism; MAS, 
Masculinity. Regions - *Arab: Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, U. A. E.; **East 
Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia; ***West Africa: Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone. 
The four dimensions are very similar to the ten characteristics of organisational 
culture listed by Robbins (1989). For example, the characteristics of individual 
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initiative, management support and identity could all be items concerned with the 
individualism / collectivism dimension of Hofstede, whereas the risk tolerance, 
control, and conflict tolerance could all be items concerned with the uncertainty 
avoidance dimension. 
Dimension 1: Power Distance 
This measures the degree of unequal relationships between superiors and subordinates 
in a country. It informs us of the unequal distribution and exercise of power which 
are expected and accepted within a culture. In a high power-distance culture (e. g. 
China) leaders are expected to be autocratic and decisive, while their subordinates are 
seen as frequently afraid to express disagreement with their leaders. In a low power- 
distance culture (e. g., Austria) superiors usually consult with their subordinates for 
suggestions and opinions. 
Dimension 2: Uncertainty Avoidance 
This measures the (in)tolerance of ambiguity in a country. It indicates the extent to 
which society cope with novelty, ambiguity, and uncertainty. High uncertainty- 
avoidance cultures (e. g. Japan, France) people tend to be intolerant to unstructured 
and unpredictable situations. They prefer clarity and order; they favour rules and 
regulations. Alternatively, in low uncertainty-avoidance cultures (e. g. New Zealand, 
Denmark) people are used to unstructured and unpredictable situations. Rules are 
only established in case of absolute necessity. 
Dimension 3: Individualism 
This measures the degree of individualism in a country. It encompasses individualism 
and its opposite, collectivism. People in strongly individualistic cultures (e. g. USA, 
Australia) are expected to act according to their own interest, while people in 
collectivist cultures (e. g. Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore) tend to act according to the 
interest of the society. 
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Dimension 4: Masculinity 
This encompasses masculinity and femininity. In masculine cultures (e. g. Japan, 
Italy) ambition and performance are valued. In feminine cultures (e. g. Netherlands, 
Sweden) people value a welfare society. 
The summary of the four dimension is listed in table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Summary of the Four Dimensions 
Dimension Rating 
High Low 
1. Power Distance Autocratic Consultative 
2. Uncertainty Avoidance Risk avoiders Risk takers 
3. Individualism Individualistic Collectivistic 
4. Masculinity Masculine Feminine 
These four cultural dimensions do not exist independently; they interact with each 
other. There is a strong correlation between large power distance and collectivism, 
and between small power distance and individualism. Johnston has applied Hofstede's 
findings to aircraft operations. He states (Johnston, 1993) Hofstede's and other 
studies "serve to illustrate that culture exerts a pervasive, enduring influence on all 
human activities and actions. They also serve to remind us that the cockpit of an 
aircraft cannot be free of such social and cultural influences, however opaque they 
may be to the casual observer. " Johnston draws comparison between countries and 
regions with strong individualistic and collectivist cultures and finds that strong 
individualistic countries and regions have notably safer aviation records. The same 
results applies to countries with a low power-distance index. The comparison clearly 
shows that power-distance and individualism indices are correlated with accident 
rates. The reasoning behind the results is that, in countries with a high power- 
distance and collectivist culture (such as most Asian countries), junior crew do not 
challenge the captain and expect him or her to give orders. Thus, a subordinate pilot 
will not question a captain's flying even when the captain deviates from standard 
operating procedures. The 1993 crash of Boeing 747-400 at Hong Kong exemplifies 
the influence of cockpit power gradient upon accidents. One of the major causal 
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factors determined for this accident was that "the commander diminished the co- 
pilot's ability to monitor rollout progress and proper autobrake operation by 
instructing him to perform a non-standard duty and by keeping him ill-informed 
about his own intentions" (Civil Aviation Department-Hong Kong, 1995). By 
matching Hofstede's individualism and power-distance indices with accident statistics 
on hull loss rates, Boeing has also illustrated existence of a "possible" correlation. 
Countries with small power distances and high individualism tend to have lower 
accident rates; on the contrary, countries with large power distances and low 
individualism are found to have higher accident rates (see figures 3.11 & 3.12). 
Boeing explains the results from the viewpoint of ergonomics, "It is interesting to 
note that the majority of the world's commercial jet aircraft were designed and built 
in the regions of the world with high individualism and low power-distance indices. " 
Johnston (1993) also emphasised that "It would clearly be foolish to tackle cross- 
cultural problems of management and group functioning by blindly using a narrow 
and predefined repertoire of conceptions, prescriptions, and tools. " 
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3.7 Documentation and aviation safety 
A complex human-machine system is more than a collection of hardware and 
software components. To support the efficiency and safety of the system, the 
organisational infrastructure of operating concepts and documentation must be 
consistent and logical. In other words, coherency between organisational culture in 
its broadest sense (e. g. philosophy and policies) and what actually happens in practice 
(e. g. procedures and records/practices) is vitally important for the safety management 
of a learning organisation. 
3.7.1 Documentation 
3.7.1.1 The approach of two `P's and one `R': Policy, procedures and records 
The function of safety management is to ensure that the safety level of an 
organisation is maintained. An organisation's safety documentation can be viewed as 
a hierarchy containing three tiers, as shown in Figure 3.13. All documentation moves 
from the highest level to the middle level, and from the middle level to the lowest 
level. In a well-organised safety system, changes at one level will seldom affect the 
levels above it but may affect those below. 
Why-state philosophy, goal, 
mission 
POLICIES ~ 
Define What will be done 
Manuals Who, When, 
PROCEDURES 
ý- Where, How 
Evidence for 
RECORDS improvement 
Figure 3.13 The Documentation Pyramid 
Policies The first tier of documentation is the policy manual. This is the 
document that states an organisation's philosophy, goal and mission, and defines what 
will be done and why it should be done. A safety policy manual should be written 
clearly, precisely, practically, and easily to understand .A safety policy statement, 
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providing guidance for what is to be done, should be a short simple definition of the 
organisation's safety intentions. For example: "We believe that an excellent company 
is by definition a safe company. Since we are committed to excellence it follows that 
minimising risk to customers, aircraft and services is inseparable from all other 
company objectives. ", and "A good safety record goes hand in hand with high safety 
standards and productivity. " 
Procedures The second tier of documentation consists of procedures. These 
describe the methods that will be used to implement and perform the stated policies. 
In general, procedures specify the following six things: 
I. What the task is. 
2. When the task is conducted (time and sequence). 
3. By whom it is conducted. 
4. How the task is done (actions). 
5. The sequence of actions. 
6. What type of feedback is given (callout, actions etc. ) 
Procedures dictate the strategies that will be used and applied to all areas within the 
organisation to ensure the safety of the system. Thus, they should encompass all the 
details and be written in a manner that will allow for easy clear understanding. It 
should be noted that procedures are not required for all elements. 
Procedures are sometimes called "work instructions" because they spell out how a job 
will be done. Thus, "procedures" are the most detailed of the documentation 
hierarchy. 
Records Records are a way of documenting that policies and procedures have 
been followed. Records provide data for tracing actions taken as part of a specific 
process, and they offer information for taking corrective action and recalling 
products, if necessary. 
Manuals Manuals are the written documents that set forth the priorities and 
goals of the organisation. They state the methods to be used by the various units in 
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supporting these priorities and goals, and provide the organisation's policies and 
procedures that employees must comply with. 
Manuals need to be upgraded to meet current needs, but the policies and procedures 
in the revised versions must be kept in agreement with the old ones and consistent 
with manuals used by other departments. All departments should review their 
policies and procedures annually to ensure that desired practices, procedures and 
regulations are in compliance with each other. It is recommended that manuals be a 
loose-leaf type so that revisions can be made easily; in addition, there should be a 
method of ensuring that revisions are received and recorded properly. 
3.7.1.2 Degani and Wiener's four `P' approach: Philosophy, policy, 
procedures and practices 
The Degani-Wiener approach emphasises a top-down methodology. Flight 
management first determines its overall operating philosophy; this in turn generates 
policies. Procedures, then, are derived from the policies. Based on procedures, 
practices are conducted by crew. 
Philosophy The philosophy of operations is a combination of economic factors, 
public relations campaigns, new generations of aircraft, and major organisational 
changes. It is the operational concept, showing how the business of the airline will be 
conducted. A company's philosophy is largely influenced by the individual 
philosophies of the top decision makers, but also by the company's culture. The 
corporate culture permeates the company, and a philosophy of flight operations 
emerges either with or without clear statements. Philosophy generates policies, and 
may change with time when the operation becomes more mature. 
Policies Policies are the broad specifications of the manner in which 
management expects operations to be performed, such as training, flying, 
maintenance, exercise of authority, personal conduct, etc. Policies can be defined and 
added over time. They affect procedures. 
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Procedures Procedures are step-by-step specifications drafted by management and 
provided to pilots. They are designed to dictate the manner in which tasks and sub- 
tasks are carried out and to provide a standardisation of cockpit duties. Degani and 
Wiener argue that if how operators conduct flight dock procedures needs to be 
understood, the infrastructure of the philosophy and policies should also be examined. 
Practices In a later paper Degani and Wiener point out the significance of the 
roles of the pilot in flight operations, who is the one that actually carries out the 
procedures, and whose decisions and actions determine the system outcome. They, 
then, call for the need to add a fourth `P', Practices, to address the gap between 
management's intentions and the reality of operational practices. Although all 
planning is top-down, bottom-up influences also exist because actual practices may 
affect procedures. Ideally, procedures and practices should be the same, but there are 
cases indicating that operators do not always follow any given procedure dictated by 
flight management (Lautman and Gallimore, 1988). The difference between 
procedures and practice is procedural deviation, or error, which will be discussed later 
in the chapter. 
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Policy of British Airways is a good 
example to illustrate the four `P' framework (ICAO, 1993). 
" Philosophy: it is a corporate goal to be a safe and secure airline, as stated in 
the corporate mission and goals. 
" Policy: in the event of a full, or partial, "Pull-up" or other hard (red) warning, 
the following action must be taken promptly: 
a) Below MSA (Minimum Safe Altitude) 
Announce "PULL-UP GO-AROUND" 
Immediately complete the pull-up manoeuvre in all circumstances. 
b) At and Above MSA 
Immediately assess aircraft position, altitude and vertical speed. If 
proximity to MSA is in doubt, take action as in a) above. 
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" Procedure: GPWS pull-up manoeuvre is described in fleet-specific manuals. 
Describe the call-outs by the handling pilot and the non-handling pilot - 
procedures at and below MSA and procedures above MSA; define MSA 
during climb and descent in case of ambiguities and include additional 
operational information deemed appropriate for the crews to observe the 
GPWS Policy. 
" Practices: do flight crews observe the policy and follow the procedure in 
operational conditions? 
The original policy of GPWS mandated an immediate pull-up upon receipt of any 
GPWS warning. Operational feedback, however, indicated the unreliability of the 
GPWS alerts led to pilot deviation in 60% of occasions. An obvious discrepancy 
between the three first Ps and the last one - Practices - was evident. Based on this 
feedback data and its analysis, the safety services of the operator amended its GPWS 
policy to that listed in the above paragraph, with the purpose of ensuring compliance 
with the policy on all occasions. 
3.7.2 Standard operating procedures 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are operating rules which provide operators 
with step-by-step guidance for carrying out their operations in predictable situations. 
Well-designed SOPs should be able to ensure efficient and error resistant actions, 
enhance co-ordination between operators in the system, and exercise quality control 
by management and regulating agencies over the operators. 
The flawlessness obtained from standardisation of operating procedures is essential in 
high-risk endeavours such as aircraft operations. Based on a broad concept of the 
user's operation, procedures specify how to perform tasks efficiently and safely in 
keeping with the company's basic operating philosophy. Standardisation ensures that 
"the best way" of doing things may transcend the whole organisation, encompassing 
fleets of very different aircraft. Standardisation makes sure that crews are trained to 
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behave in one consistent and predictable way, so that each pilot should know exactly 
what to expect of another pilot. 
The importance of SOPs is much greater than standardisation. First, SOPs provide 
for flight operations with a structure, which gives crew members the ability to 
anticipate each other's actions. In the cockpit, the most important task of the pilot- 
not-flying (PNF) is to monitor the adherence to procedures and clearances by the 
pilot-flying (PF). Thus, one of the virtues of SOPs is to offer the PNF standards for 
effective monitoring. Secondly, by providing consistent and safe methods of 
accomplishing many normal (and abnormal) tasks, SOPS help flight crews to deal 
calmly with unexpected or inexperienced situations. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, adherence to SOPS helps to keep pilots active in long-term planning - for 
any action taken there is an anticipated procedure or response. As long as a situation 
is anticipated and can be practised, there is a set procedures for dealing with it. SOPS 
provide pilots with these anticipated responses and procedures, and all good pilots 
rely on them in flight operations. In addition to the three benefits above, abiding by 
SOPs may also minimise language barriers when multi-national crews work together. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, many past accidents and incidents are correlated 
to deviation from standard operating procedures. It should be noted that although 
SOPs promote uniformity and serve as an intervention against human error, they 
cannot ensure absolutely safe operations. In situations where procedures are not 
adequate for the task or are not compatible with the operating environment, 
adherence to them might lead a responsible operator to execute unsafe operations. 
Degani and Wiener (1994) proclaim that operations of high-risk systems need the 
support of procedures and human cognition as well. They emphasise that "The role 
of management should be to provide the best possible baseline for its crews, and then 
train and standardise to this baseline. No procedure is a substitute for an intelligent 
operator. " 
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Here is a dramatic example: 
On 19 July 1989, a United Airlines (UAL) DC-10 suffered a total loss of hydraulic 
flight controls during cruise flight. 16 Because the possibility of total loss of 
hydraulic-powered flight controls was considered so remote as to negate any 
requirement for an appropriate procedure to counter such a situation, the flight crew 
could not be taught how to control the aircraft and land successfully. Under the 
circumstances, although the aircraft subsequently crashed during an attempted 
landing, the UAL flightcrew performance was highly commendable and greatly 
exceeded reasonable expectations. 
Additionally, SOPs with poor design are apt to promote errors on the part of 
operators. Two Boeing 747-400 cases revealed the problem of using the adaptability 
of the human beings to make up for a shortfall in the system. After being given a late 
runway change, the captain in each of these cases was busy at sorting out the flight 
management system and changing the instrument landing system (ILS) frequency so 
that the aircraft was positioned high on the approach and consequently landed deep. 
After this, the 747-400 Fleet Newsletter suggested a solution to the problem: " 
Rehearse what you will do in the event of a late runway change, possibly setting up 
the parallel runway in advance in route 2 of the FMS" (Seaman, 1992). 
The above examples emphasise the importance of the feedback process. Feedback 
provides an effective channel of communication between line and management, a 
channel for line pilots to offer suggestions and information regarding SOPs for the 
attention of the procedure designers and for re-evaluation by management. The 
feedback process can serve to eliminate the differences between actual operations and 
written procedures. 
16 The UAL DC-10 flight 232 experienced a catastrophic failure of the No. 2 engine during cruise flight. The 
separation, fragmentation and forceful discharge of the stage I fan rotor assembly parts from the No 2 engine 
led to the loss of the three hydraulic systems that powered the airplane's flight controls. The flightcrew 
experienced severe difficulties controlling the airplane, which subsequently crashed during an attempted 
landing at Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa. There were 235 passengers and 11 crewmember onboard. One 
flight attendant and 110 passengers were fatally injured. 
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3.7.3 Procedural deviation influences on safety 
Pilots are supposed to conform to SOPs when on the flight deck, but in reality they 
can decide to conform to or deviate from them. It is often the case when written 
procedures are incompatible with the operational environment, or have technical 
deficiencies, increase the workload, or create conflict in time management, etc., flight 
crews may react by resisting and deviating from SOPs. 
Procedural deviation results from problems within the human-procedure context. 
Deviations may be trivial or significant. In most cases, deviations are not apparent 
and left unresolved in the system until unpredicted interactions of failures and 
deviations manifest themselves in an accident or an incident. Lautman and Gallimore 
(1988) conducted a study of jet-transport aircraft accident reports to `better 
understand accident cause factors' in commercial airline operations. They analysed 
93 jet hull-loss accidents that occurred between 1977 and 1984, and finding that the 
leading crew-causal factor in their sample was `pilot deviation from basic operational 
procedures' (Figure 3.14). These findings are also clearly supported by the airline 
accidents in Asia (see Figure 3.15; Chapter 2, Table 2.3) and in Taiwan (see Chapter 
2, Table 2.4). Additionally, Boeing's analysis of jet transport accident records (1982 
through 1991) shows that among the thirty seven identified accident prevention 
strategies, the most common one is "Flying Pilot Adherence to Procedures" (Weener 
and Russell, 1993). 
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Percent of occurrence 
10 20 30 40 
1. Pilot deviation from basic 
operational procedures ..................... ...... 
33% 
2. Inadequate cross-check by 
second crew \ 
member .............................. 
26% 
\\\\\\\\ 
3. Crews not conditioned for proper 
response during abnormal condition . ........ 
9% 
4. Pilot did not recognise need 
for go-around ................................... ........ 
6% Mý 
5. Pilot incapacitation .......................... ........ 
4% 
6. Inadequate piloting skills ................. ........ 
4% 
7. Errors during training flight ............. ........ 
3% 
8. Other ............................................... ...... 
15% 
Figure 3.14 Significant crew-caused factors in 93 hull-loss accidents 
(Source: Adapted from Lautman and Gallimore, 1988) 
Percent of occurrence 
10 20 30 40 50 
1. Failure to follow regulations 
or procedures ........................................ 
44% 
2. Failure to cross-check / 
co-ordinate ............................................. 
40% 
3. Lack of situational 
awareness ................. 
35% 
4. Omission of action/ inappropriate 
0 action ..................................................... 
2 0 
5. Flight handling ...................................... 
19% 
6. Fast / high approach .............................. 
15% Mýýý 
7. Lack of qualification / training ............... 
13% 
8. Language barrier ...................................... 
6% 
9. Action on wrong control / 
instrument ............................................... 
4% 
10. Slow / low on approach ........................... 
4% M 
Figure 3.15 Significant crew-caused factors in Asia 
(Each accident may have more than one Causal Factor) 
Source: ICAO, Asian CAAs and aircraft manufacturers 
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The classification of `pilot deviation from basic operational procedures' seems to 
imply that deviations happen when pilots deliberately ignore or misuse procedures. 
To avoid oversimplifying the issue, the factor lying beneath the surface - what leads 
flight crews to deviate from Standard Operating Procedures - should also be 
examined. 
Two fundamental distinctions can be generated from the "pilot deviation from basic 
operational procedures" classification. They are: 
" pilot-generated deviation, and 
" design-induced deviation. 
The aviation accident reports of Hong Kong and Nepal accidents illustrate the point. 
1. China Airlines Boeing 747-409B Accident in Hong Kong 
The pilot-generated deviation was identified as one of the major causal factors. 
9 The commander deviated from the normal landing roll procedure in that he 
inadvertently advanced the thrust levers when he should have selected reverse 
thrust. 
The investigation concluded that design-induced deviation also contributed to the 
accident. 
9 The absence of a clearly defined crosswind landing technique in China 
Airline's Operations Manual deprived the pilots of adequate guidance for 
operations in difficult weather conditions. 
2. Thai Airways Airbus A310-304 Accident in Nepal 
After the investigation, the following findings are listed: 
" The crew's response to the GPWS warning was not in accordance with the 
manufacturer's procedures. (Pilot-generated deviation) 
The operator's procedures for responding to GPWS did not provide sufficient 
guidance to the crew. (Design-induced deviation) 
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9 The Captain assessed the GPWS warning as false. (Design-induced 
deviation) 
Attempting to increase the attention paid to less explicit factors, Degani & Wiener 
(1991) subdivide the design-induced deviation into four categories and highlight their 
deficiencies. 
Incompatibility of the procedure with the operational environment Incompatibility of 
procedures with the operational environment is usually caused by the lack of proper 
policies. Thus, the design and development of the policies and procedures should 
take into consideration the operational environment in which they will be used. 
Sequential incompatibility Sequential deficiencies are particularly critical because 
of the time limitation, workload and level of stress involved in dealing with 
abnormal/emergency situation. 
Incompatibility of paperwork and computerwork Much of the paperwork and 
procedures in use today by airlines were designed for traditional aircraft, and have not 
been adapted to the advanced technology cockpits. It is necessary for carriers 
operating high technology aircraft to examine every aspect of their operations and 
paperwork for incompatibility with the new aircraft. 
Wording The words used in operating procedures should be consistent and 
unambiguous in order to prevent misunderstanding. 
In one incident a captain consulted the appropriate manual for solving a technical 
problem. The captain and the first officer came up with three different interpretations 
of the instructions. In this situation, the flight engineer was unable to adjudicate 
satisfactorily. The captain then asked his 12-year-old daughter, sitting on the 
jumpseat behind him, whether she could understand what was written. Needless to 
say, it was complete "gobbledegook" to her as well! 
The point is that "if manuals are not written in language that is clear to an intelligent 
12-year-old, then there is a good chance that flight crews will not understand what is 
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required of them when they are trying to cope with problems in the most adverse of 
circumstances, when their attention will inevitably be divided among a number of 
conflicting and competing tasks" (Seaman, 1992). 
To summarise, the safety of high-technology organisations depends on well- 
established policies and procedures. Without them it is impossible to ensure that 
operations will produce the desired results. Management's role must be to maintain 
an active involvement in reducing the difference between procedures and actual 
operations. The establishment of a hazard/incident reporting system in combination 
with undertaking regular audits in an organisation will help improve the links 
between the two `P's and `R', or the four 4 `P's. 
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3.8 The "New Third Pilot" automation and safety 
The aircraft automation advances made over the last few decades have been 
developed to cope with two primary objectives: to provide economic benefits to the 
aircraft operator and to improve flight safety. Today's advanced level of automation 
have delivered on economic promises, but their safety effectiveness has been a 
subject of dispute. 
3.8.1 The reasons for automation 
Long before the microprocessor revolution, the call for automation had resulted in the 
prodigious utilisation of analogue devices, such as autopilots, flight directors, yaw 
dampers, and various alerting devices, in the flight deck. Recent advances in 
microprocessors and display systems have merely served as a catalyst to hasten the 
process of flight-deck automation and bring more rapid changes. There are three 
principal reasons for aircraft automation: 
" Increasing availability of sophisticated technology (see the next section) 
" Economical benefits 
" Safety improvement 
these amazing changes in aircraft automation could not have been possible without 
the rapid advances in microprocessor technology. Economic benefits have 
encouraged the trend of automation. The influence of human factors or pilot error in 
accident causation has also prompted the implementation of flight deck automation. 
Economical benefits are to be derived from a combination of factors as listed below 
(Learner, 1983; Wiener & Curry, 1981). 
1. Personnel costs can be cut because crew size can be reduced through automation 
of the crew's tasks. 
2. The new generation of solid state avionics and display systems can not only 
improve reliability but also reduce maintenance. 
3. An automated monitoring and recording systems can save money in maintenance 
of high-value systems, such as engines and auxiliary power units. 
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4. Flight automation can improve the accuracy of routes and approaches, and foster 
safer ground operations. 
5. Increasing automation also leads to more economical, fuel-efficient operation. 
The principal rationale for cockpit automation is to reduce pilot workload and 
improve safety. Wiener (1988) presents three related reasons for justifing this 
rationale: (1) to enable effective pilot performance during both normal and 
emergency operations; (2) to increase the scanning capability of the pilot; and (3) 
allow the certification of aircraft for two crew operations. 
Effective performance during normal and emergency conditions A principal reason 
for the implementation of automation is the need to relieve the flight crew of routine 
manual control and mental computations so that there is time to supervise the flight 
more effectively and to perform optimally in high workload and emergency 
conditions. 
Increased scanning capability As shown in Chapter 2 Figure 2.3, more than 
50% of airline accidents occur at lower altitudes; thus, one of the most important pilot 
monitoring tasks is to scan for other aircraft during flight. Automation enables pilots 
to spend less time with their heads in the cockpit so that more time may be devoted to 
scanning outside. 
Crew size The reduction in pilot workload through automation permits two-pilot 
crews to complete a task previously performed by three. Nowadays aircraft, 
including wide-body airliners, can be designed and certified for two crew operation. 
Despite the apparent attractions of automation, however, there are a number of less 
obvious shortcomings. Further discussion about . the problems associated with 
automation is provided later in the section. 
3.8.2 Aircraft automation development 
Cockpit automation began in the mid-1930's with the introduction of crude 
autopilots. By the 1950's more sophisticated models were developed and installed on 
aircraft of the Super Constellation and DC-6 generation. In the jet age, flight 
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guidance systems consisted of autopilots and other automatic devices, such as flight 
directors, area navigation (RNAV) and basic autothrottles. Autoslats, autospoilers and 
autobrakes also became part of the automation package. 
At the beginning of the eighties, rudimentary forms of computer-based error 
elimination and protection were first found in the "glass cockpit"s aircraft of the 
Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. The Airbus A320, introduced in 1987, took error 
protection one step further. It possessed a fly-by-wire control system and side stick 
controllers in place of the usual control columns in the cockpit. The fly-by-wire 
feature offered the opportunity to fly manoeuvres such as maximum safe angle of 
attack (AOA) for windshear escape, with no danger of entering a stall. 
Although aircraft automation was first seen in the stability augmentation system 
invented by Sir Hiram Maxim in 1891 (see Figure 3.16), it was the availability of 
very compact digital computers, 90 years after this, that made it possible to automate 
control, information presentation and management functions. Consequently, the role 
of pilot has changed to being a supervisor of automated equipment. 
Level 
of 
Aircraft 
Automation 
+ FBW with Envelope Protection (A-320) 
+ Performance Mgt. Systems (MD-80) 
+ Flight Mgt. Systems (MD-80, B-767) 
+ Active Controls, Adv. Autopilot (L1011-500) 
+ Triplex Autopilot + Autoland 
+ Full Capability Flight Director 
+ Sperry "Zero-reader" Director 
+Coupled Navigation (DC-6) 
+ Autopilot in World Flight (Hughes) 
+ Autopilot in World Flight (Post) 
+ Two-axis Non-gyro SAS (Taplin) 
+ Coupled Stabiliser (Sperry) 
+ Stab. Aug. System (Wright) 
Gyroscopic Stabiliser (Maxim) 
1900 1980 Year 
Figure 3.16 A Chronology of Aircraft Automation 
Source: revised from Billings, 1991 
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3.8.3 Problems associated with automation 
Flight automation innovations have been introduced to increase safety and efficiency. 
Automation and computerisation are employed in almost all branches of the aviation 
system today. It is undeniable that airlines can secure safety and financial benefits 
from the increased use of computers and automation, but some new and potentially 
serious hazards associated with the new technology have also arisen. 
The industry has weighed the advantages with the disadvantages, and has concluded 
that increasing automation is the correct course to follow. However, the 
disadvantages associated with automation must be examined. 
Table 3.7 lists the past accidents and incidents in which automation has been a 
contributing factor. Each of these accidents or incidents shows that the pilots either 
did not understand what the automation was doing or did not receive adequate 
feedback from the automated systems. 
Table 3.7 Accidents/Incidents in Which Automation Has Been a 
Factor 
DATE TYPE LOCATION FACTOR SEVERITY 
Feb. 1985 B747 Nr San Francisco overconfidence accident 
Apr. 1988 MD-80 Detroit autopilot design accident 
Jun. 1988 A320 Habsheim overconfidence accident 
Jul. 1988 A320 Gatwick mode understanding incident 
Jun. 1989 B767 Boston mode understanding incident 
Feb. 1990 A320 Bangalore mode understanding accident 
Jun. 1990 A320 San Diego mode understanding incident 
Feb. 1991 A310 Moscow pilot vs autopilot incident 
Jan. 1992 A320 Strasbourg mode understanding accident 
Sep. 1993 A320 Warsaw authoritarian system accident 
Apr. 1994 A300 Nagoya pilot vs autopilot accident 
Jun. 1994 B757 Manchester autopilot design incident 
Jun. 1994 A330 Toulouse autopilot design accident 
Sep. 1994 A310 Orly autopilot design incident 
Source: Compiled from AW & ST, Jan. 1995 and Billings, 1996 
Automation in today's advanced aviation systems seldom provide all of the benefits 
promised, and increasing dependence on flight automation breeds new kinds of safety 
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problem that might not occur with older flight deck design. Perils of automation, as 
listed below, are generally man-machine interface problems. 
1. Complacency Automation is progressively changing the role of the pilot from 
an active operator to a system monitor. Studies show that after a period of time in 
passive monitoring situations, a human's ability to detect a failure diminishes 
(Foushee, 1991). Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993) also point out that "the 
presence of automation affects the efficiency of human monitoring. " Excessive 
reliance upon automation, for example, may cause serious problems in abnormal 
situations or emergencies. 
2. False Alarms Failure of automated equipment makes the operator question its 
validity. For example, the original Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
was unusable due to a high false-alarm rate. Although software improvements 
have been implemented to make it more reliable, the improved version (TCAS II) 
still has high false alarm rates in high-density traffic areas (Kantowitz, 1992). 
Wickens (1984) indicates that false alarms lead to distrust of indicators and 
"produce the `voluntary vigilance decrement' -a conscious conservative 
adjustment of the detection criterion. " 
3. Skill Degradation Automation increases training requirements. It takes 
longer for pilots to learn a more complex automated system. Furthermore, flying 
with automation deprives the pilot of practice in the manual mode which may 
induce a loss of proficiency, the skills that are critically important when the 
automated system malfunctions. In addition, there is often more to take care of 
when intervention is unavoidable, because the system was probably automated to 
increase its capability. Pilots, thus, require additional simulator time to maintain 
the skills in emergency situations when the system malfunctions and their 
workload is at its peak. 
4. Manual Take-over Problem Automated system makes the crew unaware of 
its state at all times. Norman (1990) discussed the hazards of automatic 
compensation for abnormal events and conditions about which the crew was 
unaware. The difficulty lies in the lack of awareness of either the problem or the 
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automatic compensation by the crew when automation reaches its limit to 
compensate and the crew need to take over. Take the well-known case of the 
China Airlines Boeing 747-200 (NTSB, 1985) for an example. The captain lost 
control of the aircraft because he was distracted from his flight monitoring duties 
by his participation with the flight engineer in the evaluation of the No. 4 engine's 
malfunction. 
5. Mental Workload Increase Current automation systems are machine- 
centred, and functions are allocated to reduce pilots' workload under routine 
conditions but seldom support them in difficult situations. Pilots perceive some 
reduction in the total workload, but probably less than that claimed by the 
manufacturers during the certification process. Wiener (1985) argues that 
designers emphasise reducing manual workload, but does not account adequately 
for the mental workload. Bainbridge (1987) gives an insight into the ironies of 
automation. He indicates that, "the designer who tries to eliminate the operator 
still leaves the operator to do the tasks which the designer cannot think how to 
automate.. . the operator can 
be left with an arbitrary collection of tasks, and little 
thought may have been given to providing support for them. " 
6. Error Relocation The rapid expansion of automation in the cockpit does not 
remove human error; on the contrary, it merely relocates its sources to a different 
level. The research of Wiener and Curry suggests that automation merely changes 
the nature of error, and possibly increases the severity of its consequences (Curry, 
1985; Wiener, 1985,1988,1989). In brief, computer-controlled flight may invite 
large blunders while eliminating the small errors seen in manual systems. 
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Figure 3.17 Two Dimensions of Automation: Summary the 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Automation. 
3.8.4 Differences in manufacturer philosophy 
Sources of human error are not confined in operational level. Errors in the 
manufacture and maintenance of automated equipment can also be potentially 
disastrous. 
The more complex that computers become and the more authority they are given in 
the cockpit, the more chances for breakdown in communication between the pilots 
and automated systems there are. In this regard, the three major commercial aircraft 
manufacturers have different philosophies. 
Airbus Industrie officials believe that automation serve to prevent a pilot from 
inadvertently exceeding safety limits. Hence, the "hard" speed envelope protection 
features in Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft are designed to prevent a pilot from stalling the 
aircraft in most circumstances and from pulling accelerations of more than 2.5g, even 
in an emergency. 
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Boeing's approach is to never bypass the crew. The flight crew plays a crucial role in 
the aviation system, so the design of automation must be based on an understanding 
of the roles, responsibilities, capabilities and limitations of the human crew. 
Automation is a tool to aid pilots and should not be given authority to override pilot 
inputs. 
McDonnell Douglas' philosophy to advanced cockpit design includes a similar "soft" 
protection scheme to Boeing's. However, the MD-11 design removes the pilot 
function in many situations and gives a large amount of authority to sophisticated 
automation systems. 
Technology-centred automation may be based on the designer's view that the human 
operator is unreliable and inefficient and should therefore be eliminated from the 
system (Belai, 1995). Recent accidents involving aircraft equipped with automation 
and computerisation highlight some significant problems with this approach. Firstly, 
errors in system design can in fact be a major source of operating problems. 
Secondly, automation is introduced to reduce human error and workload, but 
frequently, automation leaves the operator to cope with different and more demanding 
situations which automation is not programmed to handle. To this we can add the fact 
that automation is not, after all, unerring and able to fully replace fallible humans. To 
make matters worse, automation usually fails in mysterious and unpredictable ways 
and the human is expected to match the exigencies of the machine. For automation to 
be effective and at the same time satisfy minimum safety standards, a human-centred 
approach needs to be designed and employed. This should assist the human operator 
by providing management options, timely information, and explanations of its actions 
and intentions. 
3.8.5 Intervention for safety management 
The purpose of emphasising some of the potential problems that may occur with glass 
cockpits is not to condemn automation but instead to highlight the need for a more 
viable balance for ensuring human and machine co-operation in performing tasks. 
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Lauber (1991) pinpoints the key problem of human and machine co-operation: 
"Although technology seems to be readily available and generally reliable, what is 
missing are principles, rules and guidelines defining the relationship between that 
technology and the humans who must operate it. " In other words, how automation 
should be implemented to meet the needs of the operators is of fundamental. 
As pointed out in the previous section, designers should develop a system taking 
human capabilities and limitations into account. Higgins (1996) clearly states the 
design principles of human-centred automation that could be used as areference: 
1. Design must address fundamental human strengths, limitations and individual 
differences 
2. Design must recognise the captains authority and aid both pilots' responsibilities 
3. New designs should be based on past training and operational experience 
4. The hierarchy of design alternatives is simplicity, redundancy and automation 
5. New technologies and functional capabilities should only be used when: 
" the result is clear and there are distinct operational or efficiency advantages, 
and then 
9 only if there is no adverse effect on the human machine interface. 
6. Automation should be applied as a tool to aid, not replace the pilot 
7. Designs must apply human error tolerance and avoidance techniques 
8. Presentation of information to the crew must support the pilot task priority 
Additionally, airlines can also take steps to reduce the safety concerns bred by 
increasing dependence of flight automation. Providing specialised instruction in 
automation, changing training procedures and using partial simulators all can help. 
Some training programmes overemphasise those of autoflight at all times and not 
offer enough instruction on when to use it and when to disengage it. Consequently, 
pilots sometimes hesitate to turn off the automation when a problem, or even just a 
change in flight plan, occurs. As Wiener emphasises, "When there is confusion, the 
best solution is to turn the system off and fly the aircraft just like an old Boeing 727. " 
119 
_Chapter 
3 Contemporary Safety Thinking and Its Application 
Airline safety management must ensure that pilots are trained to use the level of 
automation required by their tasks, and they should be taught strategies for dealing 
adequately with the human-machine relationship. 
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PART II 
Airline Safety Management Survey 
CHAPTER 4 
Safety 
Survey Design 
The goal of zero accident is a noble one and should be pursued as a matter of philosophical 
principle. Although it is impossible to wholly eliminate human fallibility, system failures, and 
hazards, it is definitely worth trying to do so. 
In aviation, airlines must manage the organizational factors that influence safety. With attempt 
to eliminate active and in particular latent failures within their operational processes, they have 
to develop means to identify them and erect missing defensive barriers once they've been 
identified. These goals can not he accomplished without continuous safety endeavour across all 
levels of the airline, from the line pilot or ground staff up through top management. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAFETY SURVEY DESIGN AND INTERVIEW 
"Safety is work that is more than opportune, it is imperative. " 
------- Victor Hugo 
4. Overview 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an illustration of how accidents are identified and analysed. 
They probe the perceptions of factors contributing to accidents and the implication of 
safety culture to root out the underlying causal factors. 
The chapter begins with an illustration of why a safety survey is essential in accident 
prevention and how it was conducted to reach the optimal goal. Then, it indicates 
that the reason for selecting Taiwan and Asia as research subjects is to understand the 
regional situation to deal with regional safety issues. The author goes on to discuss 
the methodology used in the research, together with its advantages and disadvantages. 
In the final sections, sampling, distribution procedures and a summary of the general 
results obtained from the questionnaire and interview surveys are depicted. 
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4.1 Conducting a safety survey 
4.1.1 Fundamental principles of a safety survey 
A safety survey is essentially used to review the extent in satisfaction of aviation 
operations and to diagnose their problems if they appear or are suspected. Figure 4.1 
shows the three essential methods of hazard identification: Safety surveys, 
hazard/incident reporting and investigation, and accident investigation. Among them, 
a safety survey is the most cost-effective and flexible hazard identification method. It 
can be done at any time and in any place; it can include all the employees throughout 
an organisation, or focus on a particular area of operations or facilities. Unlike 
investigation, a safety survey makes people feel more comfortable in revealing their 
opinions and observations without holding back. Identifying hazards in advance, it 
enables airline and safety management to take proactive action to eliminate or avoid 
their occurance. 
Proactive I Reactive 
Hazard/incident Accident Safety surveys reporting investigation 
and investigation 
Identification 
and 
assessment 
of hazards 
Figure 4.1 The Three Essential Methods of Hazard identification 
4.1.2 Aim of the safety survey 
From the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, it is known that accidents usually result 
from multicausal factors, and that a high proportion of aviation accidents and 
incidents are the result of human-factor errors. Nevertheless, it is also realised that 
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many accident causes might be rooted in organisational issues and the role of 
management. Identifying the failures or weaknesses in an organisation's safety 
management system could, therefore, yield significant benefits in aviation safety. 
These benefits might include better understanding of an organisation's existing safety 
management (e. g. organisation structure, corporate culture, resource availability, the 
quality of training) and permitting effective formulation of priorities, policies, 
procedures and tasks by evaluating sufficient feedback gained from line pilots. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, universal solutions in aviation safety are not practical to 
regions with different cultures; Thus regional solutions are needed. The main study, 
designed to probe regional situations, was conducted to better understand airline 
safety management in Asia and, then, make a closer study of one of the Asian air- 
travel booming countries, Taiwan. The airline safety management survey in the study 
aims to: 
" investigate pilots' perception of airline safety management 
" better understanding of the underlying situation 
" compare the difference of attitude or perception regarding airline safety 
management between Captains and First Officers, Ab-initio trained pilots 
and military trained pilots 
" look at the impressions held by of the pilots and CAA operation officers 
about the role of the aviation regulatory authority on airline safety 
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4.2 A brief introduction to air transport in Taiwan 
Due to rapid economic growth, commercial aviation throughout Asia is experiencing 
an unprecedented boom. Taiwan's carriers exemplify the current situation. 
The number of airlines presently operating in Taiwan has grown from five to ten 
airlines in the past six years. Of these, eight operate regional scheduled flights and 
two operate international scheduled flights. In 1985 there were about a dozen flights 
a day between the two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung. On the Taipei-Kaohsiung 
route there are 99 flights a day in each direction at present (CAA-Taiwan, 1995). 
These are operated by aircraft types ranging from the Saab SF340 to the Boeing 767. 
What is more impressive is the Hong Kong route. There are about 105 passenger 
flights a week and several Boeing 747 freighter services. International routes are 
expanding too. Destinations on the route network scatter across US, Japan, South- 
eastern Asia, South Africa, Australia and Europe. They are undertaken by a varied 
fleet of wide-body airliners, comprising Airbus A300s and A320s, MD- I Is, Boeing 
747s and the soon-to-be-in-service Boeing 777s. Figurre 4.1 shows traffic growth 
over the last ten years. 
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Figure 4.2 Teeming Taiwan Air Transport 
Source : CAA-Taiwan 
* excluding transit passengers. 
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The reasons for this unprecedented boom in air travel in Taiwan are journey time, 
deregulation, and the potential establishment of a direct air link with mainland China. 
The country's only motorway, linking the capital Taipei in the north to Kaohsiung in 
the south, is overloaded and the journey time for the distance of 350km is around four 
hours. In comparison, the flight time by jet is merely 35 minutes. Another major 
factor was the decision by the government in 1987 to permit open sky, boosted to 
which was another decision to permit Taiwan residents to visit mainland China in the 
same year. As all Taiwanese visiting the mainland have to travel via Hong Kong, 
many of the scheduled flights on the 70 minute journey are operated by Boeing 747s. 
In addition, the operators expect the approval of a direct air link to the mainland in 
the near future, so that a number of new carriers have been formed and many orders 
for new aircraft'7 signed in order to compete with others for the potentially huge 
market for the next twenty years. 
In the past eight years, the number of aircraft has grown from 65 to 156 airworthy 
aircraft (comprising about 25 fixed wing types, ranging from PA-31 to B-747, and 7 
helicopter types). Some additional aircraft are registered, but are not airworthy at 
present. The licensed pilot population has grown from 314 to 1,207 during the same 
period. Recently there were 3,093 total licensed aviation personnel in Taiwan, 
comprising 1,207 licensed pilots (217 foreign pilots), 1,309 ground mechanics, 243 
dispatchers, 103 avionics technicians, and 231 air traffic controllers together with 42 
more to be recruited in the next two years) in Taiwan that come under the CAA's 
authority. Within this group, there are 88 designated check pilots and 39 designated 
maintenance inspectors (CAA-Taiwan, 1995). 
17 Taiwan's Civil Aviation Authority has ruled that the country's airlines are not permitted to buy second-hand 
aircraft, and it is understood that aircraft over 20 years old will not be permitted to operate in the near future. 
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4.3 Method general overview 
The term "survey" is used in a variety of ways, but commonly refers to the collection 
of standardised information from a specific population. The target population of this 
safety survey is the airline pilot. The procedure of the safety survey was carried out 
in four stages: the initial qualitative interviews, the questionnaire construction and 
pilot stage, the main questionnaire study, and finally the data collection and analysis 
stage. The following sections give a detailed description of each stage in the research 
process. 
4.3.1 Methodological considerations 
Based on the degree of structure or formality, surveys are commonly divided into 
three types: Structured, semi-structured and unstructured surveys (Hague, 1993). 
1. Structured. In structured surveys, the questions, their wording, and their 
sequence are fixed and are identical for each respondent. Most of the 
questions have predefined answers and there will be little latitude for a 
respondent to stray beyond them. This ensures that any differences 
between responses are attributable to individual differences and not to 
variations in the survey. 
2. Send-structured. This type of survey has a mixture of questions with 
predefined answers as well as those where the respondent is free to say 
whatever he likes. The semi-structured survey is more flexible than its 
highly structured counterpart and there is likely to be more probing to 
find out the reasons for certain answers. 
3. Unstructured. In this type of informal, or depth survey, the questions 
are not prespecified. Commonly, the researcher used a checklist of 
questions to assist the respondents to state their experiences, their 
opinions and attitudes. 
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Of the variety of survey approaches available, the major self-reported ones include 
interviews and questionnaires. 
The interview survey is a kind of purposeful conversation. It is a flexible and 
adaptable way of finding things out. All interviews require careful preparation; it is 
time-consuming. The interview session itself varies in length, but in general it takes 
30 to 60 minutes or more to gather valuable data. Considerable skill and experience 
are necessary for the interviewers to obtain co-operation from potential interviewees 
as well as to control and close the interviews. In addition, visits need to be arranged 
and confirmed, appointments need rescheduling to cover absences, notes need to be 
written up, and subsequent analysis requires even more time. 
Face-to-face interviews allow the interviewer to modify his line of enquiry or clarify 
any misunderstandings; they enable the interviewer to probe on specific questions; 
they encourage co-operation and rapport; and they allow the interviewer to make a 
truer assessment of what the respondent really believes in a way that postal and other 
self-administered questionnaires cannot. Telephone interviews share many of the 
advantages of face-to-face interviewing: a high response rate; correction of obvious 
misunderstandings, etc. Other advantages include smaller interviewer effects and a 
lower tendency towards socially desirable responses. However, the lack of visual cues 
may cause problems in interpretation. 
The format of the postal questionnaire may be highly structured or semi-structured. 
The degree of structure is determined by the inclusion of closed and/or open-ended 
questions. With closed-ended questions the respondent has to choose from given 
alternatives or select unrealistic alternatives and the analysis is straightforward. On 
the other hand an open-ended style enables a more elaborate response and depth of 
understanding, but it is difficult to code the wealth of qualitative information 
obtained. 
Postal self-completion questionnaires can be completed and returned by a large 
number of respondents in about the same amount of time that it takes to complete a 
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single interview. The major advantage of postal self-completion questionnaires, 
particularly if the sample is hard to reach or is dispersed in different countries, is the 
lower cost in terms of effort, time and money. Checking on the honesty or sincerity of 
responses may be difficult, but this is compensated for by the provision of anonymity. 
Anonymity is considered particularly important when the questions demand a 
considered answer or are so sensitive that the interviewees may not give a true answer 
in the presence of an interviewer. The most serious disadvantage is identified as the 
low response rate. Nachmias and Nachmias (1976) note that the typical response rate 
for a face-to-face questionnaire is about 95 percent, whereas that for a postal 
questionnaire is between 20 and 40 percent. Nevertheless, a well-constructed 
questionnaire needs less time to code and analyse responses, particularly when open- 
ended questions are kept to a minimum and when computer coding or analysis is 
available. 
4.3.2 Structure of the chosen methodology 
Questionnaires and interviews are usually used in safety surveys to determine if a 
particular facility or operation contains hazards. Interviews in particular may elicit 
information which cannot be obtained from self-completion questionnaires. 
Table 4.1 summarises the three different classifications of survey and shows the types 
of survey approaches the author adopted in the study. 
Table 4.1 A Classification of Self-reported Survey 
Type of Survey Survey Approach The Author's 
Choice 
Structured Postal questionnaire  
Face-to-face interview 
Telephone interview 
Semi-structured Postal questionnaire 
Face-to-face interview  
Telephone interview  
Unstructured Visit interview 
Group discussions 
Depth telephone interview 
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The decision was made to use questionnaires for the major part of the Airline 
Management Safety Survey, while face-to-face and telephone interviews were 
employed to complement questionnaires. Table 4.2 summarises the advantages and 
disadvantages of the chosen methodology. 
Table 4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the chosen methodology 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Face-to-face 
Interview 
Telephone 
Interview 
Postal 
Questionnaire 
" Correction of misunderstanding 
" Encouragement to participation and 
involvement 
"A high response rate 
"A high response rate 
" Correction of misunderstandings 
" Smaller interviewer effects 
"A lower tendency towards socially 
desirable responses 
" Low cost, short time and less effort 
"A large sample 
" Large amounts of data 
" Low cost, short time and less effort 
" Anonymity 
" Data standardisation. 
" Interviewer effects and bias 
" Less forthcoming or open responses 
" Social desirability response bias 
" Time-consuming 
" Lack of visual cues for 
interpretation. 
"A low response rate 
" Undetectability of ambiguities and 
misunderstanding 
Although a postal questionnaire is not the most effective data collection method in 
terms of quality of data or response rate, it is efficient to reach a large sample of the 
pilots who were "mobile" all the time due to the nature of their occupation. 
In order to improve the response rate, a number of techniques were adopted in this 
research programme. They are as follows: 
" The questionnaire was printed on coloured paper in order to make it 
appear more interesting; 
" Questionnaire was pretested to ensure that wording and instructions were 
clear, and that the length of questionnaire was compact enough to 
encompass all the key questions and not to bore the respondents; 
" The researcher tried addressing to a named person if possible; 
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"A covering letter was enclosed to inform the participants of the purpose 
and importance of the research, to assure confidentiality and to 
encourage a reply; 
"A stamped addressed envelope for return of the questionnaire was 
enclosed; 
"A follow-up letter was sent to thank them for their help and offer an 
abstract of the findings. 
It is hoped that the use of both interviews (face-to-face and telephone) and 
questionnaires as complementary approaches avoids the shortcomings of either, and 
strengthens the validity and reliability of the data obtained. 
4.4 Development of the survey instrument 
4.4.1 The design of the postal questionnaire 
Considering the necessity of generating a series of items for inclusion in the survey 
and acquiring a broad understanding of the airline operating environment, informal 
interviews were first conducted with management pilots and some safety 
professionals to elicit information about the possible factors relevent to airline safety 
management (Interviewees are listed in Appendix B). From these meetings, ideas for 
questionnaire design and content were noted and some were later implemented in the 
final questionnaire. 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts: the first contained questions about the 
pilots' biographical details; the second contained questions about the pilots' opinions 
on airline safety management. Questions in the first part asked about pilots' current 
crew position, number of years in professional flying, source of initial training, and 
their airline. Questions in the second part comprised seven sections addressing: 
organisational structure; management styles; organisational culture; operating 
standards and training; resource availability; organisation effectiveness; and the role 
of the aviation regulatory authority. At the end of this part respondents were given 
space for freehand comments. 
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It was noted that the five-point Likert scale was widely used in attitude measurement, 
but after consideration of the neutral or modest bias found in some Asian countries 
(Stening & Everett, 1984; Chun, Campbell & Yoo, 1974; Zax & Takahashi, 1967)18, 
a six-point scale was developed to make respondents take sides rather than revert to a 
neutral answer. The pilots were requested to state their agreement on the six-point 
scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree", "Disagree", "Slightly Disagree", "Slightly 
Agree", "Agree" to "Strongly Agree". Each of these questions also contained an "I 
don't know" option, used by subjects who did not know the situation, or did not want 
to express an opinion on a particular issue. 
4.4.2 Pre-testing of the postal questionnaire 
Due to the restraints of geography and time, it was decided that the pilot survey 
would not entail the standard procedure of carrying out a mail shot with members of 
the target population. Instead the nearest and most convenient persons were chosen to 
act as respondents for the pilot test. The questionnaire was completed and criticised 
by individuals who had skills in either questionnaire design and research methods, or 
skills and experience in aviation. Some of the individuals used were the multinational 
pilots attending short courses at Cranfield University. The others were Taiwanese 
airline pilots who were training at the British Aerospace Flying Training Centre in 
Woodford. 
The pilot test was conducted in order to determine whether or not the questions and 
instructions were clear and readily understood. The author was available to answer 
queries about the questionnaire and to observe the sample subjects when they filled it 
in so that any possible misunderstanding of the questions could be avoided or 
corrected. This procedure and respondents' comments led to minor modifications of 
some questions. One major suggestion from Chinese respondents in the pilot study 
was to include a translation into Chinese. When the final questionnaire was 
18 A less extreme response style, a tendency to overuse the mid-range of a scale, has been linked with cultural 
norms of modesty and caution in Asian cultures. In contrast, some Mediterranean romance cultures appear to 
overuse the extremes of the scale to demonstrate sincerity (Hui & Triandis, 1989). 
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administered, a Chinese translation was available to respondents. These final copies 
used for the study can be found in Appendix C and D. 
4.4.3 The design of the interview questionnaire 
For the purpose of this study a multi-method approach was considered appropriate for 
two reasons. Questionnaires helped to examine the differences between respondents 
on a general basis, and interviews, as a complement to questionnaires, offered the 
freedom to discuss the situations with a pilot and to raise specific queries concerning 
the influence on airline safety management. 
To encourage frankness, anonymity was provided for the pilots, both for themselves 
and for the airline which they worked for. The main considerations in selecting 
individual interviews rather than group interviews were that the pilots were usually 
hard to reach due to their flying schedules, and that many pilots wished for 
confidentiality when discussing their company's policies and situation, or, personal 
experience on safety issues. On most occasions, face-to-face interviews were done in 
the meeting rooms at the interviewees' company. When face-to-face interviews were 
unlikely to be arranged, telephone interviews were used. All respondents had a very 
positive attitude towards this research. 
The interview questionnaire comprised two parts. The first part, which consisted of 
four questions, asked about pilots' current crew position, source of initial training, 
number of years working for the company, and the aircraft type they flew at that time. 
The second part contained topics about company management; pilot selection, 
training and operation standard; company resource management; the role of CAA; 
cockpit communication problems; and flying experiences with multinational crews. 
The interview questionnaire included both open and closed questions with English 
and Chinese versions (see Appendix F). 
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4.4.4 Interview characteristics 
The interview was semi-structured, so that the sequencing of questions, the amount of 
time and attention given to different topics were guided and modified by the 
interviewee's responses. It depended on whether an interviewee's previous answer 
covered the content of the planned questions, whether there was a natural 
circumstance for the interviewer to ask those questions, or if the interviewee felt 
relaxed to talk about his experience. Not all questions were asked in every interview. 
Some questions which seemed inappropriate with a particular interviewee were left 
out. The interviewer was cautious about not putting pressure on interviewees so that 
they could talk freely and be at ease. The actual interview session varied in length 
from forty minutes to four hours. 
There are two main features in these interviews. The first is that the interview is 
semi-structured rather than completely open. This means that all the interviews with 
the same group of interviewees started with the same question. The intention was to 
let them say anything unexpressed in the questionnaire, especially about their 
attitudes, flying, and safety experiences. 
The second feature is that the interview became a resource for suggestions. 
Interviewees naturally provided some suggestions to problems posed, or sought 
advice and suggestions to problems which concerned them. This was another kind of 
two-way communication. Many interviewees, especially the First Officers, 
expressed a wish for more opportunity for this kind of discussion. 
4.5 Methods of interpreting the results 
4.5.1 Method of interpreting the postal questionnaire 
A comparison was made between Captains and First Officers, between military- 
trained and Ab-initio trained pilots, and between international-airline and regional- 
airline pilots. The significance of any notable differences in responses were 
statistically tested using Chi-Square. Differences were assumed to be significant if 
134 
Chapter 4 Safety Survey Design and Interview 
there were at least five in one hundred possibility that the differences were due to 
chance (p<. 05). 
To be a valid test of significance, chi-square usually requires the most expected 
frequencies (fe`s) be 5 or larger. This is always true for a two-by-two table. If larger 
than a two-by-two table, a few exceptions are allowed as long as (a) no fe is less than 
one and (b) no more than 20% of the fe`s are less than 5 (Mark, 1995). 
In the study, the tables are two-by-six tables. When any fe was less than one and/or 
more than 2 fe's were less than 5, the author modified the table by collapsing or 
combining categories until all fe's satisfy the size criteria. 
4.5.2 The process of selecting from the interview data 
Qualitative data obtained from the interviews was not immediately accessible for 
analysis as quantitative data, but required to be selected and systematically analysed 
in order to draw valid meaning from it. The qualitative data, though difficult to 
analyse, was full of rich descriptions and comments from the live experiences of the 
interviewees. Moreover, it was useful in supplementing and illustrating the 
quantitative data obtained from the questionnaire survey. 
In order to generate trustworthy results, there were three stages in analysing the 
interview data: Data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification. At 
the first stage, the author listed the seven topics which revealed the major interest or 
the discussion focus in the interview for examining the interview data. Data not 
significant for the purpose of this research was left out. At the second stage, the 
author did not transcribe every word of an interview, but selected remarks and 
comments related to the seven topics. The information was consequently organised 
and assembled into a more accessible form so that it was easier to draw justified 
conclusions. The final stage was conclusion drawing and verification. The attempts 
at this stage were to locate recurring patterns, make contrasts/comparisons and 
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generate meaning from the findings. The conclusions were consequently weighted 
with evidence gained from other studies to check their validity. 
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4.6 Sampling strategy and limitation 
The negotiation of access is a continuous and laborious process. It is relatively more 
difficult to gain access in countries or regions with poorer safety records than those 
with better safety records, because these countries or regions tend to be more 
conservative and reluctant to have "extra work". 
The study, taking place in conservative environment, encountered great difficulty in 
clearing official channels for permission to carry out the study. It took much time for 
the author to contact the managers and discuss the study with them in order to gain 
access. Even after approval was obtained, there were further problems. In one 
instance, the middle manager hesitated to carry out what he had agreed to because his 
superior did not support and accept the study. In an other case, the manager in a 
flight operations department agreed to have the study carried out, but the other 
manager in the safety department was afraid of too many sensitive issues being 
exposedby the research. Given these circumstances, the response rates consequently 
turned out to be much lower than expected. The withdrawing from the study at a later 
stage and the occurrence of conflicts not possible to foretell. This indicates the 
importance of flexibility in real world research and the possibility of sampling bias. 
As experienced researchers stress, the contest between what is theoretically desirable 
and practically possible must be won by the practical. 
The respondents of the questionnaire could be divided into three groups: Taiwanese 
pilots, Asian management pilots, and Asian CAA officers. 
The sample of the Taiwanese pilots who participated in the study was from six out of 
the ten scheduled airlines in Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the author encountered 
considerable difficulty in obtaining the co-operation of the airlines, and it was 
impossible to obtain the assistance of Taiwan's airline pilot association because it has 
only just been established in May of 1995 and posessed only a few members to be 
undertaken. 
137 
Chapter 4 Safety Survey Design and Interview 
The questionnaire was also distributed to the Asian management pilots in twelve 
airlines as listed in Appendix G, and sent out to Asian CAA standards and safety 
officers in eight countries. The names of these CAA officers came from ICAO 
Document 7604. Although the proportion of Asian pilots and CAA officers was 
unrepresentative of the flying and CAA population, the problems encountered in 
sampling subjects led to the decision to accept that the sample achieved would contain 
some bias. 
4.7 Distribution procedure 
In the Taiwan's case, the questionnaire survey was taken or sent to the representative 
at each participating airline in sealed envelopes and distributed to the pilots by the 
airline administrator. Included with the questionnaire was a covering letter from the 
author, a memo from the flight operations manager or safety manager of each airline, 
and a postage paid addressed envelope. The covering letter explained the purpose of 
the research, ensured its confidentiality and anonymity of all responses. The memo 
confirmed that the airline had approved the research programme and invited flight 
crew to participate in the study on a voluntary basis only. The pre-addressed stamped 
envelope enabled the direct return of the completed information to the author. 
As to the groups of Asian management pilots and CAA standards and safety officers, 
the distribution procedure was similar to that employed for the Taiwanese pilots. The 
major differences were that the questionnaire was mailed directly to the pilots, and 
that in order to increase response rates, a reminding letter was sent out three weeks 
after the questionnaire had been distributed. Once again the questionnaire was 
accompanied by the covering letter used in the Taiwanese pilots case and a pre- 
addressed envelope for the return of the completed questionnaire to the author. 
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4.8 Results 
4.8.1 Response rate details 
The study includes two major parts: postal questionnaire survey and face-to-face 
interview survey. Of the 949 questionnaires distributed, 323 were completed and 
returned in time for analysis, representing a response rate of 34%. With respect to 
interviews, 32 Taiwanese pilots and 5 expatriate Captains19 were interviewed, and all 
of the interview questionnaires were analysed. A detailed account of the response 
rates of the postal and interview surveys is given in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Response Rates of the Postal and Interview Surveys 
Administration 
of Questionnaire 
Subject Sent Received Response 
Rate 
Postal Pilot study N= 24 n= 22 91.7% 
Taiwanese pilots N=685 n= 233 (245) 34.0% 
Asian MGT pilots N= 186 n= 46 (53) 24.7% 
Asian CAA officers N= 54 n= 22 40.7% 
Interview Taiwanese pilots * N= 37 n= 37 100.0% 
* Including five expatriate Captains 
Under the "received" column, the numbers in parentheses are the actual returned 
copies of questionnaires, and the numbers without the parentheses represent the valid 
copies of questionnaires. The due date for Asian management pilots and Asian CAA 
officers to return their completed questionnaires was the longest, about three months 
after the questionnaires were mailed. This was decided, after consideration was given 
to the fact that they were not easy to locate because of their flying schedules, that the 
postal systems in these Asian countries differed, and that the delivery time would be 
extended due to the need to translate the English-written address to the language of 
their own. 
The overall response rate of 33% was considered satisfactory and was consistent with 
the tendency for postal surveys to achieve a response rate of between 20% and 40%. 
19 According to Regulations of Operations of Civil Air Transport Enterprise -Taiwan, Chapter 5, Article 62, and 
Region of Airman Rating and Certification, Chapter 6, Article 96, airlines are allowed to recruit expatriate 
Captains only. 
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Merrit (1995) stated that according to the NASA/FAA/University of Texas group's 
experience, the magic number for the larger airlines is 20 percent while it is 40 
percent for smaller ones. Each questionnaire was coded for computer analysis and 
entered into the personal computer using the SPSS statistical analysis package. 
4.8.2 Flying experience and personal details 
A breakdown of the response according to the respondent's position is presented in 
Table 4.4. There were 94 Captains and 139 First Officers included in the main study. 
Of the 233 respondents, 42.5% were from international airlines and 57.5% were from 
regional airlines. Regional airlines refer to those operating domestic and/or intra- 
Asian flights, while international airlines are those who offer services on international 
routes. 
Of the total respondents, 12.0% were the international-airline Captains, 28.3% were 
the regional-airline Captains, 30.5% were international-airline First Officers, and 
29.2% were regional-airline First Officers. 
Table 4.4 Breakdown of Response 
According to Airlines and Current Position (Taiwanese Pilots) 
Position International Regional Total 
Airlines Airlines 
Captain 28 (28.3%) 66 (49.3%) 94 (40.3%) 
First Officer 71 (71.7%) 68 (50.7%) 139 (59.7%) 
Total 99 (42.5%) 134 (57.5%) 233 (100%) 
Chi-square goodness of fit analyses were performed to determine whether the 
distribution of responses according to position was significant for the target 
population. The observed and expected frequencies for each cell are presented in 
table 4.5. The results indicated that the obtained chi-square was significant at the 
0.01 level. It can therefore be concluded that the distribution of responses between 
Captains and First Officers are different from the distribution of ranks in the 
population from which they were drawn. 
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Table 4.5 One-way Chi-square to Examine the Distribution of 
Respondents According to Position: Observed and Expected Cell 
Frequencies 
Captains First Officers 
Observed freqency = 94 Observed freqency = 139 
Expected frequency = 116 Expected frequency = 116 
p<0.01, df = 1, X obt = 8.69 
Analysis of the personal data for Taiwanese pilots (n = 233) revealed that the 
majority of these pilots had been working in civil aviation for 2-10 years, 
corresponding to 65.7% (see Table 4.6). The highest proportion for the Captains was 
in the 6-10 year category, whereas the highest proportion for the First Officers was in 
the 2-5 year category. It seems that their working experience in civil aviation was not 
relatively short, but up to 79.8 percent of these subjects had worked as pilots in the air 
force (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.6 Breakdown of Response According to Current Position and 
Airline Working Experience (Taiwanese Pilots) 
Position Less than 2-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 More than 
2 years years years years years 20 years 
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Captains 11 (4.8) 46 (19.8) 22(9.4) 11(4.7) 4(l. 7) 
F/0 43 (18.4) 86 (36.9) 10 ( 4.2) 
Total 43 (18.4) 97 (41.7) 56 (24.0) 22(9.4) 11(4.7) 4(l. 7) 
n= 
Table 4.7 Initial Flying Training Background (Taiwanese Pilots) 
Background Frequency Percent 
Military 186 79.8 % 
Ab-initio 42 18.0% 
General aviation 5 2.1 % 
n=233 
The percentage of initial training background that the achieved samples revealed was 
an approximately similar distribution for the population of flight crew in Taiwan. The 
subjects were, therefore, considered representative. 
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A breakdown of the response of Asian management pilots and CAA standards and 
safety officers according to current position and working experience is presented in 
Table 4.8. More than 50% of the Asian management pilots had 16-20 year working 
experience and about 40% of the sample had been working for more than 20 years in 
aviation. 28 (60.9%) pilots received initial training in the military, 10 (21.7%) trained 
at Ab-initio scheme, and 8 (17.5%) were from general aviation (see Table 4.9). 
On average Asian CAA officers are less experienced. Marginally more than 40% of 
them were in 16-20 year category and only one of them had more than 20-year 
working experience. Of the 22 CAA officers, 18 were of either flying or engineering 
background (see Table 4.10). 
Table 4.8 Breakdown of Response According to Current Position and 
Working Experience (Asian Management Pilots and CAA Officers) 
Position 6-10 
years 
11-15 
years 
16-20 
years 
More than 
20 years 
Asian MGT pilot 3 25 18 
n=46 6.5% 54.3% 39.2% 
Asian CAA officer 5 7 9 1 
n= 22 22.7% 31.8% 40.9% 4.5% 
Table 4.9 Original Flying Background (Asian Management Pilots) 
Background Frequency Percent 
Military 28 60.9 % 
Ab-initio 10 21.7 % 
General aviation 8 17.5 % 
n=46 
Table 4.10 CAA Working Background (CAA Officers) 
Background Frequency Percent 
Pilot 10 45.5 % 
Air traffic officer 3 13.6% 
Engineer 8 36.4 % 
Other 1 4.5% 
n=22 
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4.8.3 The overall results of the postal questionnaire 
The means and standard deviation for each of the 34 statements are presented for each 
group in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. An examination of these tables indicated that there 
was some variability in response to each question (i. e. most standard deviations were 
greater than one). Nevertheless, both Taiwanese and Asian management pilots shared 
the same opinions on statements 32 and 8. Most of them disagreed that the CAA's 
investigators were qualified to the level of advanced technology aircraft, and that the 
reward system for safety in the airline was well organised. 
Table 4.11 Means and Standard Deviation of Responses to Each 
Question 
(Taiwanese pilots ) 
All pilots Captain First officer 
mean ( s. d. ) mean (s. d. ) mean ( s. d. ) 
1. Significant expansion in the scale of 5.45 (0.83) 5.48 (0.83) 5.43 (0.83) 
the airline operations. 
2. Functional responsibility for safety 4.26 (1.36) 4.28 (1.40) 4.25 (1.34) 
is clearly placed. 
3. The influence of safety staff is 3.84 (1.28) 4.03 (1.27) 3.70 (1.29) 
strong. 
4. The position of safety staff in the 3.69 (1.40) 3.54 (1.33) 3.80 (1.44) 
company's hierarchy is appropriate. 
5. Top management is dedicated to 4.19 (1.32) 4.33 (1.34) 4.10 (1.30) 
supporting safety policies and 
events. 
6. Operations managers are strongly 4.48 (1.23) 4.54 (1.29) 4.43 (1.19) 
involved in the safety events. 
7. The safety staff have direct access to 4.32 (1.21) 4.48 (1.22) 4.19 (1.19) 
top management. 
8. Reward system for safety is well 3.09 (1.33) 3.05 (1.43) 3.11 (1.26) 
organised. 
9. The safety inspection program is 3.65 (1.13) 3.67(l. 19) 3.63 (1.10) 
satisfactory. 
10. The perception of safety is good in 4.11 (1.07) 4.19 (1.17) 4.05 (1.01) 
the company. 
11. Channels for communication are 3.13 (1.14) 3.34 (1.24) 2.98 (1.04) 
accessible in the company. 
12. Flight and ground crews co-ordinate 3.73 (1.09) 3.90 (1.05) 3.62 (1.11) 
well . 
13. The company encourages voluntary 3.93 (1.23) 3.91 (1.20) 3.94 (1.26) 
safety reports from crews. 
14. Crews are willing to report 3.89 (1.20) 3.95 (1.28) 3.85 (1.14) 
hazards/incidents. 
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All pilots Captain First officer 
mean(s. d. ) mean(s. d. ) mean (s. d. ) 
15. Crews are willing to report 3.89 (1.20) 3.95 (1.28) 3.85 (1.14) 
hazards/incidents. 
16. The company makes strong efforts 4.94 (1.03) 4.94(l. 11) 4.94 (0.97) 
to standardise checklists and 
manuals in accordance with its 
policy. 
17. The selection criteria for flight 3.95 (1.23) 4.09 (1.31) 3.86 (1.16) 
crews are high. 
18. The quality of recurrent training is 4.16 (1.19) 4.16 (1.32) 4.17 (1.09) 
very good. 
19. The working experience of qualified 4.14 (1.17) 4.46 (1.25) 3.92 (1.06) 
crew members is high. 
20. Human factors training is effective. 3.40 (1.32) 3.26 (1.54) 3.48 (1.16) 
21. The company maintains 3.79 (1.17) 3.71 (1.24) 3.85 (1.13) 
incident/accident data very well. 
22. The company enthusiastically 4.04 (1.33) 3.91 (1.33) 4.13 (1.35) 
participates in the aviation safety 
organisations and meetings. 
23. The company provides very good 4.05 (1.25) 4.00 (1.33) 4.08 (1.19) 
quality safety-related information. 
24. The company has invested a lot in 3.54 (1.45) 3.25 (1.54) 3.74 (1.36) 
safety improvement. 
25. The safety criteria in the company 3.94 (1.50) 3.87 (1.62) 3.98 (1.41) 
are strict. 
26. The company handles emergency 3.59 (1.30) 3.56 (1.55) 3.61 (1.10) 
situations effectively and efficiently 
27. The company is proud of its safety 4.14 (1.62) 4.07 (1.74) 4.19 (1.53) 
record. 
28. Image of the company's overall 4.04 (1.53) 3.84 (1.55) 4.18 (1.50) 
service is very good. 
29. The CAA's pace of response to 3.24 (1.23) 3.32 (1.29) 3.20 (1.19) 
technological change is good. 
30. The CAA's follow-up to check 3.31 (1.18) 3.45 (1.33) 3.21 (1.06) 
compliance with its safety standards 
is good. 
31. The CAA's capacity to guide 3.19(l. 19) 3.51 (1.25) 2.98(l. 10) 
effectively the adequate training of 
airlines is good. 
32. The CAA provides adequate safety 3.35 (1.06) 3.54 (1.18) 3.23 (0.96) 
information to airlines. 
33. The CAA's investigators are 2.49 (1.23) 2.67 (1.31) 2.37 (1.16) 
qualified to the level of advanced 
technology aircraft 
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Table 4.12 Means and Standard Deviation of Responses to Each Question 
(Asian Management Pilots and CAA Officers) 
Asian MGT pilot CAA officer 
mean (s. d. ) mean (s. d. ) 
1. Significant expansion in the scale of the 5.35(1.15) 5.46 (1.39) 
airline operations. 
2. Functional responsibility for safety is 4.63 (1.24) 4.23 (1.34) 
clearly placed. 
3. The influence of safety staff is strong. 4.48 (1.17) 3.86 (1.04) 
4. The position of safety staff in the 4.96 (1.28) 4.15 (1.04) 
company's hierarchy is appropriate. 
5. Top management is dedicated to 4.67 (1.16) 4.18 (0.80) 
supporting safety policies and events. 
6. Operations managers are strongly 4.45 (1.19) 4.28 (1.37) 
involved in the safety events. 
7. The safety staff have direct access to top 5.07 (1.28) 4.45 (1.00) 
management. 
8. Reward system for safety is well 3.28 (1.30) 4.15(1.14) 
organised. 
9. The safety inspection program is 4.05 (0.96) 
satisfactory. 
10. The perception of safety is good in the 4.74 (1.03) 4.55 (0.91) 
company. 
11. Channels of communication are 4.41 (1.18) 4.50 (1.05) 
accessible in the company. 
12. Flight and ground crews co-ordinate 4.17 (1.16) 4.25 (0.44) 
well. 
13. The company encourages voluntary 4.50 (1.33) 4.59 (0.73) 
safety reports from crews. 
14. Crews are willing to report 4.28 (0.96) 4.05 (1.32) 
hazards/incidents. 
15. The company makes strong efforts to 5.54 (0.59) 4.55 (1.10) 
standardise checklists and manuals in 
accordance with its policy. 
16. The selection criteria for flight crews are 4.91 (1.23) 4.32 (0.65) 
high. 
17. The quality of recurrent training is very 4.92 (0.83) 4.64 (0.66) 
good. 
18. The working experience of qualified 5.02 (0.86) 3.91 (1.02) 
crew members is high. 
19. Human factors training is effective. 4.13 (1.33) 
20. The company responds well in terms of 5.02 (1.24) 
change in policies and procedures after 
any incident/accident happened. 
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Asian MGT pilot CAA officer 
mean (s. d. ) mean (s. d. ) 
21. The company absorbs safety-related 4.61 (1.18) 
information from the industry well. 
22. The company maintains incident 4.46 (1.38) 
/accident data very well. 
23. The company enthusiastically 4.41 (1.30) 
participates in aviation safety 
organisations and meetings. 
24. The company handles emergency 4.00 (1.40) 
situations effectively and efficiently 
25. The company is proud of its safety 5.07 (1.14) 
record. 
26. Image of the company's overall service 4.65 (1.22) 
is very good. 
27. The CAA's pace of response to 3.43 (1.66) 3.86 (0.83) 
technological change is good. 
28. The CAA's follow-up to check 3.48 (1.39) 4.32 (0.84) 
compliance with its safety standards is 
good. 
29. The CAA's capacity to guide effectively 3.28 (1.60) 4.14 (0.77) 
the adequate training of airlines is good. 
30. The CAA provides adequate safety 3.07 (1.29) 4.18 (0.73) 
information to airlines. 
31. The CAA's investigators are qualified to 2.61 (1.56) 4.00 (0.69) 
the level of advanced technology aircraft 
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CHAPTER 5 
AIRLINE SAFETY SURVEY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
" And the man went on to say : The woman whom you gave to be with 
me. She gave me from the tree and so I ate. " 
------- Genesis 3: 12 
5. Overview 
In this chapter, the results of the postal questionnaire survey of the main study will be 
analysed and discussed. There are eight sections, each of which summarises the 
overall results and then compare the differences in terms of crew position (Captains 
vs. First Officers), flying background (Military vs. Ab-initio) and flights operated 
(International vs. Regional)20. All data collected is then divided into positive and 
negative answers to measure these pilots' agreement and disagreement to the 
statements in the questionnaire. 
21 
Each section also discusses the written comments made by pilots completing the 
questionnaire as well as the interview transcripts gathered from the interviews with 
the thirty-seven pilots. 
At the end of each section, further discussion will be provided to look in-depth at the 
findings of each section. 
20 The main study includes two international airlines and four regional airlines. International airlines 
offer service on international routes, while regional airlines refer to those operating domestic and/or 
intra-Asia flights. 
21The term `Positive' indicates a respondent's favourability towards the attitude object or behaviour 
in question, in this case indicated by a score of 4-6 (where scales are used). The term `Negative' 
reflects unfavourability on the part of respondents towards the attitude object or perception in 
question. This is indicated by scores of 1-3 (where scales are used) in this study. The term `don't 
know' is used to describe respondents who are neither favourably nor unfavourably disposed towards 
the attitude object or behaviour in question. A score of 8 is attributed to this situation (where scales 
are used). 
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5.1 The Safety department in an airline's organisation structure 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The structure of an organisation is an indicator of what priorities the organisation has 
22 
on its activities. In a bureaucratic organisational structure, the closer to the top of 
the pyramid, the more important the department is to the strategy of the company 
(Crozier, 1964). 
This is especially true for safety. The position of the safety department not only is an 
indirect sign to crews about the importance of safety, but affects the effectiveness and 
efficiency of communication, co-ordination and use of information. 
The first section required pilots to indicate their opinions on statements about the 
position and influence of safety officers in their airlines. The five statements included 
in this section are: 
1. In the past several years, your company has undergone a significant 
expansion in the scale of its operations. 
2. Functional responsibility for safety is clearly placed. 
3. The influence of the safety staff is strong. 
4. The position of safety manager or personnel in your company's 
hierarchy is appropriate. 
5. The safety manager / personnel have direct access to top management. 
5.1.2 Pilots' opinions of safety officer position and influence in the 
organisation structure 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the difference in responses on the five statements. The majority 
of the pilots agreed on the first and the second statements. Though about half of the 
respondents gave positive answers on the third and the fourth statements, 39.1% and 
45.9% of the pilots expressed their disagreement. As to the fifth statement, most 
pilots consent that the safety manager / personnel had direct access to top 
22 Unlike the stereotyped description of excessive red tape and procedural delays, a bureaucratic 
structure is a well-organised collection of offices that combines the efforts of large numbers of people 
through a system of rules and procedures (Cherrington, D. J. 1994. Organisational behaviour: The 
management of individual and organisational performance. Allyn and Bacon. ). 
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management. However, the percentage of "I don't know" answers was very high, 
about 13%. 
The company has undergone a 
significant operation expansion 
Functional responsibility for safety 
is clearly placed 
Safety manager have direct 
access to top management 
The influence of safety staff is 
strong 
The position of safety statt in the 
hierarchy is appropriate 
ýmm 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
% of respondents 
p positive 
" negative 
p don't know 
80 90 100 
Figure 5.1 Position and Influence of Safety Officer in the Organisation 
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Placement of functional responsibility Chi-square revealed that there were 
significant differences at the . 05 level between international and regional airlines 
regarding the placement of functional responsibility for safety. 30.3% of the pilots in 
the regional airlines were against the statement, while 21.1% of the pilots in the 
international airlines were not in favour of the statement. Although there were no 
significant differences between the other comparing groups, about one third of the 
military-trained pilots showed their disagreement with the statement. 
Table 5.1 The Rating of the Statement: "Functional responsibility for 
safety is clearly placed. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 2 9 18 22 18 25 
n= 94 percent 2.1% 9.6% 19.1% 23.4% 19.1% 26.6% 
First officer frequency 7 8 17 13 36 26 
n= 137 percent 5.1% 5.8% 12.4% 31.4% 26.3% 19.0% 
Military frequency 8 16 32 51 38 41 
n= 186 percent 4.3% 8.6% 17.2% 27.4% 20.4% 22.0% 
Ab-initio frequency 1 1 3 14 16 10 
n=45 percent 2.2% 2.2% 6.7% 31.1% 35.6% 22.2% 
International frequency 2 7 12 24 34 20 
n= 99 percent 2.0% 7.1% 12.1% 24.2% 34.3% 20.2% 
Regional frequency 7 10 23 41 20 31 
n= 132 percent 5.3% 7.6% 17.4% 31.1% 15.2% 23.5% 
[X-obe = 12.58, di = 5, pSU ] international vs Regional 
Influence of safety staff Chi-square revealed that there was a significant 
difference at the . 05 
level between Captains and First Officerss. More First Officerss 
(48.1%) expressed their disagreement on the influence of safety staff than the 
Captains. There were no significant differences between the pilots in the other two 
groups. However, military-trained pilots (43.5%) outnumbered Ab-initio trained 
pilots (26.6%) in showing their disagreement on the statement. Moreover, about 
sixteen percent of the pilots working with regional airlines indicated "strongly 
disagree" or "disagree" on the statement, whereas only 6.4% of the pilots with 
international airlines gave such strong negative answers. 
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Position of safety manager Chi-square revealed that there were significant 
differences between Captains and First Officerss (p<. 05), between military- and Ab- 
initio trained pilots (p<. 05), and between international and regional airlines (p<. 01). 
About half of the First Officerss disagreed that the position of safety manager was 
appropriate. There was wide variation between the second and the third groups: 
52.5% of the military-trained pilots and 59.1% regional-airline pilots gave negative 
answers, whereas only 25.6% of the Ab-initio trained pilots and 30.8% international- 
airline pilots reported disagreement. 
Direct access to top management As seen in Table 5.4, there were no significant 
differences between these groups regarding direct access to top management. In 
general, more Captains, Ab-initio trained pilots and international-airline pilots gave 
positive answers to the statement than their counterparts, corresponding to 79.8%, 
84.2% and 75.2% respectively. However, the average percentage of the positive 
responses was not so high, being 67.4% after the 31 pilots giving the "I don't know" 
answer were included. 
Table 5.2 The Rating of the Statement: "The influence of safety staff 
is strong. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 4 6 17 37 16 14 
n= 94 percent 4.3% 6.4% 18.1% 39.4% 17.0% 14.9% 
First officer frequency 8 9 47 33 23 13 
n= 133 percent 6.0% 6.8% 35.3% 24.8% 17.3% 9.8% 
Military frequency 11 14 54 57 26 20 
n= 182 percent 6.0% 7.7% 29.7% 31.3% 14.3% 11.0% 
Ab-initlo frequency 1 1 10 13 13 7 
n=45 percent 2.2% 2.2% 22.2% 28.9% 28.9% 15.6% 
International frequency 2 4 26 26 22 14 
n= 94 percent 2.1% 4.3% 27.7% 27.7% 23.4% 14.9% 
Regional frequency 10 11 38 44 17 13 
n= 133 percent 7.5% 8.3% 28.6% 33.1% 12.8% 9.8% 
[X obt= 11.14, ctt = S, p<. u. )] Captain vs . First Ullicer 
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Table 5.3 The Rating of the Statement: "The position of safety 
manager or personnel in your company's hierarchy is appropriate. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 8 12 23 34 14 7 
n= 94 percent 8.5% 12.8% 24.5% 31.9% 14.9% 7.4% 
First officer frequency 10 9 45 22 26 20 
n= 132 percent 7.6% 6.8% 34.1% 16.7% 19.7% 15.2% 
Military frequency 17 17 62 41 26 20 
n= 183 percent 9.3% 9.3% 33.9% 22.4% 14.2% 10.9% 
Ab-initio frequency 1 4 6 11 14 7 
n=43 percent 2.3% 9.3% 14.0% 25.6% 32.6% 16.3% 
International frequency 2 6 21 23 25 17 
n= 94 percent 2.1% 6.4% 22.3% 24.5% 26.6% 18.1% 
Regional frequency 16 15 47 29 15 10 
n= 132 percent 12.1% 11.4% 35.6% 22.0% 11.4% 7.6% 
[X`obt= 12.83, Ut = -ý, p<"u. )l Laptamvs wirst uincer 
[X obt= 14.33, 
df = 5, p<. 051 Military vs Ab-initio 
[X2obt = 23.98, df = 5, p<. Ol] International vs Regional 
Table 5.4 The Rating of the Statement: "The safety 
manager/personnel have direct access to top management. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 2 3 13 23 28 20 
n= 89 percent 2.2% 3.4% 14.6% 25.8% 31.5% 22.5% 
First officer frequency 1 13 14 42 26 18 
n= 113 percent 0.8% 11.5% 12.3% 37.2% 23.0% 15.9% 
Military frequency 2 14 23 55 38 32 
n= 164 percent 1.2% 8.5% 14.0% 33.5% 23.2% 19.5% 
Ab-initio frequency 0 2 4 10 16 6 
n=38 percent 0% 5.3% 10.5% 26.3% 42.1% 15.8% 
International frequency 0 6 10 24 30 15 
n= 85 percent 0% 7.1% 11.8% 28.2% 35.3% 17.6% 
Regional frequency 2 10 17 41 24 23 
n= 117 percent 1.7% 8.5% 14.5% 35.0% 20.5% 19.7 
Interview results about organisational structure The safety function's position, in 
the airline it serves, varies. The interview survey asked several questions about 
airline safety programs. Only two of the six airlines surveyed had an independent 
safety position in the company's management structure. In these two airlines, the 
position was filled by a manager or officers who reported directly to a member of top 
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management (for example, to president, general manager or equivalent). Another 
four reported to the director of flight operations. 
When pilots were asked to whom they would report a safety concern, most (64%) 
cited the chief pilot or the director of flight operations (or equivalent position) rather 
than the flight safety officer. Only 6 of 28 (21%) will voice to the flight safety 
manager or officers. When pilots were asked why they did not report directly to 
safety officers, explanations frequently offered were, "It is more effective to report 
to the chief pilot rather than the safety officer. " and "You will get no response if you 
report to the safety officer. " 
Some impressive points made below are based on interviews or the comments from 
the postal questionnaire: 
"The Flight Safety Office or Department should be placed at a level higher 
than Flight Operations Department to ensure its neutrality. Safety-related 
personnel should be qualified and capable of practising their specialities 
without being restrained by the Flight Operations Department. " 
"Safety-related personnel should be competent individuals with 
professional experience and credentials to ascertain and certify their fitness 
for their jobs. " 
"The Flight Safety Office should be fitted in a position where it may 
override the other departments in the organisation structure" 
5.1.3 Discussion of the role and position of airline safety staff 
Two more frequently asked questions about airline safety management in the 
organisational structure are 1) where the flight safety department should be installed 
and 2) to whom the safety manager should report. 
The oral and written comments gained from interview and questionnaire surveys 
revealed that the line pilots felt the necessity to place the flight safety department at a 
higher level, so that the safety manager could have more influence or power to deal 
with the unsafe practices they reported. However, only two of the six airlines 
surveyed did so. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, a high percentage of the pilots, 
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especially those military-trained First Officerss in regional airlines, gave negative 
answers about the influence of safety staff and their position. It is no wonder that 
79% of the interviewees said that they would rather report a safety concern to 
someone other than the flight safety staff. 
Autonomy of safety department The organisational position of the safety 
department affects the amount of power possessed and the effectiveness of safety. 
Unless the safety manager can report directly to a boss with influence and who wants 
safety, he will not have the authority to create a safety environment. Besides, whom 
the safety manager reports to is critical because it shows the airline's commitment to 
safety that the airline gives, and it affects the willingness of the line pilots to report 
operational anomalies that could compromise safety. When the safety department 
comes under flight operations, the ineffective position is likely to cause the hesitation 
of pilots in reporting unsafe practices because their suggestions will be reviewed by 
the same individual who is their day-to-day boss. The safety department should be an 
autonomous unit; it should not come under the flight operations or maintenance 
departments. In any case, the safety manager must hold a position of such stature that 
all channels in the organisation are open to him. 
The role of the safety manager or officer The safety manager has to bridge the gap 
between top management and line employees, and to maintain a close working 
relationships throughout the organisation. He should be responsible to the top 
management by enabling the line to exercise the authority effectively on behalf of 
safety, and he should be approachable by the pilots so that they can communicate 
their own weaknesses, errors and perception of hazards without fear of reprisals. He 
should also provide feedback through an internal newsletter with contributions from 
company personnel and articles from other publications that may be relevant to 
aviation safety. He should make safety everybody's business rather than the 
responsibility of the safety department alone. 
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5.2 Corporate and cockpit culture 
5.2.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 3, section 3.4, culture is a reflection of deeply held beliefs 
and values, which affect our attitudes, our behaviours and our interactions with 
others. In aviation, differences in pilots' attitudes can stem from differences in 
cultural backgrounds. Therefore, safety management in multi-cultural airlines 
especially need to be aware of and appreciate the role of cultural differences and 
similarities in the flight operations. 
The second section first presents the responses of the pilots on the following five 
statements about the corporate culture. 
1. The awareness of safety in the company is good. 
2. Channels for communication are accessible. 
3. Flight and ground crews co-ordinate well. 
4. Company's policy encourages voluntary safety reports. 
5. Crews are willing to report hazards / incidents. 
More discussion is then provided to look closer into their opinions of cockpit culture 
in terms of military background influences and flying with expatriate pilots. 
5.2.2 Pilots' responses to corporate and cockpit culture 
5.2.2.1 Corporate culture 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the overall opinions of the pilots surveyed about corporate 
culture. In response to the first statement "The awareness of safety in the company is 
good", the majority of the respondents in the postal survey (70.4%) gave positive 
responses and only 29.1% gave negative responses. With regard to channels for 
communication, a significant percentage (67%) of the respondents did not think they 
were accessible. Approximately 50% of the flight crews surveyed disagreed that flight 
and ground crews co-ordinated well. More than half of the respondents (57.5%) 
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agreed that the policy of their companies encouraged voluntary safety reports, but 
51.8% of the them did not agree that crews were willing to report hazards / incidents. 
The awareness of safety in the 
company is good 
Channels for communication 
are accessible 
Flight and ground crews co- 
ordinate well 
Company's policy encourages 
voluntary safety reports 
Crews are willing to report 
hazards/incidents. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
% of respondents 
Figure 5.2 Pilot's Responses to Corporate Culture 
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Channels for communication As shown in Table 5.5, there were significant 
differences between Captains and First Officerss at the . 05 
level, and between 
military- and Ab-initio trained pilots at the . 01 level. 74.3% of the First Officerss, 
74.8% of the military-trained pilots and 74.6% of the regional-airline pilots did not 
think the channels for communication were accessible. Although there was no 
significant difference found in the third group (p=. 75), 62.1% of the international- 
airline pilots and 74.6% of the regional-airline pilots gave negative responses on the 
statement. 
Table 5.5 The Rating of the Statement: "Channels for 
communication are accessible in your company. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 8 8 42 21 7 7 
n= 93 percent 8.6% 8.6% 45.2% 22.6% 7.5% 7.5% 
First officer frequency 10 28 60 24 8 2 
n= 132 percent 7.6% 21.2% 45.5% 18.2% 6.1% 1.5% 
Military frequency 16 29 89 28 9 8 
n= 179 percent 8.9% 16.2% 49.7% 15.6% 5.0% 4.5% 
Ab-initio frequency 2 7 13 17 6 1 
n=46 percent 4.3% 15.2% 28.3% 37.0% 13.0% 2.2% 
International frequency 4 14 41 20 11 5 
n= 95 percent 4.2% 14.7% 43.2% 21.1% 11.6% 5.3% 
Regional frequency 14 22 61 25 4 4 
n= 130 percent 10.8% 16.9% 46.9% 19.2% 3.1% 3.1% 
[X obt= 
11.13, df = 5, p<. O5] Captain vs First Officer 
[X obt= 
13.6, df = 3, p<. 01] Military vs Ab-initio 
[X obt = 9.98, 
df = 5, p= . 075] International vs Regional 
Co-ordination of flight and ground crews In response to crew co-ordination, Chi- 
square analysis revealed that there was significant difference between military- and 
Ab-initio trained pilots. 57% of the military-trained pilots disagreed that flight and 
ground crews co-ordinated well in their airlines, whereas only 21.7% of the Ab-initio 
trained pilots indicated their disagreement. There were no significant differences 
between Captains and First Officerss, and between international- and regional-airline 
pilots, but more First Officerss (52.8%) and regional-airline pilots (50.8%) were 
against the statement. There was a tendency that the First Officerss with military 
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background were inclined to show disagreement on the statement about crew co- 
ordination. 
Table 5.6 The Rating of the Statement: "Flight and ground crews 
co-ordinate well in your company. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly a gree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 0 2 40 24 17 9 
n= 92 percent 0% 2.2% 43.5% 26.1% 18.5% 9.8% 
First officer frequency 1 18 54 32 26 7 
n= 138 percent 0.7% 13.0% 39.1% 23.2% 18.8% 5.1% 
Military frequency 1 17 87 38 26 15 
n= 184 percent 0.5% 9.2% 47.3% 20.7% 14.1% 8.2% 
Ab-initio frequency 0 3 7 18 17 1 
n=46 percent 0% 6.5% 15.2% 39.1% 37.0% 2.2% 
International frequency 1 8 39 23 24 3 
n= 98 percent 1.0% 8.2% 39.8% 23.5% 24.5% 3.1% 
Regional frequency 0 12 55 33 19 13 
n= 132 percent 0% 9.1% 41.7% 25.0% 14.4% 9.8% 
(x`obt= 8.97, dt = 3, p<. USJ Military vs Ab-initio 
The willingness to report hazards / incidents There were wide variations among the 
three comparison groups. Approximately two thirds of the First Officerss (62.6%) 
and Ab-initio trained pilots (66%) disagreed that crews were willing to report hazards 
/ incidents, while 35.8% of the Captains and 48.1% of the military-trained pilots 
thought so. Chi-square was statistically significant at the . 05 level for both ranking 
and initial training groups. Once again there was considerable difference in the 
airline comparison group (p<. 01). 71.8% of the international-airline pilots indicated 
their disagreement, but merely 37% of the regional-airline pilots disagreed that crews 
were willing to report hazards / incidents. 
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Table 5.7 The Rating of the Statement: "Crews are willing to report 
hazards/incidents. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 1 12 20 32 19 8 
n= 92 percent 1.1% 13.0% 21.7% 34.8% 20.7% 8.7% 
First officer frequency 1 24 59 29 11 10 
n= 134 percent 0.7% 17.9% 44.0% 21.6% 8.2% 7.5% 
Military frequency 1 26 59 52 26 15 
n= 179 percent 0.6% 14.5% 33.0% 29.0% 14.5% 8.4% 
Ab-initio frequency 1 10 20 9 4 3 
n=47 percent 2.1% 21.3% 42.6% 19.1% 8.5% 6.4% 
International frequency 1 19 49 16 8 3 
n= 96 percent 1.0% 19.8% 51.0% 16.7% 8.3% 3.1% 
Regional frequency 1 17 30 45 22 15 
n= 130 percent 0.8% 13.1% 23.1% 34.6% 16.9% 11.5% 
[x`obt= 8.25, df = 5, p<. 05J Captain vs First Officer 
[X2obt= 7.87, df = 3, p<. 05] Military vs Ab-initio 
[x2obc= 18.48, df = 5, p<. Ol] International vs Regional 
5.2.2.2 Culture in the cockpit 
Military background influences As noted in Chapter 3, in high power distance 
countries, pilots transitioned from military flying tend to be aggressively result- 
oriented. Such military background influences are likely to emerge if insufficient 
training is in place to neutralise that attitude when pilots enter civil-air-transport 
operations. 
In this study, all of the Ab-initio trained pilots were trained overseas after being 
recruited. They comprise 19% of the sample (Ab-initio trained pilots consists of 
17.8% of the study population). The rest of the pilots were retired military pilots, 
who received their initial flying training in the military. When asked what special 
communication experience in the cockpit they had, many interviewees mentioned the 
conflict resulting from differences in background culture. 
Below are some transcripts of the interviews about the deviation of safety recognition 
between military-trained Captains and Ab-initio trained First Officerss: 
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"After the aircraft was pulled back, the captain asked me to do *** test. I 
instinctively told him that the test should have been done before take-off. He 
replied, `Just do what I tell you... ' I hesitated a while but obeyed his 
command because I figured out that I still had three continuous flights with 
him on that day. " 
V am accustomed and convinced that reading the procedure checklist to 
operate accordingly is accurate. But one day, a captain said, `Having flown 
for six months, how come you do not memorise the approach chart! ' I dared 
not reply and did not know what to do. " 
The difference of safety recognition not only results in the differentiation of operation 
but also causes other problems. For example, subordinate pilots dared not question or 
correct their Captains lest something adverse might happen. Some more transcripts 
exemplify the phenomenon of hierarchical relationships. 
"Because there were not so many passengers on board, the captain asked 
the flight attendants to save the passenger safety briefing. I thought it was 
wrong but did not know how to manage. " 
"For their convenience of getting on and off the aircraft, our flight 
attendants always arrange senior passengers and children to sit beside the 
cabin doors. From the viewpoint of safety, they will obstruct cabin 
evacuation during an emergency.. .1 don't know what to say as the captain 
feels it is all right. " 
`It was about 7: 00 in the evening when the aircraft approached X airport. 
It was pouring with poor visibility, and the captain was flying the aircraft. I 
thought it was time to turn to final when it approached the mountains, but 
the captain did not make any move. I reminded him politely, `Sir, it is about 
time to turn. ' He did not respond and I said again, `Sir, it is time to turn. ' 
There was still no reaction.... I hesitated a while, and said for the third 
time, `Sir, we must turn to final right now. ' At the same time, I operated the 
aircraft to final. (I thought the captain was out of his mind) Soon after 
that, I heard the warning sound of GPWS 'too low, too low '.... After landing, 
I was still worried that my override would cause a consequently bad 
influence with the captain. " 
`I have to learn how to ask the right questions, the questions that the 
captain knows how to answer. If I ask a question that the captain does not 
understand, it will be viewed as arbitrary query. That making the captain 
feel he is losing face is likely to worsen the cockpit atmosphere. " 
It is obvious that when the cultures are in conflict, crews become unsure of how to 
proceed or behave. Uncertainty, hesitation and frustration follow. Safety is, 
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consequently, compromised. An interviewee commented that safety compromise was 
more a problem of the organisational culture than the conflict of background culture. 
He illustrated the point very clearly: ".... regulation and law protection are useless. 
You can do nothing if culture doesn't change, for most colleagues will boycott you. " 
Flying with expatriate pilots In five of six subject airlines, expatriate pilots are 
employed from around the world to "fill the pilot-shortage and experience gap" until 
enough local pilots are fully qualified to staff the company. Most expatriate 
Captains in the target population are retired from other airlines and have much flying 
experience. However, because they are employed on the basis of a short-term 
contract, they are usually hard to gain complete acceptance and the perception of such 
secondary status is apt to foster low commitment. 
Based on the interviews and comments on the questionnaire, some pertinent points 
about the experiences of working with expatriate pilots are made below. 
Advantages The most quoted advantage of flying with expatriate pilots is less 
pressure. Several interviewees, and particularly First Officerss, also emphasised that 
working under such a non-threatening environment fostered better performance. 
"Less pressure is felt when I work with expatriate pilots. "--------Less Pressure 
"The majority of native pilots will treat us like the second auto pilot and treat us 
like trained pilots. I will be more aggressive when flying with multinational 
crews, but definitely not with our own national crews. "---------Less Pressure 
"Though language barrier exists, expatriate pilots are easier to communicate with. 
On the contrary, native pilots are more stubborn and have stronger hierarchical 
concept. "--------Less Pressure 
"It is more relaxing to work with them, and I fly better. "--------Less Pressure & 
Better Performance 
"My performance will be better to fly with multinational crew because I will feel 
more free to question captain's decisions and give more advice . 
"------- Better 
Performance 
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Additionally, expatriate pilots were praised for their valued co-operation, adherence 
to SOP precisely, and the willingness to share their experience. 
"Native pilots tend to be more authoritative and harder to communicate with. 
Native pilots value cockpit ethics, but expatriate pilots value co-operation. "-------- 
Less Pressure & Co-operation 
"Expatriate pilots divide PF and PNF clearly, so when working with them, First 
Officerss can focus on PF and do their best. "--------Co-operation 
"The cockpit atmosphere is more open and comfortable when flying with a 
foreign captain. You can make your decision freely and discuss with the captain 
reasonably. The native captain will use what he calls experience by himself to 
disregard all decisions you make. Sometimes, you wonder what he knows about 
aviation except flying the aircraft. "--------Less Pressure & Co-operation 
"Expatriate pilots value First Officerss' responsibilities. They respect our 
viewpoints. Thus, our performance improves and confidence is consequently 
built up. "---------Co-operation & Better Performance 
"Expatriate pilots explain clearly during takeoff and landing. They value crew 
co-operation to complete each mission. "--------Co-operation 
"They fully follow the SOP and FCOM. If they have a different view, they will 
raise up the question and seek for advice and discussion. "---------SOP & Co- 
operation 
"Expatriate pilots are more willing to share their knowledge and experience with 
other crew members ----------- xperience 
Sharing 
Disadvantages In addition to the advantages described above, the surveyed 
pilots also mentioned the disadvantages of working with expatriate pilots. They are 
frustrations mainly stemming from the difference of language and culture. 
The main disadvantages cited by twenty-two of the interviewees was with the 
language. Language barriers caused difficulties in communication and co-operation 
and influenced the transmission and sharing of safety information. 42% of the pilots 
agreed they suffered a language gap on receiving safety-related information (Further 
discussion about language barriers will be provided in Section 5.7). Some clues come 
from the interviews and the written comments. 
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"During long haul flight, it often seems that no topics of conversation are found 
except talking about flying the airplane. Long haul flight is boring. "-------- 
Language Barrier 
"Because I am not able to express opinions freely in English, language 
communication is limited to flying, and there is no chance to get to know each 
other more. The language barrier seems to distance us. "--------Language Barrier 
"The English accent of those who come from non-English speaking countries is 
not easily understood. "--------Language Barrier 
"Expatriate pilots speak too fast to understand, especially at the first contact. " 
---Language Barrier 
"Due to language barrier, it is difficult to get along well with them. Not always 
understanding fully. "--------Language Barrier 
"It takes time to understand their operations and attitudes. It is necessary to use 
different expressions to avoid misunderstanding. "--------Language Barrier 
"Failure to recognise deterioration flight, weather or system problems which will 
cause bigger problems or a later emergency situation. "--------Communication in 
Emergency 
"I have a much higher sense of awareness of all switch positions, aircraft 
configuration and clearances to prevent problems due to misunderstanding. "------- 
-Communication in Emergency 
In addition to language problems, the difference in background and life style was also 
addressed. The cultural difference caused incomprehension or even misunderstanding 
between the local and the expatriate pilots, and sometimes caused expatriate pilots a 
feeling of detachment from the airline they were working for. 
Here are some quotations about incomprehension and misunderstanding. 
"Misunderstandings happen due to different culture ............ isunderstanding 
"It is not about the problem of language. It is about the way they talk, which is 
very different from what natives are used to. "--------Incomprehension 
"Due to different background, it takes time to communicate. I do not understand 
their jokes. "-------Incomprehension: Different Senses of Humour 
The frustrations with expatriate pilots also included racial discrimination. 
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"Racial discrimination and cultural gaps between east and west mostly come from 
`X' crews. Generally, `XX' crews are more understanding and easier to work 
with. "--------Racial Discrimination 
"Some expatriate pilots have inexplicable sense of superiority: they rebuke other 
aircrews due to language problems. "------- Racial Discrimination 
The most cited reason for detachment occurring was that the expatriate pilots still 
followed their previous company's policy on operation and ignored the regulations of 
the current company (Customs Conflict). The detachment also reflected on their 
behaving like an outsider (Low Involvement). Some mentioned that they did not 
know how to get along with them (Social Separation). 
"Expatriate pilots still follow the previous company's policy on operation. Some 
expatriate pilots do not know the company's regulations. "--------Customs Conflict 
"It looks like they are doing summer jobs rather than their careers. He kept on 
asking me whether I would like to share coffee with him. "--------Customs Conflict 
"They have crew concept, but no company concept. "--------Customs Conflict 
"Expatriate pilots care less about the company's policy, and that easily causes 
misunderstanding. Besides, they seldom participate in group activities. "-------- 
Customs Conflict & Low Involvement 
"It is difficult to understand their personalities due to language and culture 
problems. "--------Social Separation 
Some other arguments were listed below: 
"Expatriate pilots like to fly manually, which adds to the workload. "--------More 
Workload 
"You receive a diverse view of ideas and operational procedures based on 
different backgrounds. "--------Uncertainty 
"A few misbehaving pilots like to put the blame on bad communication to cover 
up their own misconduct. "-------Misleading 
r 
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5.2.3 Discussion 
From the survey, more than half of the respondents indicated that the awareness of 
safety was good and voluntary safety reports were encouraged in their airlines. 
Nevertheless, the majority of them also showed their disagreement on accessible 
communication channels, crew co-operation and willingness to report hazards or 
incidents. All the indications reflect that there was a gap between the desired state 
(perception) and the actual state (implementation). 
From passive to active safety management The analysis of the survey data discussed 
above suggested that top management in the airlines did recognise the need to 
enhance safety, but effective safety management requires more than simply knowing 
about the importance of safety or paying lip service to the regulations. Actual 
managerial practices needed to be improved in order to reduce the impact of 
discordant culture on safety. Unfortunately, there is no simple or universal solution 
for cultural conflicts and confusion. The ways to minimise cultural problems vary, 
depending on the particular characteristics of each culture. To strengthen 
organisation's ability to deal with these issues, cultural conflicts need to, therefore, be 
diagnosed and understood. Then, desired norms could be reinforced and leadership 
should be provided to unify the diversities in sub-cultures. 
From the foregoing discussion of the problems caused by cultural and language 
differences in the study, four recommendations were suggested: 1) requesting all the 
crew to take CRM course, 2) offering language skills training, 3) providing cultural 
awareness training and 4) creating group-identity activities. 
CRMtraining Military mentality and cultural frustrations such as those 
described above hindered effective crew co-ordination and communication. The 
purpose of CRM training programmes focuses mainly on improving the attitudes, 
behaviour and performance of newly qualified and experienced pilots, so that each 
individual understands his or her personal role as a leader or follower in the team and 
recognises the need for good communication- and co-ordination. To ensure the 
success of the programme, CRM training should not only provide basic human 
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performance and limitation concepts but need to define clearly operational norms and 
rules for individual pilots to abide by. 
Language training Language barriers as described above tend to produce 
difficulties in communication and co-operation, which can have serious implications 
for safety. Language training aimed at overcoming language barriers should include 
both the non-native English pilots and native English pilots flying with non-native 
English crews as well. To non-native English pilots, mastery of aviation English 
should be one of the most important requirements, though safety management seldom 
places emphasis on it. To native English pilots, though they have the linguistic 
advantage because English is the formal language of international commercial 
aviation, they need to be trained to be aware of and more sensitive to the difficulty of 
communicating in other than one's first language. The use of plain English should be 
emphasised to ensure understanding. 
Cultural awareness training Each culture has its own relative strengths and 
weaknesses. Perceiving the differences in underlying cultural values helps to promote 
better understanding of the behaviours of individual pilots. Besides, an analysis of 
corporate and cockpit cultures and the influences affecting them might be beneficial 
for generating improvements in safety. Moreover, cultural awareness can be 
integrated into existing training packages without large financial outlay(Merritt, 
1995). 
In high power-distance cultures of the study, communication was influenced by these 
hierarchical relationships. The high power and social distance between captain and 
crew made a junior pilot reluctant to advise a senior pilot of an observed mistake, or 
question his decisions. Accordingly, safety management needs to adopt the correct 
attitude in minimising conflict and uncertainty, reinforcing the desired norms, and 
providing leadership which unifies the diverse subcultures. 
Grouup-Identity activities As noted earlier, the expatriate pilots were employed as 
"guest workers" on the basis of short-term contract, so it was difficult to establish a 
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team spirit or group identity. Creating the opportunity for a multi-national crew to 
attend local crew's activities is necessary to reduce the social separation and 
encourage involvement. 
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5.3 The involvement of management in safety 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The third section addresses the relationships of management to aviation safety. 
Management attitudes and behaviour have a profound effect on safety practice 
(Grimaldi and Simonds, 1984; Petersen, 1988; Jensen, 1995): They affect pilot 
judgement on managing risks and flight operations. As noted in Chapter 3, it was not 
until recently that responsibility for human error has been placed airline management 
as well as pilots. This systematic thinking approach looks for a chain of factors and 
often reaches far outside the cockpit. 
As management's commitment to safe operations may influence safety performance 
in an airline, the four statements in this section were to elicit pilots' responses to the 
involvement of management on safety in their airlines. They are as follows: 
1. Top management is dedicated to supporting safety policies / events. 
2. The company's response to changes in policies and procedures after the 
occurrence of incidents / accidents is good. 
3. Operations mangers are strongly involved in the safety events. 
4. The reward system for safety is well organised. 
Comments made by the pilots interviewed were analysed to determine their 
expectations for reward methods and their perceptions about use of a punishment 
base approach. 
5.3.2 Pilots' responses to the involvement of management in safety 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the overall opinion of the pilots on the four statements. In 
response to the first statement, more than 40% of the pilots disagreed that top 
management was dedicated to supporting safety policies / events. Though' the 
majority of pilots showed their agreement on the second and the third statements, 
more than 20% of the respondents did not agree that the company's response to 
changes in policies and procedures after the occurrence of accidents / incidents was 
good, and that operations managers were strongly involved in the safety events. With 
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regard to a reward system, slightly over one-half of the respondents gave negative 
responses on the statement provided. Detailed analysis found that there were no 
significant differences between the three comparison groups. 
Top management dedicated to 
supporting safety policies/events 
Responding to change in 
procedures after accidents well 
Operations managers strongly 
involved in the safety events 
Reward system for safety well 
organised 
o positive 
" negative 
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Figure 5.3 Pilots' Responses to the Involvement of Management on Safety 
5.3.3 Discussion 
Many airlines advertise that safety is their primary goal. This is only true if the 
investment in safety can prevent loss due to damage or injury and serve to promote 
the public image and profits of the company. The opposing goals of simultaneously 
maximising both safety and profits can, and often does, lead to the introduction of 
hazards. Therefore, the support and commitment of management, and particularly top 
management, are vitally important to the success of a safety programme. 
Top management influence From the viewpoint of organisational context, the 
influence of top management on safety can clearly be depicted "Every accident, no 
matter how minor, is a failure of management. (Andrews, 1953; Lauber, 1994) 
That the way management is seen to practise safety standards and sets the model for 
the pilots, which influences the latter's attitude toward safety. A manager concerned 
with productivity goals may perceive a safety programme as being a waste of 
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efficiency and being concerned with costs, while a people-oriented manager probably 
will perceive safety programme as the welfare of the people. Top management, 
depending on their production versus people orientation, will influence and motivate 
line management into different actions. Their concern will, in consequence, be 
transmitted to line pilots and influence their judgements when operating the aircraft. 
The commercial pilots paid on a flying-hour basis, in particular, are faced with the 
difficult decision to balance financial reward with safety. Below is the transcript of 
an interviewee addressing this conflict. 
"After passengers were on board, No. 1 engine failed to be started twice. 
According to the operational manual, it needs to rest for 60 minutes before 
being started again. The Maintenance Manager immediately came and 
asked with his arms rolling, "Captain, could you .... ?" He dared not ask if 
I could give it another try because he knew the rules and was afraid of 
taking responsibility. Besides, he also feared of being blamed if the aircraft 
was on ground Additionally, our basic salary is low but the flight pay is 
comparatively high. The more we fly, the more bonus we can get. Under the 
circumstances, it is hard to make a decision ............. " 
The pressure imposed on the maintenance manager by corporate goals and profit 
seeking leads him to tempt the pilot in lowering his margins of safety. Jensen (1995) 
puts it well, "understanding management's point of view is not too difficult, but 
usually when it comes to piloting an unsafe aircraft or making a trip in unsafe 
conditions, usually the management person is on the ground. " Managers usually 
assume that pilots will give up flying if there is any `real' danger, and do not take into 
consideration the fact that pilots could face a life or death situation in order to comply 
with strong pressures and attempting to keep their jobs. It is not only a matter of 
indifference to the pilots' predicament but also a problem over the allocation of safety 
responsibilities. Though management influences the attitudes and actions of line 
pilots, safety responsibilities have been allocated exclusively to the front-line 
operators since they are the ones that make the unsafe decisions and the managers 
have little or direct control over them. 
170 
Chapter 5 Airline Safety Survey Analysis and Discussion 
Top management has great opportunities to contribute to safety within an airline. It 
defines the safety culture and decides where safety can help to meet the productivity 
objectives. If top management does not define clearly what can be done to achieve 
company goals within safety constraints, it is likely, as in the above case, that the 
flight crews, and even the middle management, may not know how to react in 
situations when safety and profits are in conflict. Clear accountability for safety at all 
levels helps to reduce risk and enhance safety. Active involvement also demonstrates 
the management's commitment to safe operations. 
Reward system and punishment approach In addition to top-down support, a 
bottom-up approach is useful to represents help ensure safety. Punishment and 
reward are analogous to a coin with two faces. The former is a passive way to 
diminish undesired actions or conditions; the latter actively induces desirable 
outcomes. 
In safety, utilising a "punishment" approach should be carefully examined. Premature 
focus on blaming the pilot for what may in fact be due to factors totally beyond his 
control can delude management into ignoring causal factors, rather than remedying 
them. Thus, pilot punishment for accidents may, in the absence of identifying all 
relevant causal factors, mask other subtle and residual factors that may escape 
appropriate attention. Some interviewees were worried that the long-term use of 
severe punishment might result in the following side effects. 
"Captains are not willing to allow First Officers to operate the aircraft. " 
"Pilots tend to overuse automatic flight system in order not to deviate from 
required standard and be punished " 
"Captains are afraid of filing a report to suggest what First Officers need 
strengthening. " 
Other interviewees mentioned how a punishment approach backfired as well as their 
reactions to the approach. 
"Flight and ground crews do not co-operate well enough. When problems 
come up, they either cover them up or lay the blame on each other. " 
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"There should not be any disciplinary action taken on refusing to fly aircraft 
for safety reasons. " 
A reward system, conversely, reinforces continued safety effort. Rewards can either 
be formal or informal. Formal systems include a promotion, a merit salary increase, 
letters of accomplishment or appreciation, formal performance appraisals, etc. 
Informal ones are the daily "thank you's" or "pats on the back, " or the informal 
communication network of the organisation. The value of reward depends on how 
attractive the potential outcome is to individuals. For example, a promotion might 
have very little positive value, because of a lack of desire to take on increased 
responsibilities. Therefore, it is important to identify the perceptions of employees 
about what individuals are rewarded for, and for what they will be reprimanded or 
punished. The opinions derived serve to influence efforts made in the future. 
From the results of the survey, it is obvious that the subjects in the study were not 
satisfied with the reward system in their airlines. The usual comments mentioned 
were as follows: 
"The company usually rewards individuals but punishes the whole team. " 
"The company has punishment regulations? but does not have reward 
rules. " 
"Rewards are offered to Captains but not to First Officers. " 
"Rewards are offered too slowly to have good effect. Internal circulars do 
not fulfil their function. " 
The unfairness in the reward and punishment systems was clearly expressed by an 
interviewee, who highlighted his dissatisfaction by saying that "Our company gives 
small reward and severe punishment. " 
A punitive approach is not constructive. Most errors are good honest mistakes (not 
deliberate or wilful neglect) which are made by people simply trying to get the job 
done. These errors are indicators of the system deficiency or failure and should not be 
utilised to assess individual performance. Apart from the abatement of punishments, 
rewards should enhance teamwork rather than individual performance. In order to 
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build up the concept of teamwork, they should be offered to the whole team, rather 
than to individuals, and should be offered immediately in doer to ensure their 
effectiveness. 
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5.4 Flight training 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Rapid growth of airline structures and fleets cause a great demand for more pilots in 
the subject country. As a result, airlines have had to train their own pilots or recruit 
pilots from military, and quickly promote them to fly the complex aircraft currently in 
service. Under these circumstances, pilots tend to have relatively low levels of 
training and experience. In order to fly safety and efficiently, the provision of 
sufficient training has become more important than ever. 
In addition, increasing levels of aircraft automation have changed the way in which 
aircraft are operated, and consequently, training needs have altered considerably. 
Safe and successful operation of commercial aircraft requires more than the 
traditional "stick-and-rudder" skills. Accordingly, a pilot is no longer an active 
operator but a system manager, and aircraft are flown not by individuals but by crews 
(Orlady, 1993). In today's environment, both traditional training and human factors 
training are required to prepare pilots, both on using basically technical skills and on 
dealing with the human-machine relationship (Wiener et al, 1991). 
The issues and concerns inherent in flight training are discussed in this section with 
focus on the aspects of outsourcing training and human factors training. 
5.4.2 Pilots' responses to airline flight training 
Figure 5.4 shows the comparison of the positive and negative responses regarding 
flight training and operations. It is obvious that more respondents gave positive 
responses to the quality of recurrent training, the working experience of qualified 
crew members, selection criteria for flight crews, and standardisation of checklists 
and manuals. However, a high percentage of negative responses were revealed about 
recurrent training (31.7%), working experience of, qualified crew members (27.1%), 
and selection criteria (38.6%). With regard to the effectiveness of human factors 
training, over 50% of the pilots indicated their disagreement. 
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Figure 5.4 Pilots' Responses to Flight Training 
Detailed analysis based on sub-groups shows that there was significant difference at 
the 0.01 level between Captains and First Officers (see Table 5.8). What needs to be 
cautioned is that one fifth of the Captains surveyed strongly disagreed that human 
factors training in their airlines was effective. There were no significant differences 
found in the other two comparison groups. With the exception of Ab-initio trained 
pilots (38.3%), more than half of the other pilots gave negative responses to the 
statement, which corresponded to 61.3% of the military-trained pilots, 52.6% and 
59.1% of the pilots working respectively for international and regional airlines. 
Further information on flight training was obtained during the interviews. Of the 34 
pilots who were asked, 30 (88.2%) indicated that professional references were 
requested, but only 4 (11.8%) of them reported that the information on the types of 
preemployment background was verified. All of the pilots reported that their airlines 
imposed minimum standards for new-hire pilot qualifications and captain upgrade 
qualifications. When asked about contract flight training, all of the subject airlines 
contracted out their entire pilot training program to contract training centres. In 
general, these centres provide a complete service, including the screening and 
selection of pilot candidates; initial ground school and flight training of newly hired 
pilots; aircraft transition, captain upgrade, recurrent training and check flights; CRM 
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training and LOFT24. However, the surveyed airlines merely contracted out initial 
training on some aircraft type (all of the airlines) and recurrent training (4 of the 6 
airlines) basically with focus on simulator training. The pilots at 3 of the 6 airlines 
indicated that their airlines provided CRM training. The training was generally 
offered to new-hire pilots during initial training, but not to pilots who were upgrading 
to captain or making a transition to a new type of aircraft. None of the airlines 
conducted joint CRM training with both cockpit crew members and flight attendants, 
and only 2 airlines provided LOFT training. 
Table 5.8 The Rating of the Statement: "Human factors training is 
effective. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly a gree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 17 8 21 21 11 7 
n=85 percent 20.0% 9.4% 24.7% 24.7% 12.9% 8.2% 
First Officer frequency 2 22 51 30 16 9 
n= 130 percent 1.5% 16.9% 39.2% 23.1% 12.3% 6.9% 
Military frequency 15 24 64 36 18 11 
n= 168 percent 8.9% 14.3% 38.1% 21.4% 10.7% 6.5% 
Ab-initio frequency 4 6 8 15 9 5 
n=47 percent 8.5% 12.8% 17.0% 31.9% 19.1% 10.6% 
International frequency 9 12 29 23 14 8 
n= 95 percent 9.5% 12.6% 30.5% 24.2% 14.7% 8.4% 
Regional frequency 10 18 43 28 13 8 
n= 120 percent 8.3% 15.0% 35.8% 23.3% 10.8% 6.7% 
[%'obt= 25.33, df = 5, p<. O1] Captain vs First Officer 
5.4.3 Discussion 
Outsourcing training In general, benefits attributed to contracted training are 
access to flight simulators and more experienced instructors, uniformity of 
instruction, and a reduction in workload for senior management and pilots. Among 
24 LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training) provides a method of exposing a crew in a full mission 
simulator to complete flight operations (such as pre-flight operations, the flight itself and the post- 
flight activity) in such a way that company procedures, flight procedures, flying techniques and 
cockpit management (human factors) are observed without providing any more assistance to the crew 
than it would have on a real flight. Crew operation and teamwork shortcomings are reviewed during 
debriefing by a training pilot. Some airlines have introduced video recording and playback into the 
debriefing and found this beneficial in allowing self-critique by the pilots. Thorough preparation of 
LOFT scenarios is essential in order to provide a maximum of crew decisions, actions and 
opportunity for error in a realistic flight that imposes an abundance of high crew workload and stress. 
176 
Chapter 5 Airline Safety Survey Analysis and Discussion 
the many training approaches available, simulator training allows hazardous 
manoeuvres to be practised in a safe environment. In particular, the majority of 
airlines usually conduct pilot training at night, so pilot and instructor tend to be tired. 
For example, on the 11th of September 1979,6 flight crew of China Airline Boeing 
747 were killed whilst training in a company aircraft at night outside Taoyuan, 
Taiwan. In addition to safety considerations, the cost of training in a simulator is 
usually less than the cost of training in an aircraft, but the expense of sophisticated, 
high-fidelity flight simulators is likely to prevent most of the airlines surveyed from 
purchasing their own simulators. As aircraft manufacturers provide contracted 
training services as an added bonus for purchasing their aircraft, these airlines usually 
have their pilots trained at manufacturers training centres. 
A basic problem appears to be discrepancy in the quality of training services 
provided. Some training centres only offer systems introductions whilst others 
provide complete training facilities and services. Another frequently encountered 
problem is that simulators used in contract training are different from the type of 
aircraft operated in airlines. It was also revealed in the interviews that pilots flying 
different series of the same basic aircraft type generally took the same aircraft system 
course. The inability of training centres to provide adequate instruction to cater for 
an airline's specific needs will be likely to affect training effectiveness. Thus, airlines 
must attempt to advantage of the relative strengths of contracted training and try to 
dispel its limitations in order to increase the value and effectiveness of the services 
obtained. 
Human factors training In order to increase awareness and promote amore 
responsible attitude towards the importance of human factors in civil aviation, human 
factors training has become a requirement for ICAO contracting countries since 1992. 
In ICAO's Annex I, all pilots are required to be familiar with human performance and 
limitations as they relate to their flying activities and the formal privileges of their 
license. 
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The application of human factors in the aviation system takes the form of CRM. In 
recent years, CRM has been subject to increased attention from the airline industry, 
due to the growing number of accidents and near misses in air traffic. One of the 
prime aims of CRM is to encourage cockpit crews, in particular inexperienced First 
Officers, to be more assertive in reminding other crew members when they deviate 
from prescribed operating standards. Other operational changes include increasing the 
responsibility of the First Officer, and encouraging the Captain to consult with the 
First Officer for suggestions and opinions, in order to create an effective and open 
flight environment. 
Based on Hofstede's measurement, the subject country is inclined to high power 
distances. It is understandable that the junior crews surveyed never challenged their 
Captain, but intend expected the Captain to give orders. Also most of the Captains did 
not attempt to create a communicative cockpit environment. Examples were provided 
by two of the First Officers interviewed about how they tried not to affront their 
Captains. 
`It was Captain that was flying IFR to xx c Airport. As the aircraft (Airbus 
300-600R) was making an ILS approach to runway 31, Captain 
inadvertently activated the GO lever, like what happened in Nagoya 
accident. I reminded Captain three times before he made the correction. 
However, I could tell he was a little upset probably because of losing face. 
On our flight to return to xxx, during the taxi check I set V2 (takeoff speed) 
to V! (decision speed) on purpose in order to let him correct my mistake. As 
planned, he noticed the mistake and corrected me. Then, I said, `Thank you. 
To err is human. ' Captain responded with `Yes, to err is human. People 
always make mistake. ' How to please Captain is the spirit of CRM because 
when Captain is happy, you are happy. " 
"Face is more important to military-trained Captains, who always think that 
they had flown fighters for more than 20 years without any accident, how 
could there be any problems to fly commercial aircraft? Thus, if they feel 
they lose face with their fellow crew members on this flight, they will try to 
win it back on next flight. " 
Other interview results showed that CRM training disappointed the subject pilots 
because what was taught conflicted with cultural influences. 
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"When Captain agrees with your reminding, he thinks you have CRM 
concept. When he does not agree, he thinks you do not have disciplines. " 
"CRM merely exists in the classroom but not in the cockpit. The CRM 
instructor in our company is the Captain who, as generally acknowledged, is 
the most difficult to communicate and has the least CRM concepts in the 
cockpit" 
Survey and interview results suggested that cultural differences should be exploited to 
move toward improved CRM practices on a regional basis. With continuous 
reinforcement, CRM training can improve line operators' teamwork and crew co- 
ordination concepts to achieve better crew performance. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
transformation of human behaviour takes time, so the support of top management is 
critical in determining the effectiveness of CRM training. Heimreich and Foushee's 
research (1993) found that an organisation's commitment to the concepts of CRM and 
its importance in safety and crew effectiveness had demonstrated significant 
improvement in cockpit management attitudes. In addition, check pilots and 
instructors also play a critical role in influencing pilot attitudes about the value and 
usefulness of CRM training. Thus, there needs to be more emphasis on selection 
procedures for both flight instructors and check pilots, with considerable attention 
being paid to their ability to implement CRM principles. In addition to technical 
skills, they require special training in evaluating individuals in team performance and 
in an individual's ability to function as a team member. 
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5.5 Airline resource availability 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Considering the effective allocation of resources, an airline's two objectives are: 
pursuing the production goals of the organisation and safety (ICARUS, 1994; Reason, 
1990). In the long term, these two objectives are compatible, but when resources are 
finite, conflicts of interest arise and priorities have to be decided. Such conflict is 
especially obvious in airlines just entering the market and those confronted with 
structural or financial problems. When finite resources are allocated to the pursuit of 
production goals, their allowances for safety may be diminished. Similarly, resources 
allocated to safety may also decrease those available for production. On facing this 
dilemma, these airlines may be tempted to give priority to production or short-term 
profits over safety concerns. 
Management should, therefore, make rational decisions about how resources are 
allocated to achieve the production objectives of the organisation at acceptable levels 
of risk. 
The section attempts to understand pilots' viewpoints on the following five statements 
about the availability of resources for safety in their airlines. 
1. The company has invested a lot in safety improvement. 
2. The company absorbs safety-related information from the industry well. 
3. The company maintains incident/accident data very well. 
4. The company enthusiastically participates in the aviation safety 
organisations and meetings. 
5. The company provides very good quality safety-related information. 
The results of the interview survey related to participation in safety conferences are 
also presented. At the end of the section, further discussion about resource 
availability and allocation is provided to look more deeply into the topic. 
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5.5.2 Pilots' perception of airline resource availability 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the overall opinions of the pilots on statements related to airline 
resource availability. Less than 50% of the pilot respondents indicated that their 
companies had invested a lot in safety improvement. About the same percentage of 
the respondents disagreed that their company maintained incident/accident data very 
well. However, it was noteworthy that more than 10% of the respondents checked "I 
don't know" on this statement. In response to the fourth statement, it appeared that 
more than 30% of the respondents showed their disagreement. As to the provision of 
good quality safety-related information, a majority of the respondents were against it. 
The company has invested a lot in 
safety improvement 
Absorbing safety-related 
information from the industry well 
Maintaining hazard/ 
lncidentlaccident data very well 
Participating in aviation safety 
organisations and meetings 
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Figure 5.5 Pilots' Perception of Airline Resource Availability 
Participation in safely Organisations and meetings The distribution of responses 
based on positions, training background and airline operations are shown in Table 5.9. 
It appeared that a substantial number of the military-trained pilots over Ah-initio 
pilots did not believe that their company enthusiastically participated in the aviation 
safety organisations and meetings, with the difference significant at the . 
01 level. 
More pilots in regional airlines were against the statement than those in international 
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airlines, with 60% indicating their disagreement. Chi-square revealed that there was 
significant difference at the . 01 level. 
Table 5.9 The Rating of the Statement: "Your company 
enthusiastically participates in the aviation safety organisations 
and meetings. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 2 12 20 27 16 13 
n= 90 percent 2.2% 13.3% 22.2% 30.0% 17.8% 14.4% 
First officer frequency 2 13 28 29 26 25 
n= 123 percent 1.6% 10.6% 22.8% 23.6% 21.1% 20.3% 
Military frequency 3 23 41 48 29 23 
n= 167 percent 1.8% 13.8% 24.6% 28.7% 17.4% 13.8% 
Ab-initio frequency 1 2 7 8 13 15 
n=46 percent 2.2% 4.3% 15.2% 17.4% 28.3% 32.6% 
International frequency 0 11 18 17 24 22 
n= 92 percent 0% 12.0% 19.6% 18.5% 26.1% 23.9% 
Regional frequency 4 14 30 39 18 16 
n= 121 percent 3.3%1 11.6%1 24.8% 32.2% 14.9% 13.2% 
[obc= 13.83, ff = 3, p<. O 1] Military vs Ab-initio 
[X2Obt= 11.39, ff = 3, p<. O1] International vs Regional 
Investment in safety improvement The responses to this statement suggested that 
military-background captains who were working in regional airlines tended to 
disagree that their airlines had invested a lot in safety improvement. It was 
noteworthy that more than one-fifth of the captains checked "strongly disagree" to the 
statement. There was significant difference between the captains and the first officers 
at the . 01 
level (X2obt = 24.81, df = 5, p<. 01). There was wide variation between the 
ranking (p<. Ol) and airline (p<. 01) comparative groups: 58.3% of the military- 
trained pilots and 60.2% of the regional-airline pilots gave negative answers to the 
statement, whereas only 22.2% of the Ab-initio pilots and 37.8% of the international- 
airline pilots reported disagreement (see Table 5.10). 
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Table 5.10 The Rating of the Statement: "Your company has 
invested a lot in safety improvement. " 
strongly disagree 123456 strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Captain frequency 18 5 23 18 13 6 
n= 83 percent 21.7% 6.0% 27.7% 21.7% 15.7% 7.2% 
First officer frequency 3 22 31 25 25 14 
n= 120 percent 2.5% 18.3% 25.8% 20.8% 20.8% 11.7% 
Military frequency 20 24 48 31 21 14 
n= 158 percent 12.7% 15.2% 30.4% 19.6% 13.3% 8.9% 
Ab-initio 
n=45 
frequency 
percent 
1 
2.2% 
3 
6.7% 
6 
13.3% 
12 
26.7% 
17 
37.8% 
6 
13.3% 
International frequency 7 8 19 17 26 13 
n= 90 percent 7.8% 8.9% 21.1% 18.9% 28.9% 14.4% 
Regional frequency 14 19 35 26 12 7 
n= 113 percent 12.4% 16.8% 31.0% 23.0% 10.6% 6.2% 
[xhobt= 24.81, df = 5, p<. Ol] Captain vs First Officer 
[X2obt= 20.25, df = 3, p<. 0l] Military vs Ab-initio 
[X2obt= 18.02, df = 5, p<. 01] International vs Regional 
An interview question was asked to assess the interviewees' willingness and opinions 
about attending safety conferences or meetings. Their opinions for and against 
participation in safety organisational meetings are summarised below: 
Table 5.11 Reasons for attending and not attending aviation safety 
conferences 
Reasons for attending aviation safety conferences: (n = 25) No. of 
respondents 
" It helps to increase knowledge. 12 
" There is no influence on flight training. 8 
" Safety meetings themselves are attractive. 5 
" It helps to improve language ability. 5 
" It helps to better understand updated studies, regional differentials 4 
and current concerns. 
Reasons against attending aviation safety conferences: (n = 25) No. of 
respondents 
" Language gap: 19 
There is lack of involvement due to inability to comprehend and 
discuss. 
" Workload increase: 14 
The participant is required to file a report right after the meeting. 
" Flight pay decrease: 8 
Flying hours are reduced for attending meetings, but some 
companies do not compensate the participant for the loss of flight 
pay. 
" Attending meetings are viewed as an extra but unnecessary job. 6 
" Time arrangement of these meetings is not appropriate. 2 
183 
Chapter 5 Airline Safety Survey Analysis and Discussion 
5.5.3 Discussion 
Due to rapid expansion in the scale of their operations, some subject airlines are 
facing the dilemma of allocating finite resources between maximising profits and 
meeting safety standards. The survey results showed that a considerable number of 
the respondents reported negatively about resource application on safety, with 
regional-airline pilots being more against it than were international-airline pilots. 
Essentially, there are no major regulatory differences between regional and 
international air carrier operations. Presumably because international airlines have to 
face a more competitive environment (external) and there was a higher safety 
recognition by their top management (internal), international-airline pilots tended to 
be more satisfied with the safety endeavour in their companies when compared with 
regional-airline pilots (Safety investment: x2obt= 18.02, df = 5, p<. Ol; Participation in 
safety meetings: x2obt= 11.39, df = 3, p<. 01). 
Some comments made by the interviewees indicated that accident and incident 
investigation reports were treated as absolutely confidential, so lessons gained from 
them could not be learned by pilots, let alone maintenance and ground staff. 
Consequently, incidents were talked about amongst them in private, which is apt to be 
misleading and cause rumours. One interviewee stressed that "The safety staff just 
like to complete the investigation process as soon as possible, seldom try to take 
further action. " The other pilot interviewed pointed out that "As learning from past 
accidents was almost impossible, how could learning from past incidents be 
expected? " 
The feedback and outcome of safety efforts are not as tangible and rapid as those of 
production. When it comes to decision making, it is often the case that top 
management recognises the importance of safety but does not know how to place the 
priorities, and this always makes subordinates feel that top management merely pay 
lip service to the importance of safety. In addition, there is often an imbalance 
between investigation effort and remedial effort. Figure 5.6 illustrates circular 
procedures of accident prevention. To ensure the effectiveness of safety effort, every 
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procedure is indispensable. In other words, only if such a safety cycle is completed, 
safety performance can be assured. 
Higl 
Safety 
Level 
Low 
Figure 5.6 Safety Cycle 
Recommendation 
Time 
Safety literature Considering the high percentages of disagreement shown in the 
statements about resource availability, it is suggested that appropriate safety literature 
should be offered and subscribed, and that management and pilots should be 
encouraged to attend safety seminars or conferences. Any (and every) notice of safety 
information should be distributed to all employees as quickly as it is determined to be 
relevant. Only in this way is it possible to educate and create a continuous awareness 
of potential hazards. 
Establishment of a safety information network Establishing a safety information 
network is an effective and essential safety management tool, which includes four 
main directions: participation in industry safety activities, safety information 
exchange, flight safety database, and statistics and trend analysis. Properly 
administered, it makes everyone in the organisation safety-conscious, and the safety 
information network should be totally "transparent". That is, everyone should have 
access to safety information throughout the entire organisation. Trend analysis gives 
everyone a glimpse of "how we are doing" in safety performance and can be a 
powerful motivational tool. 
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5.6 The role of the civil aviation authority in airline safety 
5.6.1 Introduction 
When considering air travel risk, the safety/risk levels established by regulatory 
authorities are usually the minimum acceptable (ICAO, 1984). The quality of a 
national aviation regulatory authority has a direct impact on safety. If the authority is 
not working at peak efficiency, safety can become impaired. If the authority 
mismanages its meagre guidance and enforcement resources, it might have to rely 
heavily on the good faith of the regulated companies to comply with safety rules. 
In most countries, the civil aviation authority has the responsibility of achieving a 
high standard of safety. It usually undertakes this by formulating regulations and 
procedures based on ICAO SARPs25 (Standard and Recommended Procedures), 
tailored where necessary to meet local environmental or operational conditions. 
Inspection and enforcement processes are then established to ensure that the aviation 
community complies with the national regulations. 
5.6.2 Respondents' perception of the role of aviation regulatory authority 
This section deals with the pilots' opinions about the role of the aviation regulatory 
authority in the subject countries. The majority answered negatively about the CAA's 
performance in terms of response to the pace of technological change, checking 
compliance with safety standards, capacity to guide airline training, provision of 
safety information, and investigator's qualification for dealing with advanced aircraft. 
A point of particular interest was that two-thirds of pilots did not feel that the 
investigators were qualified to the level required for advanced technology aircraft (see 
Figure 5.7). 
25 When countries cannot, for whatever reason, adapt their national legislation to conform to ICAO 
SARPs, they are required to file a "difference". This is published by ICAO, and indicates to other 
countries, and users, that their legislation differs from internationally agreed standards. 
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Figure 5.7 Pilots' Perceptions to the Role of Their National Aviation 
Regulatory Authorities 
Significant differences regarding compliance with safety standards [x2 (5, N=233) = 
13.62, p<. 05] and guidance of training [x2 (5, N=233) = 20.88, p<. 001] were found 
between captains and first officers. Some other information from Asian management 
pilots and CAA officials is shown in Table 5.11 It is obvious that there is a wide 
variation between pilots' perceptions and CAA officers' self-assessment. 
Table 5.12 Respondents' Perceptions of the Role of Aviation Regulatory 
Authority (Percentage of Disagreement) 
Asian Pilots CAA officers 
Response pace to technological change 41.8% 23.5% 
Compliance check with safety standards 39.1% 17.6% 
Capacity to guide the training of airlines 47.8% 23.1% 
Provision of safety information to airlines 50.8% 18.7% 
Investigator's qualification to advanced aircraft 69.6% 29.4% 
When asked about the necessity of setting up an independent aircraft accident 
investigating agency, 21 of the 22 CAA officers agreed and only I disagreed. The 
reason for objecting to the idea, as indicated by the individual concerned, was that his 
country was small. Considering the finite resources available and the small size of 
the aviation community in his country, he did not think there was a need to establish 
an independent investigating agency. 
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5.6.3 Discussion 
Challenge for the CAA The boom in air traffic and airline deregulation have 
created a great challenge for the CAA staff. These factors have placed excessive 
workload demands on regulatory authorities. Once an airline is formed, or a new 
aircraft type is placed into service, the CAA has to devote its limited pool of staff to 
inspect the operation of the airline or to certificate the plane. As most CAA staff in 
the subject country were retired Air Force personnel and did not have airline 
experience, in most cases, they had not acquired the qualifications appropriate for 
flying and maintaining the types of civil transport aircraft currently being operated. 
Technology advances, moreover, require additional training for the CAA staff to keep 
abreast of recent technological developments, such as new navigation systems and 
computerised flight control systems. Time constraints have made it difficult for the 
CAA staff to augment their qualifications in newly operated equipment and 
knowledge of airline operations. In addition, the number of staff employed has 
declined. This may possibly be because a flight- or maintenance- qualified person 
can get a higher paying but lower workload job with the airlines. 
Excessive workload demands as well as staff shortages have resulted in overreliance 
on reviewing paperwork. Such a "pencil whipping" phenomenon has raised concerns 
in the aviation community. Several interviewees have stated that "the CAA should 
have larger budgets to enhance the salary of civil aviation officials and reinforce 
necessary training" in order to encourage them to stay with the CAA and, moreover, 
to create incentives for young people to enter the profession as a desirable career. 
Another situation to have been aggravated by the workload problem was the inability 
to revise and update the Civil Aviation Regulations in order to meet current needs. 
The interview and questionnaire results showed that there was great call for updating 
of the Civil Aviation Regulations. Many interviewees and pilot respondents stated 
that "The Civil Aviation Regulations should be continuously revised to meet current 
international standards. " 
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Recommendations for the existing problems To address the problem of staffing in the 
interim, the CAA is recommended to consider tapping into the sizeable pool of 
experienced technical, managerial and regulatory experts now available within the 
international aviation industry and community. With regard to setting up an 
independent accident investigating agency, the majority of the subject countries could 
not afford to establish their own although great intentions were shown in the survey. 
Considering the lack of experts, insufficient facilities and limited budgets in the 
subject countries, cross border co-operation with countries that possess qualified 
accident investigation agencies is suggested to obtain help in dealing with 
international accidents and their own domestic ones as well. As noted in Section 
2.3.3, such international co-operation should start with a willingness to establish the 
channel of communication and a commitment to participate in the development of the 
required procedures. 
As a long-term solution to manpower shortage, professional training is recommended 
to provide and augment staff qualifications, and hopefully to increase their job 
satisfaction. Additionally, salary differentials between civil service positions and 
airline jobs needs to be narrowed to encourage a career with government-base civil 
aviation. It is suggested some form of additional pay on top of the base civil service 
salary should be provided when an individual remains in his job and maintains a high 
level of performance. 
Many respondents indicated there was need to update Civil Aviation Regulations. 
However, it is a slow process, due in part to legal constraints imposed by changes to 
legislation, and more often than not, because of lags resulting from the failure 
recognise the need for remedial action. Figure 5.8 illustrates how considerable time 
lags can occur before changes to regulations can be made and implemented. As an 
interim measure, the CAA could act as an informant by publishing advisory circulars 
to highlight the lessons learned from accident and incident investigations, and 
hopefully to help avoid these weaknesses in the future. 
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Figure 5.8 Four Implementing Lags 
The most fundamental change that is required is to build up the concept of partnership 
for safety. Surveillance and oversight of airline operations by the national authority is 
an essential part of ensuring safety. Sometimes the goal of preventing the accident in 
the first place is forgotten. Rather than acting in a police/punishment fashion, the 
CAA should act as an authority in partnership with the operators on accident 
avoidance, while still retaining the ultimate prerogative of applying appropriate 
punishment when necessary. 
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5.7 Language disadvantages for non-native English speaking pilots 
English is the formal language of commercial aviation. For most Asian countries, it 
is one of the most essential requirements in pilot selection. Not only is English vital 
for verbal communication during training and operations in the cockpit, but it also 
influences the transmission and sharing of safety information. Numerous studies have 
explored the problems of linguistic intervention (Billings and Cheaney, 1981; Monan, 
1988,1983), yet few examine the difficulties of language barriers. This section 
discusses the frustrations resulting from language barriers, which cause difficulties in 
communication and co-operation, and also influenced the reception of safety 
information. 
Some clues regarding language barriers have been revealed in Section 5.2. Others are 
presented as follows: 
More than one-third of the respondent pilots agreed that they suffered a language gap 
on receiving safety-related information (see Table 5.12 ). 
Table 5.13 A Language Gap for Receiving Safety-Related Information 
Taiwanese pilot 
Yes 41.9% 37.1% 
No 36.0% 50.1% 
Don't know 22.1% 12.8% 
Interview results also showed that communicative difficulty was a leading problem 
when training abroad. 57.1% of the interviewees indicated that poor language 
proficiency hindered them from asking questions, and 78.6% admitted that it 
influenced their learning speed. Here is a typical example stated by an interviewee: 
"... 1 remembered when the first time I was training abroad. Because the 
instructor spoke too fast with a special accent and it was the first time for 
me to be trained in this type of aircraft, I not only didn't totally understand 
what he said but also didn't know how to ask questions and express my 
opinions. " 
Some interviewees mentioned that language barriers could create confusion, 
hesitation and frustration with regard to co-operation in the cockpit. 
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"Crew often discuss technical problems in their native language, leaving the 
English-speaking Captain out of the loop. " 
"Greater effort and concentration are required to avoid confusion, and that 
surely would influence their focus on aircraft monitoring. " 
"In brief, my English proficiency is the biggest obstacle and frustration in 
the cockpit. Hesitation to ask questions never happens to me, but I would 
not ask the same question for the third time if I still did not get it. I would 
rather bear in mind with confusion. " 
Language barriers were not only a serious issue in both training and operations, but 
also caused problems regarding the interpretation of safety information. 32.1% of the 
interviewees expressed that they had ever misunderstood the meaning of the operating 
manual due to language gap. Below is a critic description from a First Officer 
interviewed: 
"My Captain's English is not good enough, but because the operating 
manual is written in English, he likes to make judgement by his past military 
experience and concepts. " 
Merritt's research (1995) pointed out that the first frustrations of a multinational crew 
were with language barriers, which accorded with the findings of this study. 
However, there was a difference, in that the majority of the subjects in her research 
were from English-speaking countries, while this study aimed at non-native English 
speaking pilots. 
The results of these two studies revealed that language barriers caused difficulties in 
the cockpit for both native and non-native English speaking pilots. While non-native 
English speaking pilots might have difficulty communicating in other than their first 
language, native English speaking pilots tended not to be able to communicate clearly 
and precisely with non-native English pilots as they could be unaware of and 
insensitive to the difficulty of encoding and decoding information in a second 
language. 
In addition to being used as the main language for communication in flight 
operations, English is the essential language for many aviation safety literature. Lack 
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of multilingual people to translate foreign safety articles and documents into their 
own languages has made the subject airlines unable to provide imminent safety 
information for their staff. It is, therefore, understandable that many pilot 
respondents, as shown in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, requested for the provision of more 
aviation safety information. 
The following suggestions are made for top management regarding the management 
of language barriers: 
1. Recognise the existence of language barriers on training, operations, and the 
transmission of safety information; 
2. Encourage and provide opportunities for the further improvement of English for 
aircrew; 
3. Suggest and encourage the use of English in the cockpit at all times except in the 
case of an emergency; 
4. Encouraging expatriate pilots to use simple and plain English in the cockpit; 
5. Through safety meetings or CRM training, let expatriate pilots understand the 
linguistic difficulties and problems local pilots have; 
6. Increase the availability of bilingual manuals and regulations: These help to 
prevent misunderstanding or conjecture. However, it is suggested that any 
bilingual manual or regulation be thoroughly checked before being published. 
This will help to ensure appropriate translations and avoid misinterpretation; and 
7. Establish language clinics to provide assistance for language problems: Hiring of 
a few fluently multilingual people could be very beneficial, especially if these 
people can be assigned to provide appropriate translations of foreign safety 
articles and documents. Then, concepts and ideas for safety strategies can be 
widely discussed and shared among the staff. Alternatively, another source of 
such help could be found in universities, where faculty and students who possess 
the required language skills could be utilised (and at the same time become 
interested in aviation as a possible career). Tapes with real-life recordings should 
be utilised in language labs. They could also be used in LOFT training to replace 
the synthesised recordings currently used. 
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5.8 The perception of important factors to airline safety 
Respondent pilots' and CAA officers' assessments of the relative important factors to 
airline safety are summarised in Table 5.13 and 5.14 in the form of mean rankings 
(higher mean rankings indicate the factor is perceived to relatively more important). 
Table 5.14 Mean Ranking of Factors According to Respondents' 
Perceived Importance to Airline Safety (Taiwanese pilots) 
Captain 
n=94 
Mean Ranking (s. d) 
First officer 
n= 139 
All pilots 
n=233 
Top management 5.54 (0.86) 5.50 (0.78) 5.52 (0.82) 
Training 5.57 (0.68) 5.81 (0.48) 5.79 (0.57) 
Organisational structure 4.72 (1.09) 4.59 (0.97) 4.64 (1.02) 
Organisational culture 5.17 (1.17) 4.93 (0.89) 5.03 (1.02) 
Operating standard 5.69 (0.82) 5.73 (0.57) 5.72 (0.68) 
Resource management 4.63 (1.25) 4.92 (1.01) 4.80 (1.12) 
The role of CAA 4.04 (1.67) 4.54 (1.28) 4.34 (1.47) 
Table 5.15 Mean Ranking of Factors According to Respondents' 
Perceived Importance to Airline Safety 
Mean Ranking (s. d) 
Asian MGT pilot Asian CAA officer 
n=46 n=22 
Top management 5.54 (0.66) 5.68 (0.65) 
Organisational structure 5.15 (0.89) 5.05 (0.84) 
Organisational culture 5.22 (0.84) 5.45 (0.74) 
Operating standard 5.85 (0.36) 5.36 (0.73) 
Training 5.80 (0.40) 5.55 (0.60) 
The role of CAA 4.76 (1.25) 5.18 (1.01) 
Analysis was conducted using repeated measures ANOVA in order to investigate 
individual differences in the perceived factors concerning airline safety. The possible 
influence of the current position and the initial training background of the respondent 
pilots was also assessed in the ANOVA (Taiwanese pilots). A significant main effect 
was observed within individuals across the alternative factors (p<. 001, F=52.08, n= 
233, df 6,1374) No significant effects were observed for the position of the 
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respondent pilots (F=0.46, NS, n= 233, df 6,1374) or the initial training background 
(F=0.42, NS, n= 233, df 6,1374). (see Appendix H: the summary table of the 
repeated measures ANOVA. ) Subsequent post hoc testing using multiple t-tests (see 
Appendix H) revealed significant individual differences in perceptions of the 
importance of factors in airline safety with flight training perceived to be significantly 
important than organisational structure (t=17.53, p<. 001, n= 233, df= 232), 
organisational culture (t=11.97, p<. 001, n= 233, df=232), resource management 
(t=14.15, p<. 001, n=233, df=232), and the role of CAA (t=14.46, p<. 001, n=233, 
df=232). Operating standard was also considered to be more important than 
organisational structure (t=15.66, p<. 001, n= 233, df=232), organisational culture 
(t=11.15, p<. 001, n=233, df=232), resource management (t=13.38, p<. 001, n =233, 
df=232) and the role of CAA (t=13.70, p<. 001, n= 233, df=232). 
Flight training and operating standard were perceived as more important factors to 
both Asian and Taiwanese respondent pilots, while top management was viewed as 
the most important factor in the viewpoint of CAA officer respondents. Analysis of 
all respondent groups showed that the role of CAA received the lowest mean ranking 
in all of the factors analysed (see Table 5.13 and 5.14). 
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PART III 
Feasibility Study for a Confidential Aviation Incident 
Reporting System in Taiwan 
CHAPTER 6 
Understanding of 
Confidential Incident 
Reporting Systems 
CHAPTER 7 
Taiwanese Aviation 
Community Reaction to 
the Introduction of a 
Confidential Reporting 
Despite the improvements in hardware and facilities in the aviation industry, the incidence of 
human error has remained persistently high. Hence, safety issues focus on better understanding 
of how people perform their assigned duties, and safety professionals claim that accident 
prevention should start with rooting out the underlying causal factors or incidents as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. This requires analytical systems sensitive enough to provide early identification 
and warning. It is believed that a confidential incident reporting system is one of the necessary 
tools, enabling hasards to be constantly tracked and evaluationof the risks they involve. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNDERSTANDING OF AVIATION CONFIDENTIAL INCIDENT 
REPORTING SYSTEMS 
"We never learn enough from accidents, let alone our incidents. " 
-------- Gerry Bruggink 
6. Overview 
Lauber (1984) discusses the safety research uses of aviation incident data, stating that 
an incident database "is a veritable gold mine of information waiting to be tapped. " 
This chapter examines how this `gold mine' of safety information can be gouged by 
using confidential reporting systems. 
It first explores the need to establish incident databases, and then discusses the 
strengths and limitations of using the data. The review of the six national-level 
reporting systems follows, with comments added at the end of each section. 
Similarities in underlying structures are described and the differences in details 
among these selected operational systems are compared. The last section presents the 
vital concept of data exchange for future developments. 
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6.1 The need for an incident data base 
In comparison with accidents, the characteristics of incidents discussed in Section 
3.3.4 depict the benefits of accumulating aviation safety incident information in terms 
of the frequency of occurrence, the severity and visibility of events. Incident data can 
permit early identification of problems in the aviation system and allow effective 
remedial action before they result in an accident. 
For individuals, the valuable information gathered from incident reports makes them 
aware of unsafe acts and prevents them from making similar errors with perhaps fatal 
consequences. Also, incident data often provides organisations in the aviation 
industry the opportunity to increase safety and learn from each other. It assists 
airlines to assess the existing operational system and make changes in safety 
management. Using and circulating incident data, in addition, helps aircraft 
manufacturers to achieve the design of more error-resistant aircraft. The data may 
also aid aviation regulatory authorities in modifying safety regulations. 
In order for enhance accident investigation and prevention, the eighth edition (July 
1994) of Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) of ICAO 
recommends to its member states several new provisions. Two of these provisions 
are relevant to incidents, which includes: 
" the requirement to establish incident reporting systems. 
"a requirement for the investigation of serious incidents, and 
The need of an incident data base is well explained by Ashford (1994) who stated at a 
safety conference, "Too often an accident occurs where a particular failure or 
inadequacy is involved and it is later recognised that this same aspect was a factor in 
earlier incidents or accidents, but the chain of communication failed somewhere 
between the occurrence and the corrective action. Not to have taken adequate and 
timely action earlier means that the later accident was avoidable and industry and 
authorities can be criticised for the lack of earlier action. " Incident data provides a 
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way to prevent accidents by identifying the developing causal chain and allowing 
effective remedial action to be taken before the causal factors result in an accident. 
6.2 The phenomenon of the problem 
Pidgeon and O'Leary (1995) claim that achieving maximum benefits from an incident 
reporting system is dependent on direct access to top management and open exchange 
of safety information. In an ideal organisation, line pilots should be able to discuss 
their technical, operational, crew and personal problems directly with their managers. 
Safety information can be exchanged openly without fear of being disciplined 
because of what has been reported. However, it is often the case that flight crews 
involved in unsafe or potentially unsafe events seldom submit incident reports 
involving their own performance. 
The statistics of the Accident/Incident/Hazard database of Taiwan from 1990 to 1994 
reveals that 65.8% of the accidents, 72.6% of the incidents, and 4.0% of the hazards 
are related to human performance (see Figure 6.1). As described in Section 2.6.2, it 
is generally conceded that almost two-thirds of the aviation accidents and incidents 
have their roots in human performance error. Figure 3.5 of Chapter 3 also shows that 
the ratio among major accidents, minor injuries and no injury incidents may be one to 
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Figure 6.1 Type of Aircraft Occurrence by Percentage of Data Set 
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twenty-nine to three hundred. The low percentage of hazards in Taiwan, or what is 
generally defined as no injury incidents, begs the question whether many incidents are 
not reported. 
Analysis of Australian BASI's (Bureau of Air Safety Investigation) Accident and 
Incident database indicates a similar non-reporting phenomenon. Of the incident 
reports that were submitted to BASI by flight crews in 1984 and 1985, only 12% 
(9% General Aviation) involved any form of human error (BASI, 1988). However, an 
analysis of incidents reported by all sources shows that 31% of those incidents and 
50% of the more serious incidents involved flight crew performance, whereas an 
analysis of accidents shows that 71% involved flight crew performance. These figures 
not only reveal that many incidents involving flight crew performance may not be 
reported26, but also show that there is a relationship between accidents and incidents. 
The reporting system of European Regional Airline Association (ERA) also has the 
difficulty of getting crew performance type incident reports, because almost 75% of 
reports filed were related to technical rather than operational occurrences. Even 
though some nations require a mandatory reporting of all incidents, the number of 
human unsafe acts that were reported was minimal. Green (1995) indicated that only 
about 2% of the reports submitted to the mandatory reporting system of one European 
nation involved any form of human error. 
As the contribution to accident statistics of human error remains high, an increase in 
the frequency of incident reports involving human performance would provide 
invaluable information for more effective and timely preventive measures. 
26 BASI indicates that the non-reporting of incidents predominantly involves 1) flight crew, 2) 
incidents involving flight crew performance, and 3) incidents that are known only to flight crew. 
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6.3 The strengths of using confidential incident data 
Benefit to safety management Incident data has provided aviation professionals 
with information to collaborate on solutions to safety problems: operating procedures 
and policy have been made and refined; aircraft design modified; training 
programmes developed on the basis of realistic occurrences; research has been 
conducted in determining the possible scope of the problems and providing direction 
for remedy; basic human performance associating with the operation of aircraft and 
air traffic control was better understood (Lyall, 1992; Chappell, 1994). Modifications 
to BAC 1-11 fuel selection switches exemplify the situation. An incident involving 
mis-selection of the fuel switches of a BAC 1-11 was reported to UK Confidential 
Human-factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP). After the publication of this 
incident in the Feedback newsletter produced by CHIRP, several other BAC 1-11 
pilots reported having suffered similar engine flameout due to mis-selection of fuel 
switches. As a result, UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) undertook an ergonomic 
study of the BAC 1-11 fuel selection switches and modified the switch design before 
it led to an accident. 
Incident data is also valuable in creating concerns over safety issues within an airline. 
Based on actual occurrences, risk assessment may be more accurate and training 
programmes are likely to be more effective. For example, simulation training 
scenarios constructed from realistic incident data, such as LOFT, tend to be taken 
more seriously by pilots. 
Great volume and diversity of information Though aviation accidents are 
investigated more thoroughly than incidents and thus provide many valuable lessons, 
the limitations of small samples exist when using accident data. For example, the 
wrong conclusions may be drawn because relatively little data can be obtained for 
investigators to validate what happened exactly. Because of no survivor to provide 
detailed information, the main cause of the explosion of TWA Boeing 747 Flight 800 
occurring on 17 July 1996 was still unclear at the time of this writing even though the 
investigation team had found the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). We stand little chance 
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of discoverilng all the causal factors in this accident. Incident data, on the contrary, 
offers a large quantity of detailed information provided by the participants in the 
events. The availability of large numbers of incident reports on many topics provides 
investigators and researchers with a clear picture of problem areas and allow them to 
conduct follow-up laboratory research. 
The UK CHIRP BAC 1-11 fuel management problem mentioned above is a good 
example of how beneficial incident frequencies can be in revealing the latent failures 
in the system. One report of unsafe acts in a particular aircraft type can easily be 
attributed to pilot error, but multiple reports of the same incident should bring the 
matter to the attention of aviation safety professionals. 
More thorough learning Incident data provides detailed information for direct 
studies in solving operational or training problems. It is very beneficial to be able to 
review similar incidents and seek solutions to prevent the incidents from becoming 
accidents in specific situations. The following two cases are the examples of how 
incident reports were used to evaluate the efficacy of new warning systems. Despite 
reported false alarms from the ground proximity warning system (GPWS), the 
warnings were evaluated as effective in preventing aircraft from striking the ground 
(Loomis, 1981), so GPWS were still mandated for airline aircraft in the United States. 
Another study by Mellone and Frank (1993) revealed that the false alarms of the 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) affected the air traffic control system. 
As TCAS II was mandated for airline aircraft in the United States, some airports had 
to modify their air traffic arrival and departure procedures to accommodate aspects of 
the system in order to reduce the number of false alarms (Chappell, 1994). 
Additionally, incident data provides first-hand information from the participants in 
the events which often is not available following an accident. When necessary, the 
submitted information can be augmented and clarified and compared between the 
flight crew and the participating air traffic controller in order to identify potential 
hazards. 
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6.4 The limitations of using confidential incident data 
Many of the problems result from the characteristics of the incident reporting system: 
the voluntary and confidential nature of the reporting process, and the corresponding 
granting of immunity and anonymity to the reporters. The ability to substantiate 
incident reports is addressed first, followed by biases and misperceptions on the part 
of the reporter, and statistical inference when using the database. 
Factual occurrence not verified Few countries or organisations fully investigate 
incident reports. Even though some do, the confidentiality of the system and the 
anonymity granted to reporters may preclude any additional investigation to validate 
information objectively and reports are thus unverified. In addition, the limits of time 
and budgets in dealing with a large number of incident reports prevent a thorough 
investigation on a special topic. A passive way to check the validity of information is 
to examine the consistency of multiple reports on a particular topic. However, it is 
also possible that a large number of reporters may embellish, exaggerate or report 
erroneous data in order to benefit themselves, to understate their errors and blame the 
occurrence on other parties. 
For example, the controllers at an airport tower facility may inflate the number of 
traffic conflicts to support the addition of radar, which would result in an increase in 
their salary (Chappell, op. cit. ). Nevertheless, it is likely that experienced report 
analysts detect any apparent reporting bias and reflect their suspicion in the analyses 
of those reports. 
Reporting biases In addition to the validity of subjectively reported information, 
several factors may contribute to potential bias in the incident data. Not all pilots, 
controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware 
of the incident reporting programme or equally willing to file a report. The incident 
programme and the reporting forms are more accessible for members of the aviation 
community. Other pilots and controllers who are not members of the organisations 
may not be motivated to report. Even if some of them are familiar with the 
programme and want to submit reports, they may find it difficult to contribute safety 
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reports. Take US Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) as an example. Pilots 
contribute 95% of the safety reports (64% air carrier pilots; 27% General Aviation), 
while only 4% of the reports are received from air traffic controllers (ASRS, 1996). 
This imbalance causes the ASRS database to have more pilot-error records (altitude 
deviations, runway transgressions, etc. ) than controller-error records (operational 
errors, co-ordination failures, etc. ). 
Furthermore, the immunity offered to contributors affects reporting. As airline pilots 
are suggested to greater monitoring by human and electronics means, they are apt to 
submit reports of operational problems in order to receive immunity for their 
deviations with more regularity than general aviation pilots who do not fly 
professionally. For example, with the establishment of Error Detection Programme 
(EDP) in the United States, loss of separation was recorded automatically by the 
computer. As a result, greater numbers of pilots began to report their altitude 
deviation with the purpose of receiving immunity. 
On the contrary, if an individual feels that there were no significant consequences 
resulting from the error and regulatory immunity is not needed, he may not report his 
own error. In other words, errors that go undetected are not likely to be reported. 
Not all non-significant errors are not reported. If an individual makes an error and 
the error might create problems for another, the latter may then notify the incident 
reporting programme of the event. 
Statistical limitation Using incident report information should be treated into 
caution. As described above, confidential reports are difficult to validate objectively, 
and reporting biases may affect the type and the number of reports received, and thus 
distort the statistics of incident data. Lyall (1993) points out that "incident data are 
very valuable in giving examples of specific occurrences, but should not be used and 
reported as summary statistics". When drawing conclusions from the analysis of 
incident data, one should realise that the reports are not necessarily representative of 
the full population of events. The example of altitude deviation reports described 
above shows that the number of reporting the event increased after the establishment 
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of EDP, yet there is still no knowledge of the total number of occurrences. The 
number only represents the lower measure of the true number of such events which 
were occurring. Wickens (1993) recommends that augmenting the data base by 
integrating it with others is likely to uncover critical hazards that are under-reported. 
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6.5 Analysis of US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Germany 
incident reporting systems 
A confidential incident reporting system was first introduced in the seventies by the 
US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The UK, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Germany then followed. In addition to these national-level reporting 
systems, many airlines have internal reporting programmes of their own. This section 
merely focuses on national-level reporting systems. Further discussion is offered to 
describe the extent of implementing mandatory reporting systems. The main purpose 
of this section is to examine these confidential reporting systems in terms of the 
origin, confidentiality, immunity, feedback publications, information focus and 
procedural details. Although none should be regarded as a precise model for a 
Taiwanese system, they do provide valuable insight into the ways to operate an 
aviation safety reporting systems, especially in acquiring data concerning safety 
events. 
6.5.1 US Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
6.5.1.1 The first national level confidential incident reporting system 
On 15 April in 1975, less than 5 months after the crash of Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) Flight 514 into a Virginia mountaintop, the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) initiated the first national confidential Aviation Safety 
Reporting Programme (ASRP) with the hope of offering to the aviation community 
information to eliminate unsafe conditions and prevent avoidable accidents. As the 
FAA was the regulatory body for aviation, potential reporters distrusted its neutrality. 
Thus, the scheme was not successful. The problem was solved by transferring the 
sponsorship to a neutral and independent third party - the US National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). Under the 1975 Memorandum of Agreement 
between NASA and the FAA, FAA's responsibilities included funding the 
programme and providing disciplinary immunity for pilots, while NASA is 
responsible for setting programme policy and administering operations. The name of 
the system was then changed to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
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ASRS accepts reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, and others who witness or 
are involved in an unsafe occurrence or hazardous situation. To encourage candid 
reporting, ASRS guarantees confidentiality to the reporter because many reported 
incidents involve violations of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) by the person 
making the report. In addition to a guarantee of confidentiality, reporters to ASRS 
are granted use immunity27 from FAA action, provided (NASA, 1993): 
1. reports are submitted to ASRS within ten days of the occurrence; 
2. the occurrence did not involve a criminal act; 
3. the occurrence was not an accident as described by the Code of Federal 
Regulations (49CFR 830); and 
4. the person submitting the report as not been found guilty of violating 
any FAR within the preceding five years of the date of the incident being 
reported taking place. 
The FAA also granted transactional immunity to the reporter in conjunction with 
unintentional errors. It waives fines and penalties (subject to certain limitations) in 
exchange for a candid account of the human errors that posed a threat or potential 
threat to aviation safety. Transactional immunity is a powerful incentive for reporting 
an unintentional violation, but it is not as significant a factor to controllers as pilots 
because controllers are subject to FAA directives and their operational errors have 
rarely resulted in permanent loss of air traffic control certification. 
6.5.1.2 The US mandatory incident reporting requirements 
The aviation community in the USA is legally required to report only six types of 
incident to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The six types of 
incident are: 
" flight control system malfunction or failure; 
Z' FAR 91.25 Aviation Safety Reporting Programme; prohibition against use of reports for 
enforcement purposes. The Administrator for the FAA will not use reports submitted to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation Safety Reporting Programme (or 
information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action, except information concerning criminal 
offences or accidents which are wholly excluded from the Programme. 
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" inability of any required flight crew member to perform normal flight 
duties as a result of injury or illness; 
" failure of structural components of a turbine engine excluding 
compressor and turbine blades and vanes; 
" in-flight fire; 
" aircraft collision in flight; 
" aircraft overdue and believed to have been involved in an accident. 
Regardless of the mandatory reporting requirement, any person found by the FAA to 
have been involved in breaking a FAR can be fined or penalised resulting in loss or 
suspension of certification. 
Aviation incident data is, as described above, of importance in providing valuable 
information for the improvement of safety of aircraft operations, especially the human 
performance type incident data. Nevertheless, the small proportion of human 
performance reports received by the mandatory system indicates the need to set up a 
non-punitive reporting system in order to complement the US mandatory incident 
reporting system. ASRS was thus established to elicit all types of incident reports, in 
particular human performance type. 
6.5.1.3 The report process 
The process of ASRS reporting mainly comprises of five phases: Reporting, 
comprehensive procedures, de-identification, data entry and storage, and information 
feedback. 
Reporting Any person observing or participating in an aviation safety incident 
may file a report with ASRS. Reports may be submitted on official reporting forms 
distributed by NASA or by phone calls. 
Comprehensive procedures Reports are scanned to distinguish incidents from 
criminal activities and accidents. A report involving criminal behaviour is sent to the 
Department of Justice, whereas a report considered to outline an accident is sent to 
the NTSB. Each incident report is examined for adequacy, then coded with a 
database input form for computer searching and visual scanning, and matched with 
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other reports of the same incident. If necessary, analysts will contact by phone the 
person who submitted the report to clarify the nature of the incident and to obtain 
more detailed information. 
De-identification The reporter is required to provide his or her name, address and 
contact phone number on the tear-off slip of the reporting form. If the report is 
considered to be clear and complete, the name and address slip is removed from the 
report and mailed back to the person who submitted it within seventy-two hours of 
receipt of the report. The identity slip with the NASA-received date stamped on it 
then becomes the individual's receipt and evidence of entitlement to immunity from 
FAA disciplinary action. This is known as de-identification. No information that 
may be used to identify any individual or company associated with the incident are 
kept. De-identification of reporters involves analysts removing from the records of 
names addresses and phone numbers, whereas de-identification of incidents is to 
remove any reference to flight numbers, specific routes or locations, company names, 
and specific aircraft make and model information. In other words, the de-identified 
report provides a verbal explanation of what happened and in many cases even why it 
happened, but not where, or to whom it happened. 
Data entry and storage The reports are then keyed into computer database. 
Records in error are corrected and resubmitted. Successful records are automatically 
indexed, with terms and word patterns entered into the BASIS inverted files for 
retrieval. 
Information feedback The information feedback to the aviation community 
about lessons learned by reporters is considered vital to encourage reporting and 
enhance safety awareness. ASRS disseminates its outputs in three ways: distributing 
feedback publications, dealing with search requests, and conducting research. 
ASRS publishes a monthly bulletin, Callback, and a periodic journal, 
Directline. In addition, it also issues Alert Bulletins and For Your 
Information Notices (FYIs). 
" Callback is a monthly safety bulletin directed toward pilots, flight 
crews, air traffic controllers, and others directly involved in aircraft 
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operations. Callback's content consists of representative de-identified 
incident report excerpts received in that month, articles on specialised 
subjects, and summaries of Alert messages and report intake. In recent 
years, it also covers ASRS research studies and issues relevant to the 
overall aviation community. 
" Directline is produced by the ASRS technical staff and is designed to 
incorporate the analysts' perspectives. It makes extensive use of ASRS 
report narratives and analytical expertise. It is directed toward chief 
pilots, ATC facility managers, training officers, other aviation 
professionals, and public officials. 
" Alert Bulletins are issued to individuals in a position of authority, such 
as FAA officials and airport mangers. The main purpose is to alert them 
to potential safety problems, so that they can investigate allegations and 
take corrective actions. A For Your Information Notice is a single-page 
bulletin used for less severe safety problems or when information is 
fragmentary 28. 
2. Additionally, ASRS receives requests for computer searches of the database. 
" ASRS data are provided without charge to individuals and organisations that 
make request information on safety issues. 
" In addition to routine requests for database searches, ASRS also provides 
Quick Response database searches and analyses. A quick response report is 
created as their request to produce an analysis about particular safety issues, 
an identification of the main themes, and an inventory of recurring problems. 
6.5.1.4 The limitations of ASRS 
From ASRS productive publications, it is apparent that ASRS has contributed to 
aviation safety through education and communication between the aviation 
community and the regulatory authority. However, it is not without problems. Some 
of its problems stem from the confidentiality and immunity granted to the reporter, 
and others are related to the use of ASRS data. 
Side effect of confidentiality The de-identification of incidents discussed 
above makes it difficult to address many of the mechanics' safety concerns, since 
often these concerns are related to a specific aircraft make and model. 
28 A biweekly telephone conference, known as telecons, is held for ASRS staff to discuss potential 
safety concerns to FAA staff. Safety topics raised in Alerts or FYIs maybe covered during telecons. 
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Deficiency of immunity Although provision of immunity may attract reporting, 
sometimes it results in huge numbers of the incident reports for events that can be 
detected by a monitoring system. The altitude deviation described above is a good 
example of this kind of problem. 
Misuse ofASRSdata As reports are submitted voluntarily and are subject to 
self-reporting biases, great care should be taken to ensure that the use of ASRS data 
will not present problems in comparative or statistical processes. The reports only 
represent the perception of specific individuals rather than the prevalence of problems 
within the aviation system. In addition, it is impossible to verify information after it 
has been de-identified. However, the US Freedom of Information Act enables the 
public to obtain a copy of the ASRS database, which not only results in the loss of 
confidence from reporters but may lead to misrepresentation of the data by careless 
recipients. 
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6.5.2 UK Incident Reporting Systems 
6.5.2.1 UK Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) Scheme 
It is mandatory for most United Kingdom Public Transport Operations to report 
hazardous occurrences. Hazardous occurrences refer to any fault, problem or 
shortcoming of parts or people. The term "Occurrence" as used in the MOR Scheme 
includes both accidents and incidents. The Occurrence Reporting System is managed 
by Britain's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Research and Analysis Department 
(R&AD), which evaluates, investigates, progresses, disseminates, stores and analyses 
occurrence report data. When a report received is considered as an accident, it will be 
passed to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AA1B). 
A reportable occurrence is defined in the Civil Air Publication (CAP) 382, the 
information and guidance document of MOR Scheme, as: 
1. An incident relating to such an aircraft or any defect in or 
malfunctioning of, such an aircraft or any part or equipment of such an 
aircraft, being an incident, malfunctioning or defect endangering, of 
which if not corrected would endanger, the aircraft, its occupants or any 
other person; 
2. Any defect in or malfunctioning of any facility on the ground used or 
intended to be used for purposes of, or in connection with the operation 
of such an aircraft, being a defect or malfunctioning endangering, or 
which if not corrected would endanger, an aircraft or its occupants. 
It is obvious that the focus of the MOR Scheme is much broader than that of the US 
mandatory incident reporting requirements. 
6.5.2.2 UK Confidential Human-factors Incident Reporting Programme 
(CHIRP) 
After reviewing the operation of its MOR Scheme, UK's CAA decided to set up a 
confidential human factors incident reporting scheme in order to complement MOR's 
lack of human factors information. Based on the ASRS system operating in the 
United States, Britain's CAA introduced a Confidential Human-factors Incident 
Reporting Programme (CHIRP) in December 1982, operated independently of the 
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CAA by the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM). At first, CHIRP was 
designed to elicit human factors incidents29 from the flight crew. Since 1986, the 
target population has been extended to the air traffic controllers30 licensed by the 
CAA. 
The number of reports varies greatly. Since the programme started in 1982, CHIRP 
has received 1900 flight deck reports. At the beginning, it received an average of 350 
reports per year. Over the last five years the figure has been approximately 100-150 
reports per year. Since 1986, approximately 400 Air Traffic Controller Reports have 
been received at a rate in the order of 25-30 per year (Tait, 1996). 
CHIRP gives the reporter guarantees of confidentiality and immunity under the legal 
system as does ASRS. In order to have more information and clarify possible obscure 
points, the reporter has to give his identity on a tear-off section of the reporting form. 
Once the report is closed, the tear-off section will be removed and returned with an 
acknowledgement. RAF IAM guarantees that no record of the name and address will 
be kept in the computer database. The guarantee of complete anonymity makes the 
use of immunity from prosecution almost unnecessary. Additionally, the Data 
Protection Act in the UK does not require registration or unrestricted access to the 
data in the CHIRP database where names and addresses are excluded. As a result, the 
overt use of transactional immunity by reporters caused by the Freedom of 
Information Act in the USA is unlikely to occur in the UK. Nevertheless, the 
agreement of immunity indicates that the CAA will not take legal action against an 
infringement of the Air Navigation Order and Regulations, provided (CAA AIC 
141/1992): 
" The infringement was neither wilful nor grossly negligent; 
29 For flight crew a human factor incident is defined as an incident where: 
a) A crew member's action or omission caused, or could have caused, a potentially hazardous 
situation, or 
b) the operating environment, i. e. aircraft equipment or operating procedures, could have 
contributed to an error by a crew member. 
3o In the context of Air Traffic Control, a human factor incident is defined as an incident where: 
a) An Air Traffic Controller's action or omission caused, or could have caused, a potentially 
hazardous situation; or 
b) the operating environment could have contributed to an error by the controller. 
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" the person involved forwarded a completed confidential report from 
within ten days of the incident concerned; 
" the infringement was directly connected with the human factor incident 
reported. 
The procedures for processing the reports are identical to those used by ASRS, except 
the response time. The time taken to respond to each report varies based on the 
number of reports arriving, the complexity of the problem and the response of the 
agency involved with the situation. In a number of cases reporters make initial 
contact with CHIRP by telephone, and a follow-up written report follows. Only in a 
small percentage of cases are reporters unwilling to submit a written report (Tait, op. 
cit. ). 
From the data collected, CHIRP produces a three-time-a-year newsletter report 
entitled Feedback that, like the ASRS Callback, reports de-identified and most recent 
examples of recent incidents to its target population. 
During the first ten years, CHIRP had been successful in improving cockpit lighting, 
changing the checklist to ensure pitot heat selected, modifying fuel switches to 
prevent errors in selection, alerting crews to navigational equipment inadequacies, 
and modifying software on ATC radar console (Wilson, 1992). 
With the recent organisational changes within CHIRP, the expansion of the 
programme to include other groups within the aviation industry is being actively 
considered (Tait, op. cit. ). 
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6.5.3 Canadian Confidential Aviation Safety Reporting Programme(CASRP) 
The CASRP was established in 1985 by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) 
under the recommendation of Mr. Justice Dubin in his Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on Aviation Safety. 
Fundamentally, CASRP is based on the US ASRS and UK CHIRP models. The 
marked difference to both ASRS and CHIRP is in the nature of the receiving agency. 
Unlike ASRS and CHIRP, CASRP is operated by CASB, the mandatory incident 
receiving agency and the investigation authority. 
CASB adopted the same type of identification strip procedure used by ASRS and 
CHIRP to guarantee the confidentiality of reporter identity. Moreover, it ensured that 
the reporter was protected by the legislation, which stated (CTSB, 1988): 
"The Canadian Aviation Safety Board Act prohibits any report made under 
this system from being used against the reporter in any legal or other 
proceedings. Also, no one can be required to give evidence in legal, 
disciplinary or other proceedings that could reasonably be expected to 
reveal the identity of any person making a report under this system. " 
The same immunity was offered as in ASRS, but exemption of the system from the 
Canadian freedom of information act avoided many of the problems. No other 
immunity from regulatory, punitive, or disciplinary action was offered. The 
procedures for processing and storing the reports were similar to those used by ASRS, 
except that data structure and key word coding were fully compatible with ICAO's 
ADREP standards. 
From 1985 to 1993, CASRP received 220 - 350 reports per year. Reports divide into 
52% from pilots, 12% from flight attendants, 6% from passengers, 6% from ATC, 
and 24% from others. In order to promote greater awareness of the Programme and 
stimulate the quantity and quality of reports, various promotional efforts were 
undertaken. CASRP analysts visited the aviation community, such as flying schools, 
and air carriers, to correct misunderstandings and promote the Programme; CASRP 
was advertised in major aviation magazines to describe its aims and benefits; the 
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feedback publications, INSIGHT and Air Safety REFLEXIONS, were distributed 
throughout the aviation community; a collect call telephone number with an 
answering machine was set up to encourage those people unwilling to report on paper. 
In 1990, the CASB was replaced by the multi-model Canadian Transportation 
Accident Investigation and Safety Board (CTAISB). Another reform occurred in 
early 1996, when CTAISB was taken over by the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB) and CASRP evolved into SECURITAS. SECURITAS is a multi- 
modal confidential reporting system for marine, rail, air and pipeline transportation 
modes. The major difference with the original CASRP is that there is no systematic 
call-back for reporters and no exclusive personnel to answer calls. Reporters leave 
messages on the answering machine, send Faxes, write or send E-mail on the Internet. 
However, the most popular way of reporting remains the phone message (Feminier, 
1996). 
Since the SECURITAS has used the Internet as a mode of reporting for such a short 
period, it is difficult to obtain any significant statistics regarding its effect on the 
collection of safety information (Feminier, op. cit. ). Nevertheless, several lessons can 
be learned from the process of establishing a confidential reporting programme in 
Canada. 
Continuous promotion CASRP received 485 confidential reports during the 
first year, but less than 50% (234) of them were considered to be of value. Finding 
that the promotion campaign prior to the introduction of the CASRP was incomplete, 
the CASB tried every way to increase the aviation community's awareness of the 
CASRP. More changes were made to overcome the problems discovered during the 
operation. Notwithstanding the growing pains, these promotional efforts show wide 
acceptance of the Programme by the Canadian aviation community. 
Consistent improvement SECURITAS is the first multi-model confidential 
reporting programme to receive voluntary reports on safety concerns. In order to 
stimulate voluntary reports, various reporting methods are utilised. Reports can be 
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submitted by mail, fax, telephone, or even e-mail. Moreover, the occurrence reports 
published by TSB since January 1995 can also be retrieved through its Internet site. 
6.5.4 Australian Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting (CAIR) 
In 1984, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) initiated a feasibility study for 
introducing a confidential reporting system, which included examination of 
confidential reporting programmes in operation in the world and elicitation of 
attitudes, opinions and recommendations from the industry. The study showed that 
the Australian aviation community strongly supported the introduction of a voluntary 
confidential incident reporting system to complement the mandatory incident 
reporting system (BASI, 1988). 
Following the feasibility study, the CAIR programme was established in July 1988 
and has been operated by BASI since then. BASI is the agency of the Australian 
Government which is responsible for the investigation of accidents and incidents 
occurring to civil aircraft in Australia and its territories. It is the legal recipient of air 
safety incident reports both mandatory and confidential. Air Safety Incident 
Reporting (ASIR) system deals with mandatory incident reports; CAIR system 
provides access to confidential incident reports. CAIR complements ASIR by 
eliciting reports from those people not prepared to use the mandatory ASIR, and by 
providing a facility for passing safety information which was previously unavailable 
to BASI. The main purposes are to utilise the information received to identify 
deficiencies that might adversely affect air safety, and thus to allow BASI to take 
action to prevent further accidents and incidents. 
Australia employs an intentionally broad definition of an incident. An incident is 
defined as any occurrence, other than an accident, that affects or could affect the 
safety or operations of the aircraft. It is obligatory for anyone in the aviation industry 
to report all incidents considered undesirable or hazardous. Under the Australian Air 
Navigation Regulations, reports should be submitted to BASI within 48 hours of the 
event. 
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At first the CAIR programme was opened to flight crews only, and within a year of 
commencement, it became available to air traffic services officers, maintenance and 
ground-support personnel, flight attendants and any other person who has an aviation 
safety concern. The CAIR reporting forms are included in each issue of the Asia 
Pacific Air Safety (APAS), and available at aviation organisations throughout 
Australia. Telephone reports are also accepted, but written reports are preferred. 
CAIR receives 320 - 590 reports per year. The number of reports in Australia are 
second only to the system in the United States. 66% of the reports are from flight 
crew, mainly pilots, 18% from air traffic services officers, 10% from flight 
attendants, which includes some from passengers, and 6% from maintenance 
personnel (Nadal, 1995). 
The formation and structure of CAIR is similar to other established programmes in 
the UK and Canada. Confidentiality is guaranteed by removing the reporter identity 
and by destroying the original report within three working days. Selected de- 
identified reports are published in APAS and circulated to the aviation industry and 
government bodies world-wide, thus providing the essential feedback component of 
the CAIR programme and informing readers of factors contributing to accidents and 
incidents investigated by the BASI. 
Unlike the US ASRS system, BASI does not guarantee immunity from prosecution. 
It is believed the rapid process of de-identification and the guarantee of 
confidentiality ensure that prosecution action based on information provided to CAIR 
is not possible. The findings of evaluation also show that legislative backing to CAIR 
received little support from those interviewed, because they thought that such 
legislation might undermine the guarantee of confidentiality (BASI, 1993). 
The situation of Australian CAIR provides several useful perspectives: 
Wide dissemination of information During the course of the CAIR 
evaluation, a decline in reporting for the year July 1990 to June 1991 attracted 
BASI's attention. It concluded that at that time fewer briefings on the CAIR 
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programme were made and the BASI Journal was not published. Thus, continuing 
education on such a reporting system and increased feedback to reporters became two 
major concerns for future developments. More discussion on education is canvassed 
in the next paragraph. With regard to the feedback, it is suggested that methods of 
feedback additional to the feedback publications should be investigated, which 
includes expanding section in the original publication and issuing a separate 
publication. 
Ongoing promotion The report of evaluation of the CAIR Programme found 
out that most respondents claimed that they had a good understanding of the CAIR 
programme. However, their request in the questionnaire responses for further 
education through APAS, briefings and other forms (such as audio-visual and 
advertising) indicated otherwise. Therefore, constant reinforcement of a confidential 
incident reporting system needs to be addressed, including why the information is 
required, how the reports will be handled, and what will be done with the 
information. Apart from constant reinforcement to all members of the aviation 
community, there is a need to prepare specific education programs for those who do 
not understand the confidential reporting system. In Australia, specific education 
programs are particularly recommended for maintenance engineers and flight 
attendants since in the survey both these areas indicated relatively low understanding 
of the CAIR programme. 
As some of the respondents in the survey believed that their report had little or no 
effect, immediate action should also be taken to encourage more reports to such an 
incident reporting system. Moreover, the reporting forms should be simplified to 
prevent a reluctance to fill out the form in detail. 
It can be seen that such an ongoing promotion is critical to the effectiveness of a 
confidential incident reporting system. 
Maintenance of good contacts with the industry In order to provide a reporting 
system's personnel with current knowledge of the aviation industry and expertise in 
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advertising, educational methods and communication, an industry based advisory 
group is required for a confidential reporting system. The reason is that such an 
industry based advisory group is used by the US (ASRS), UK (CHIRP), Australia 
(CAIR) and Canadian confidential reporting systems, and proved to provide on-going 
assistance to these systems. 
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6.5.5 New Zealand's confidential aviation incident reporting systems 
New Zealand has had two confidential aviation incident reporting systems, both of 
which have collapsed after failing to function properly. 
The first confidential incident reporting system was floated in the mid 1980's by the 
"Aviation Safety Board", and an ad hoc committee set up to advise Colin McLauglin, 
then the Minister of Transport. It ended after a year or so because hardly any one 
reported to it. The second was established in 1990 and was called the Independent 
Safety Assurance Team (ISAT). It published received reports in Flashback. ISAT 
stopped in 1993. It was subject to the Airways Corporation, which was a state 
owned enterprise and controlled the Air Traffic System in New Zealand. 
Referring to the author's correspondence with Mr. Russell Taylor, the President of 
Aircraft Owners' and Pilots' Association Incorporated, as well as New Zealand's 
CAA officials, the failure of these two systems was probably due to the incredibility 
of the receiving agencies in the eyes of the members of the aviation community. 
Taylor (1995) clearly states the problem: "Any organisation running a confidential 
system must be and be publicly perceived to be impartial, independent and competent, 
or a knowledgeable industry reporter will not use it. This seems to have been the 
failing with both of the above. " Additionally, there was little support from the CAA 
and management in airlines. The small populations also resulted in the difficulty of 
ensuring the confidentiality of stored data. A pilot who had submitted a report was 
identified by the regulatory authority, and the event contributed to the close of the 
reporting system. 
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful experience, the establishment of a third confidential 
reporting system is being actively considered. 
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6.5.6 European Confidential Aviation Safety Reporting Network (EUCARE) 
The European Commission released its "Communication on Community initiatives 
concerning civil aviation incident and accidents" in September 1991 with the 
intention to improve accident prevention in Europe. The initiatives were launched in 
three areas: accident investigation, mandatory occurrence reports and confidential 
reporting systems. In the area of accident investigation, six principles governing the 
investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents were established31, the inclusion 
of which means that serious incidents will be treated in a similar way as accidents in 
terms of investigation and analysis. In the area of mandatory incident reporting, the 
definition and treatment of occurrences vary widely from one European State to 
another, so that the way incidents are dealt with needs to be levelled first in order to 
put together the relevant safety information derived from the collection of 
incompatible occurrence reporting systems from various Member States. Besides, 
most of the mandatory incident reports only show a portion of the operational 
problems, mainly the problems related to technical defects, and seldom human-factor 
incidents are seldom reported to such a scheme. Therefore, the confidential incident 
reporting system is needed to elicit more information in this area. 
After surveying ASRS, CASRP and CHIRP, the European Commission found that no 
existing system would be suitable for such a multinational, multilingual and 
multicultural system. However, the European system is expected to co-operate 
closely with other national reporting systems in operation and integrate their 
experience and expertise wherever possible. Additionally, it is expected to be 
31 The six fundamental principles are as follows: (Heurotte, 1995) 
" the mandatory investigation of each accident and serious incident with the only objective to 
prevent its recurrence 
"a clear separation between the judicial enquiry and the technical investigation with the 
reinforcement of the latter's statute 
the conduct of the investigation by a permanent and independent body 
" the publication of an investigation report containing conclusions and eventual safety 
recommendations 
a system of follow up of these recommendations and 
the protection of the investigation against its use for purposes other than accident prevention. 
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compatible with a revised ICAO ADREP format, and allow co-ordination 
internationally with accident investigation boards and safety research organisations 
In 1992, the German Department of Transport funded a feasibility study that was 
ordered by the Commission of the European Communities to study the possibility of 
setting up a confidential reporting system in Germany. In the following year, 
EUCARE was established as a prototype of the future European system at the 
Technical University of Berlin. Financing and support are provided by the European 
Community and the Senat of Berlin. 
EUCARE was introduced to the public by mailing about 18,000 information 
brochures containing a reporting form and a letter of recommendation by the 
Department of Transport. In the beginning, the fact that several airlines have their 
own reporting systems was significant. The airlines did not encourage their pilots to 
report internal safety problems to a system independent from their company. Thus, 
more than 80% of the reports involved General Aviation (Nieder, 1995). But as the 
early work proved that neither airlines nor pilots need to fear exposure after reporting 
to EUCARE, the number of reports from airline pilots has begun to rise steadily. 
Some airlines have even offered co-operation. At present EUCARE has not been 
extended to a European Community wide scheme, but reports have been received also 
from Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Not only any members of the aviation community, but also passengers can report to 
EUCARE any kind of information concerned with safety issues, so as not to rule out 
any information that might prove to be important. In 1995, more than half of the 
reports were submitted by pilots. 17% were contributed by ATC officers and 12% by 
engineers (Henrotte, 1995). Reporting can be made in a personal conversation, in 
writing or by telephone through a toll-free number. 
The incoming reports are analysed in two phases by experts from all fields of 
aviation. Samples of the reports are published in "EUCAREVIEW", EUCARE's 
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feedback magazine, after de-identification. Results from scientific research and 
analysis of topical safety hazards are also produced. 
As the ultimate purpose of setting up EUCARE is to extend to a European scope, the 
problems that might need to be faced are: 
Difference of languages Although single language reports seem more practical 
in processing data and cutting costs, many reporters might fear having to report in 
English. They might also not be able to describe the incident in English as well as in 
their native language. Apart from reporting, the dissemination of information can be 
better scrutinised and adopted in their own language. 
Geographical extent of operation The geographical area of operation should be 
sufficiently large so that stored data would not be identifiable. On the other hand, the 
area should be sufficiently small that reporters can report by phone in their own 
language, and that the system's analysts are able to react immediately to the reported 
events (Green, op. cit. ). Therefore, the boundary of each receiving agency should be 
carefully marked first. 
6.5.7 Summary 
It can be seen that the reporting systems currently in operation vary in a number of 
significant respects. The target populations differ, in that some are aimed at pilots 
and air traffic controllers, whereas others are promoted throughout the whole aviation 
community as well as people with a less direct involvement in aviation, such as 
passengers. The operating agencies differ. Some are operated by an independent 
agency; others are operated by the agency that also administer the mandatory 
reporting system and the investigation unit. Table 6.1 summarises the confidential 
reporting systems presently in existence, and Table 6.2 illustrates the percentage 
distributions of reporting sources. 
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Table 6.2 Source of Reports 
Name of 
system 
Flight 
Crew 
Air Traffic 
Controllers 
Flight 
Attendants 
Others 
ASRS 95% 4% 1% 
(1988-1994 ) 
CHIRP 78% 22% 
(1982-1995 ) 
CASRP 52% 6% 12% 30% 
(1985-1993 ) 
CAIR 66% 18% 10% 6% 
(1991-1992) 
EUCARE 71% 17% 12% 
(1995) 
Report 
Airlines, Civil Aviation 
receipt 
Authority, Manufacturers, 
other institutions 
I alert bulletin, 
routine reports 
initial Accidents, criminals, special reports 
screen 
"no-safety content 
reports 
Request 
information 
Incidents 
Yes Reexamination 
Immediate 
: 
Dei: dentinication of reports 
ction? 
No 
Analyst Statistics, 
coding trend analysis, further 
Investigation 
Sufficitnt Yes Storing is 
formatioe Deldentificatioe data base 
No 
Call back II Completion Identification slip 
(telephone) of analysis back to report 
HERO/ ASRSPPT 
Figure 6.2 The General Process of a Confidential Reporting Programme 
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6.6 The philosophy of confidential incident reporting systems 
Although all the confidential incident reporting systems currently in operation differ 
in detail, they share some fundamental characteristics. In order to explore the 
philosophy of confidential incident reporting systems, further discussion is presented 
below in terms of confidentiality, immunity, independence of the receiving agency, 
information feedback to the aviation community, and complement to mandatory 
reporting systems. 
6.6.1 Confidentiality 
The word `confidential' is used to describe the procedures of de-identification. It is a 
guarantee that protects the reporter's identity from being known to any third party 
outside of the receiving agency, and that, once the details of the report are considered 
to be clear and complete, no record is kept of the report's identity. Moreover, any 
other information that could reveal the identification of the reporter will be removed 
before the report is made public, such as being published in the feedback magazine. 
The time required for de-identification varies. The more rapid the process of de- 
identification is, the less likely the reporter's identity will be divulged. ASRS and 
CAIR attempts to clear all reports within three days. However, the broad focus of 
ASRS has indicated that three days is insufficient to respond to large numbers of 
reports arriving in a short interval. CASRP claims to clear reports within ten days. 
CHIRP and EUCARE do not specify a clearance time, but endeavour to clear the 
incoming reports as quickly as possible. 
There is a great difference between an anonymous report and a confidential one. 
When a report is submitted anonymously, the report is unjustified and it is impossible 
to clarify obscure points in the report. Thus, most reporting systems do not accept 
anonymous reports. 
Confidentiality has been described as the essential ingredient to determine the success 
or failure of a reporting system. Without it, there will be no credibility and therefore 
no confidence in the aviation community. As described in section 6.5.5, the difficulty 
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of ensuring the confidentiality of stored data contributed to the demise of the 
reporting system in New Zealand in 1991. 
6.6.2 Immunity 
The term `immunity' in this context refers to the guarantee for reporters of protection 
from punitive or disciplinary action by the aviation regulatory authorities, provided 
that criminal offences and accidents are not involved. 
The promise of immunity is dependent on the extent of the system. In general, the 
broader the focus of a system is, the more likely it is that incidents reported to the 
confidential system will also be reported to the regulatory authorities via some other 
source. ASRS is heavily dependent on FAA promises of immunity, as approximately 
25% of the incident reports received are also reported by some other source to the 
regulatory authorities (BASI, 1988). The impact of the US Freedom of Information 
Act makes it more difficult for ASRS to restrict access to the ASRS database. As a 
result, waiving immunity seems impossible and will decrease the number of reports 
substantially. CHIRP provides the same immunity to reporters as ASRS does; 
however, due to its narrower definition of an acceptable incident, no reports of 
incidents are also reported to the regulatory authorities. Thus, the regulatory promise 
of immunity is seldom put to the test. No immunity is offered under Canadian, New 
Zealand, Australian and German programmes. It is believed that the guarantee of 
complete confidentiality and the prevention of any access to their recorded 
information make the use of immunity measures unnecessary. 
In Australia, despite little support for a legislative backing to CAIR, its evaluation 
report recommends that the provision of statutory privilege to responses to indemnify 
the responding organisation from defamation charges should be considered (BASI, 
1993). It was also indicated that legislative protection may encourage more written 
responses to CAIR reports for publication and thus enhance the perception of the 
effectiveness of the CAIR program. 
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As ICAO Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite told safety experts at an ICAO 
divisional meeting in 1992, "Experience shows that in spite of the implementation of 
strong regulatory programmes many preventable accidents continue to occur. The 
limitations of regulatory safety measures are widely recognised. It is not surprising 
that a number of States have placed increased emphasis on non-punitive accident 
prevention activities to complement their regulatory safety programmes. It is, 
therefore, essential to incorporate additional non-regulatory accident prevention 
measures if we are to continue to improve aviation safety. " 
6.6.3 The receiving agency 
ASRS was initially operated by the FAA. In spite of the guarantee of immunity and 
confidentiality, it soon became obvious that the aviation community did not have faith 
in the FAA. Being perceived as the law maker and enforcer of aviation regulations, 
the FAA did not earn the confidence and the credibility of the aviation community. It 
was therefore decided that to be successful, such a confidential reporting programme 
should be independent from the aviation regulatory authorities and be operated by a 
neutral third party. The importance of independence from the regulatory authorities 
was demonstrated again in New Zealand, where two confidential systems failed 
successively because of no credibility in the eyes of the members of the aviation 
community. Table 6.3 summarises the nature of these receiving agencies. All of 
them are independent from the aviation regulatory authorities. 
Table 6.3 The Nature of the Receiving Agency 
System ASRS CHIRP SECURITAS CAIR EUCARE 
Operator NASA RAF IAM TSB BASI TUB 
A 
Investigation agency  
The receiving agency of the  
mandatory system 
The receiving agency of the  
confidential system 
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Apart from the concept of independence from the aviation regulatory authorities, a 
suitable receiving agency should be able to: 
" guarantee confidentiality of reporter identity; 
" access reports from all sections of aviation; 
" maintain a centralised and standardised database for all occurrence 
information, and achieve compatibility with data reported via the 
mandatory system; 
" use the information gained to directly influence aviation safety; 
" disperse the operational costs; 
" funded on an independent basis. 
One of the important functions of current confidential incident reporting systems is to 
directly influence aviation safety by providing the aviation industry and research 
organisations with informative data, publications and research findings. Even though 
these confidential incident reporting systems do not have formal authority to direct 
corrective actions, their valuable research reports and publications appear to 
contribute to the prevention of aviation accidents. 
In order to protect individual reporters, the receiving agency should be independent 
from the aviation regulatory authorities. Whereas a total independence of the 
receiving agency is of necessity to protect itself and its system, the source of funding 
and immunity promise for a confidential system, for example, is likely to influence its 
operational decisions. 
The earlier established ASRS and CH RP systems are dependent on the FAA and 
CAA for both the promise of immunity and funding. Both aviation regulatory 
authorities have at one time or another threatened to withdraw support from the 
respective confidential reporting systems. For this reason, the Canadian CASRP, 
Australian CAIR and German EUCARE carry no promise of immunity and are 
funded independently from the aviation regulatory authorities. Therefore, they are 
unlikely to be threatened by withdrawal of support, and this ensures the neutrality of 
the system. 
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6.6.4 Information feedback to the aviation community 
The basic purpose of setting up a confidential reporting system is experience and 
information sharing. An information feedback mechanism to the aviation community 
ensures the success of a confidential reporting system. Regular feedback provides 
aviation community with a valuable source of information on human operator errors. 
The two main functions of information feedback are to: 
1. Notify the aviation regulatory authorities, organisations, aircraft 
manufacturers, and airlines concerned about identified hazardous 
conditions and unsafe practices. 
2. Undertake topical research studies in order to understand possible causes 
of an incident, define intervention strategies, and track their 
consequences 
There are many ways of disseminating information: 
" newsletter 
" alert bulletins 
" special reports 
" requests from institutions, organisations, authorities 
" database research 
0 scientific research 
0 lectures 
0 press release 
Through the various levels of feedback, the members of the aviation community are 
able to benefit from the information stored in the database. For example, information 
feedback may serve as reference for the aviation regulatory authorities when 
amending safety regulations. Such information is important to manufacturers in 
designing or modifying aircraft. Airlines may also use the information in promoting 
better training and enhancing safety awareness. In other words, it provides operators 
with a channel to reflect their problems to the aviation regulatory authorities, aircraft 
manufacturers, and airlines. Moreover, it makes these reporters feel that their reports 
are taken care of and scrutinised, which not only encourages people to submit reports, 
but also advertises the existence of the system. 
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6.6.5 Complement to mandatory incident reporting system 
The majority of mandatory systems require their members of the aviation community 
to report certain types of incidents. In order to ensure the enforcement of a 
mandatory incident reporting system, detailed regulations about who submits reports 
and what events get reported need to be specified. These regulations define a base 
level of hazards, below which an incident report is not required but reporting is 
suggested to report. However, aircraft operations vary from one aircraft model to 
another, and a minor occurrence may be transformed into a significant hazard or an 
accident under a specific situation. Thus, it is impossible to define precisely every 
significant hazard which requires reporting. In addition, the listed reportable 
occurrences mainly focus on technical failures rather than on the human performance 
aspects. To supplement mandatory systems, confidential incident reporting systems 
aiming specifically at collecting more information on the human factor aspects have 
been introduced in many countries and airlines. 
In confidential systems, pilots, air traffic controllers and others involved in aviation 
are encouraged to report hazards, discrepancies or deficiencies in which they are 
involved or have observed. The mandatory requirements and the confidential systems 
are aimed predominantly at the same target group, but because of the guarantee of 
confidentiality and the independence of the receiving agency, confidential systems 
tend to be more successful than mandatory systems in acquiring human factor related 
information. 
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6.7 International exchange of safety data 
The main purpose of collecting incident data to identify potential hazards in order to 
take effective remedial action. Although informaton may be diverse, a clear picture of 
a problem area is often exposed by examining the frequency of similar occurrences. 
In other words, the larger the numbers of similar incident reports are, the more likely 
they are to permit the identification of potential hazards. To expand the volume of 
database, international exchange of data from reporting systems is encouraged among 
some countries and safety organisations. Such international exchange of safety data is 
especially valuable to smaller countries or organisations whose database is too limited 
to examine and analyse trends, or who do not have incident reporting systems. 
The effectiveness of data exchange depends heavily on the compatibility of existing 
data management systems. However, the reporting systems in operation revealed 
radically different data structures. A number of countries use electronic document 
management systems or compatible formats and codes for data storage and retrieval, 
like BASIS+ in use at USA ASRS. Other systems, such as Canada SECURITAS and 
Australia CAIR, use the ICAO ADREP coding schemes or its compatible codes for 
reporting and database analysis. Table 6.4 summarises the software systems in use at 
each national reporting system. 
Table 6.4 Software System in Use 
Reporting System Electronic Document Relational Database 
Management System Management System 
USA ASRS BASIS, BASIS+ 
UK CAA BASIS+ 
Canada SECURITAS ORACLE (ASIS II) 
Australia CAIR ORACLE (ASIS II) 
Germany EUCARE an EDMS software 
For the maximum effectiveness of using and circulating incident data, great effort 
should be provided to develop common coding system to meet the needs of all 
reporting systems, and thus benefit everyone with each other's experience. 
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As Negroponte (1995) indicates, the change from atoms to bits is irrevocable and 
unstoppable. Due to the prevalence of Internet, the utilisation of electronic services is 
increasing in the aviation community. Electronic mail and the Internet Safety Web 
not only enable the exchange of data, but also expedite the collection and the 
dissemination of safety information. 
In an effort to encourage more reporting, electronic receipt of reports is being used or 
being considered for use by some reporting systems, like SECURITAS, EUCARE 
and ASRS. Electronic reporting is more than offering an alternative method of 
reporting. Basically, it costs less than the traditional mode of reporting. It also offers 
possibilities for automation of manual processes, such as saving time in submissions 
and processing. A carefully managed electronic reporting system may be used to 
exchange confidential information among various safety focal points, and to alert the 
whole aviation community to safety problems within a short period of time. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TAIWANESE AVIATION COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SYSTEM 
"A uniform with four rings on the sleeve and 20,000 flying hours do 
not make us immune from those human limitations ." 
-------- Captain Paul Wilson 
7. Overview 
The proposed philosophy for a Taiwanese confidential incident reporting system is to 
utilise the information received to identify deficiencies in facilities, equipment, 
regulation, instructions, or training that might adversely affect flight safety. In 
addition, the reports fulfil an important safety education function by enabling people 
to learn from the experience of others. Of particular importance are reports of 
systemic deficiencies which in particular combinations of circumstances lead to a 
failure of the system. The emphasis of the system is not on individuals, but on 
systems, procedures, and equipment. The reports will assist to identify unsound 
practices or facilities which might compromise safety. 
In order to investigate the aviation community's reaction to the possible introduction 
of such a national-level confidential reporting system, a feasibility study was 
initiated. This chapter summarises the results of the postal questionnaire and 
interview surveys of the study. The first section describes study methods, and Section 
2 presents biographical results of the subjects surveyed. Sections 3 through 9 discuss 
the differences between the airline pilots and the ATC controllers on issues 
concerning implementation of a confidential reporting system. In order to explore 
these issues, further discussion is offered at the end of each section. 
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7.1 Method: General overview 
7.1.1 The chosen methodology 
Airline pilots and ATC controllers were chosen as the target groups in the feasibility 
study, as they have accounted for the majority of reports filed with existing incident 
reporting systems. 
Questionnaires and interviews are used in the study to achieve the understanding and 
viewpoint of the Taiwanese aviation community about establishing a national-level 
confidential incident reporting system. Interviews, in particular, are adopted to elicit 
information which cannot be obtained from self-completion questionnaires. 
Consideration was also given to improving the response rate of self-completion 
questionnaires. The techniques employed in the questionnaire survey were as follows: 
" The questionnaires for airline pilots and ATC controllers (see Appendix 
H and I) were printed on coloured paper in order to make it appear more 
interesting; 
"A covering letter was enclosed to inform the participants of the purpose 
and importance of the research, to assure confidentiality and to 
encourage a reply; 
"A stamped addressed envelope for return of the questionnaire was 
enclosed; 
" The draft of proposal leaflet of the Taiwanese confidential incident 
reporting system was enclosed; in addition, 
" The author also enclosed two examples of CHIRP, ASRS reports (see 
Appendix ), a brief introduction of the confidential reporting systems in 
operation, and a translated research paper titled "Hurry Up Syndrome". 
It is hoped that the use of both interviews and questionnaires as complementary 
approaches avoids the shortcomings of either, and strengthens the validity and 
reliability of the data obtained. 
The survey in the study aims to: 
" understand pilots and ATC controllers' attitude and experience of 
sharing safety information, 
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" ellicite pilots and ATC controllers' knowledge and understanding of the 
confidential incident reporting systems current in use worldwide, 
" probe the possible reasons for pilots and ATC controllers for not 
reporting incidents, 
" evaluate the extent to which the Taiwanese airline community might 
accept to a confidential reporting system, 
" investigate opinions about the feasibility of a Taiwanese confidential 
incident reporting system, and 
" understand pilots and ATC controllers' usage of personal computers and 
their opinions on sharing safety information via the Internet. 
7.1.2 The design of the postal questionnaire 
Considering the necessity for generating a series of items for inclusion in the survey, 
informal interviews were conducted with management pilots and flight safety 
managers to elicit information about the possible factors relevant to the undertaking 
of this study. The ideas for questionnaire design obtained from these meetings were 
later implemented in the final questionnaire. 
A pilot test was then conducted in order to determine whether or not the questions and 
instructions were clear and readily understood. The sample subjects of the pilot test 
included 10 pilots who were training at the British Aerospace Flying Training Centre 
in Woodford, and 4 ATC controllers working at Taipei Approach Centre. The author 
was available to answer queries about the questionnaire and to observe and 
communicate with the sample subjects when they filled it in so that any possible 
misunderstanding of the questions could be avoided or corrected. This procedure and 
the respondents' comments led to minor modifications of some questions. One 
suggestion from respondents in the pilot study was to include the Airline Pilot 
Association (ALPA) as one of the selected receiving agencies. 
The final questionnaire consisted of three parts: the first contained questions about 
the pilots' biographical details; the second, questions about the pilots' opinions and 
perception on the introduction of a confidential aviation incident reporting system; 
and the third part, questions about sharing safety information via the Internet. 
237 
Chapter 7 Taiwanese Aviation Community's Reaction to the Introduction of a Reporting System 
Questions in the first part asked about the subjects' current position, number of years 
in the airline community, and source of initial training. The second part comprised 
fourteen questions addressing: subjects' willingness for sharing flying or safety 
experience, their cognition and expectation of incident reporting systems, the possible 
difficulties likely to be encountered in implementing such a reporting system in 
Taiwan, their possible reasons for not reporting, and their choice of the optimal 
receiving agency. At the end of this part respondents were given space for freehand 
comments. The third part had six questions and was designed to ascertain the extent 
of acceptance for using the Internet and E-mail in transferring aviation safety 
information 
7.1.3 The interview questionnaire 
For the purpose of this study a multi-method approach was considered appropriate for 
two reasons. Questionnaires help to examine the differences between respondents on a 
general basis, and interviews, as a complement to questionnaires, offer the freedom to 
discuss the situation with the respondents, and to raise specific queries concerning the 
setting up of a confidential aviation incident reporting system. 
As shown in Appendix K, the interview questionnaire included only open questions 
and this part of the study was conducted after the postal questionnaire. 
Interviews were also held with respondents in both pilot and ATC controller group. 
While the questionnaire formed the backbone of matters discussed, these interviews 
provided additional information on incident reporting issues. Much of the attached 
information would not have been provided if the respondents had been restricted to 
providing responses only by way of a questionnaire. Indeed many of their anecdotes 
and views give a level of nuance which might provide a more complete assessment of 
the perceptions held by the study subjects. 
238 
Chapter 7 Taiwanese Aviation Community's Reaction to the Introduction of a Reporting System 
7.1.4 Sampling strategy and limitation 
Negotiation for access is still a continuous and laborious process. As mentioned 
earlier, the study was taking place in conservative environment, and thus great 
difficulties were encountered in clearing official channels for permission to carry out 
the work. It took much time for the author to contact the managers and discuss the 
study with them in order to gain access. Although it was the second survey to have 
been undertaken, there still were unexpected problems. One of the domestic airlines 
completed the first survey about airline safety management, but broke the agreement 
to carry out the second survey for aviation incident reporting system. It was cancelled 
because the top management did not show approval or disapproval, which was 
interpreted as a sign of disapproval. Therefore, the samples of the pilots who 
participated in the study was from the remaining five airlines. 
7.1.5 Distribution procedure 
The questionnaire survey was taken or sent to the representative at each participating 
airline in sealed envelopes and distributed to the subjects by each organisation's 
administrator. Included with the questionnaire was a covering letter from the author, 
a memo from the senior manager of each organisation, and a postage paid addressed 
envelope. The covering letter explained the purpose of the research, ensured its 
confidentiality and anonymity of all responses. The pre-addressed stamped envelope 
enabled the direct return of the completed information to the author. 
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7.2 Biographical results 
7.2.1 Response rate details 
The study includes two major parts: postal questionnaire survey and interview 
survey. Of the 834 questionnaires distributed, 287 were completed and returned in 
time for analysis, representing a response rate of 34.4%. A detailed account of the 
response rates of the postal and interview surveys is given in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Response Rates of the Postal and Interview Surveys 
Administration 
of Survey 
Subject Sent Received Response Rate 
Postal Pilot study N= 14 n= 14 100.0% 
Airline pilot N= 614 n= 211 (218) 35.5% 
ATC controller N= 220 n= 68 (69) 30.9% 
Interview Pilot/Controller N=8/6 n=8/6 100.0% 
Under the "received" column, the numbers in parentheses are the actual returned 
copies of questionnaires, and the numbers without the parentheses represent the valid 
copies of questionnaires. 
7.2.2 Respondents' working experience and personal details 
A breakdown of the response according to the respondent's position is presented in 
Table 7.2. There were 99 Captains and 112 First Officers included in this study. 
Table 7.2 Current Position of the Pilot Respondents 
Position 
First officer 112 53.1 % 
n=211 
Chi-square goodness of fit analyses was performed to determine whether the 
distribution of responses according to position was significant for the pilot target 
population. The observed and expected frequencies for each cell are presented in 
table 7.3. The results indicated that the obtained chi-square was not significant at the 
0.05 level. It can therefore be concluded that the distribution of respondent pilots 
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between Captains and First Officers reflected the distribution of ranks in the 
population from which they were drawn. 
Table 7.3 
One-way Chi-square to Examine the Distribution of Respondents 
According to Position: Observed and Expected Cell Frequencies 
First 
Observed frequency = 99 Observed frequency= 112 
Expected frequency = 105 Expected frequency = 105 
p>. 05, df=1, Xobt=0.801 
Analysis of the personal data for pilots (n = 211) revealed that the majority of these 
pilots had been working in civil aviation for 2-10 years, corresponding to 70.1% (see 
Table 7.4). The proportion ratio for the pilot group was almost the same as that in the 
previous study (see Table 4.5). 
Table 7.4 Working Experience in Airlines 
Working Experience Frequency Percent 
Less than 2 years 30 14.2% 
2-5years 82 38.8% 
6- 10 years 66 31.3 % 
11 - 15 years 18 8.6% 
More than 15 years 15 7.1 % 
n=211 
Of the 211 pilot respondents, 158 had initial flying training in the military, 49 were 
given Ab-initio training, and 4 were trained in general aviation (see Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5 Initial Flying Training Background of the Pilot Respondents 
Background Frequency Percent 
Ab-initio 
General aviation 
49 23.2% 
4 1.9% 
n= 211 
The distribution of responses of ATC controllers according to current position, 
working experience, and current service unit is presented in Tables 7.6,7.7, and 7.8. 
241 
Chapter 7 Taiwanese Aviation Community's Reaction to the Introduction of a Reporting System 
More than 40% of the ATC respondents had more than 10 year working experience in 
aviation. 18 (26.4%) worked at the control tower, 22 (32.4%) at the Area Control 
Centre, and 28 (41.2%) at the Approach Control Centre. 
Table 7.6 Current Position of the ATC Respondents 
Position Frequency Percent 
Air traffic controller 42 61.8 % 
Assistant traffic controller 12 17.6 % 
Senior traffic controller or supervisor 12 17.6 % 
Other 2 2.9 % 
n=68 
Table 7.7 Working Experience in ATC 
Working Experience Frequency Percent 
Less than 2 years 4 5.9% 
2-5years 13 19.1% 
6-10 years 23 33.8% 
11-15 years 16 23.5% 
More than 15 years 12 17.6% 
n=68 
Table 7.8 Current Service Unit of the ATC Respondents 
Service Unit Frequency Percent 
Control tower 18 26.4% 
Area control 22 32.4 % 
Approach control 28 41.2 % 
n=68 
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7.3 About sharing information and experience 
7.3.1 Results 
The responses to the survey questions are summarised in the tables on the following 
pages. All of these tables contain entries for both the total numbers and the 
percentage of responses. 
Question 1: Are you willing to share vour fZyin, oar safety experience with others? 
100% of the pilots (n = 211) and ATC controllers (n = 68) indicated that they were 
willing to share their flying or safety experience with others. 
Question 2: Do you encourage others to share their fly fn or safety experience 
The responses to this question indicate that nearly all favoured the question, 
corresponding to 97.6% of the pilots and 97.1% of the ATC controllers. However, 
the rates are less than those in the previous question, which, as so they stated, results 
from the fear of penalty or bad consequence. 
Question 3: Have you ever voluntarily reported flight incidents or hazard event? 
Figure 7.1 depicts the distribution of respondents experience on voluntarily reporting 
incidents by their roles, i. e., airline pilots, and ATC controllers. The stack bar 
presents the number of respondents experience on voluntarily reporting incidents. The 
contrast between pilots and ATC controllers was significant (p < . 001, df = 1, X2obt = 
33.06 ). It is apparent that the airline pilots have more experience of reporting 
incidents than the ATC controllers. 
Among the pilot respondents, 85.3% of the Captains indicated that they had 
experienced on reporting incidents, whereas only 40.4% of the First Officers did so 
(see Table 7.9). It appears, therefore, that the Captains tend to experience more 
incident reporting than the First Officers, and the difference was significant at . 
001 
level (p<. 001, df = 1, )2obt = 43.65). 
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Figure 7.1 Respondents Experience on Reporting Incidents 
Table 7.9 
Pilot Respondents Experience on Reporting Incidents 
Captain (n =95) First officer (n= 114 ) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 81 85.3 % 46 40.4 % 
No 14 14.7% 68 59.6 % 
Captain vs. First officer: p< . 
001, df = 1, X`obt = 43.65 
Question 4: (hider the current situation in Taiwan, do you think it is possible for 
pilots to voluntarily share or report aviation incidents? 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the possibility for pilots and ATC controllers to voluntarily 
report human performance related incidents. The results show that ATC controllers 
were more likely to report human performance related incidents than airline pilots, 
and the contrast was significant at the . 
05 level (p < . 
05, df = 1, X2ont = 33.06, n= 
278). 
Subsequent analysis suggested that the Captains were more likely to file a report than 
the First Officers (see Figure 7.3). Chi-Square revealed that there were significant 
differences at the . 
001 level between the Captains and the First Officers (p < . 
001, df 
= 1, X20 =11.36, n =21 1). 
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With respect to the account of working experience, the more experienced the pilot 
and ATC controller respondents were, the more willing they were to voluntarily 
report incidents (see Appendix L1). Of the pilot respondents who had been working 
for less than 5 years, less than 20% expressed the possiblity of reporting incidents. 
Whereas 60% of the expereinced pilots having more than 15-years working 
experience indicated their willingness to submit an incident report. There were 
significant differences at . 
05 level in the groups of the pilots (p<. 05, df = 4, X2obt = 
1 1.12. n= 211) and the ATC controllers (p<. 05, df = 4, X20bt = 12.48, n= 67). 
Figure 7.2 Possibility for Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers to Voluntarily 
Report Incidents 
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Figure 7.3 Possibility for Captains and First Officers to Voluntarily 
Report Incidents 
7.3.2 Discussion 
The results of the survey suggest that a large proportion of the respondents indicated 
their willingness and encouragement on the issue related to information and 
experience sharing. However, when asked about their actual experience of incident 
reporting, less than two-thirds of the pilots and one-fifth of the ATC controllers had 
filed a report. A further question, asking the possibility of reporting aviation 
incidents under the current situation in Taiwan, revealed that a relatively small 
percentage (25.5%) of the pilots gave positive answers. ATC controllers, on the 
contrary, showed stronger support (41.8%) for the possibility of voluntary reporting. 
The first conflict in connection with the willingness to report incidents clearly lies 
with how ideals and beliefs are implemented in reality. According to the results, 
information and experience sharing is welcomed; but in practice, potential reporters 
hesitate to file an incident report. The discussion of Chapter 6 reveals that even when 
they report, most of the reports are related to technical problems rather than human 
performance error. It is, therefore, reasonable that less than 30% of the respondents 
thought it was possible to report aviation incident under the current situation. 
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In considering experience of voluntarily reporting of incidents, a relatively small 
percentage of ATC controllers indicated that they had ever voluntarily submitted 
incident reports. Two possible reasons to account for this finding are that pilots have 
more chances to encounter aviation incidents, and that pilots are more likely to gain 
access to a reporting system as many airlines have their own internal formal/informal 
reporting systems. 
Although fewer ATC controllers contributed to an incident reporting system, their 
responses given in Question 4 suggested that there was a potential for much higher 
involvement. Airline pilots, on the contrary, expressed less support on the possibility 
to voluntarily report incidents under the current situation. One of the main conflicts 
would appear to arise from the nature of a punitive environment. Due to the fact that 
pilots are usually involved in the operation of hazard events, pilots are more likely 
than ATC controllers to suffer from bad consequences, such as suspension or losing 
their jobs. 
A detailed analysis of the difference among pilot respondents revealed that the First 
Officers not only contributed less to incident reporting systems but also indicated a 
lower possibility for them to report. The findings reflect the phenomenon of vertical 
management in organisational structure. In most Asian societies, direct referral to 
sensitive issues is taboo. As a result, a First Officer is unlikely to challenge a Captain 
even if the captain makes a mistake. 
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7.4 About knowing and understanding other confidential reporting systems 
7.4.1 Results 
The following questions were intended to obtain the respondents' awareness of 
aviation incident reporting systems and their publications. 
Question 5: Have you heard of y foreign voluntary aviation incident reporting 
system, such as CHIRP in the UK or ASRS in the USA? 
Table 7.10 shows that approximately one-third of the pilots and one-fifth of the ATC 
controllers indicated that they had heard of other voluntary aviation incident reporting 
systems. There was no significant difference between the Captains and the First 
Officers on the issue. 
Table 7.10 The Knowledge of Any Foreign Voluntary Aviation 
Incident Reporting System 
Pilot( n =211) ATC controllers( n= 67 ) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 69 32.8 % 12 19.1 % 
No 142 67.2% 55 80.9 % 
Question 6: Have you ever read any research piers or reports from aviation 
incident reporting systems? 
Question 7: If so, are these papers or reports written in Chinese or English? 
60 of the 69 pilot respondents who gave positive answers in the previous question 
indicated that they had read the research papers or reports from aviation incident 
reporting systems (see Table 7.11). Among them, 39.3% had read Chinese papers or 
reports31, and the rest, 60.7%, had read their publications written in English. 
Among 18.2% ATC respondents that were aware of foreign voluntary aviation 
incident reporting systems, 15.1% indicated that they had read these systems' 
31 Flight Safety Foundation -Taiwan has translated several research papers or reports from other aviation 
incident reporting systems, and published them in its Flight Safety Magazine. 
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publications (see Table 7.11). Most of the papers or reports they had read were 
written in Chinese. 
Table 7.11 Contact with the Research Papers or Reports from 
Aviation Incident Reporting Systems 
Pilot (n =207) ATC controllers( n= 66 ) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 60 29.0% 10 15.1 % 
No 147 71.0% 56 84.9% 
7.4.2 Discussion 
The responses to the above questions indicated that foreign voluntary aviation 
incident reporting systems and their publications were not well known in the aviation 
community, with airline pilots being slightly more aware of them than ATC 
controllers. 
Of course, the questionnaire itself may have reminded some respondents about the 
existence of these systems. Moreover, non-respondents to the present survey may 
have been expected to be less aware of these systems than the respondents. It is 
reasonable to presume that the awareness of these systems may be somewhat lower 
than was indicated by the survey response. Such low awareness only reflects the 
necessity of education and promotion. 
Education and promotion have been the two prime concerns to existing confidential 
reporting systems. Before the implementation of a confidential reporting system, 
education of the target population and on-going promotion have proved to ensure the 
success of the system. Even after the establishment of the system, periodic promotion 
is needed to maintain interest and awareness. 
Promotional efforts not only can increase system awareness, but also build confidence 
in the system, and make it easier for individuals to take part in the system. 
Promotional activities include: 
" Distributing reporting forms, brochures, and display materials; 
" Visiting the aviation community to increase mutual understanding; 
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" Publishing feedback magazines; 
" Advertising; 
" Getting involved in aviation associations; 
" Simplifying the procedures for submitting reports; 
" Improving the reporter's satisfaction. 
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7.5 About the potential receiving agency 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The receiving agency of a confidential reporting system is like a doctor or a priest, 
whom the reporter can trust to report incidents in which they were involved or which 
they had observed, and through whom their notification of such an incident can be 
beneficial to aviation safety. Due to the possible involvement of the reporter, 
confidentiality is required for such a system to protect the reporter from disciplinary 
action. As a consequence, the success of a confidential reporting system depends 
heavily on its independence from regulatory authorities. 
Figure 7.4 illustrates an ideal receiving agency's relationship with the aviation 
community and regulatory authorities. 
MOTC & CAA The third party ? 
Figure 7.4 Relationship among CAA, Aviation Community and the Ideal 
Receiving Agency 
7.5.2 Results 
Question 10: If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, which do 
you think is the best agency to administer the system? 
When asked to choose the best receiving agency, more than 50% of the pilots and 
ATC controllers surveyed selected "research institute or school". About 40% of those 
surveyed chose "Flight Safety Foundation" as their ideal receiving agency. It is 
obvious that "Airline Pilot Association" received much more support from the airline 
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pilots (44.5%) than from the ATC controllers (2.9%). The response to this question 
suggested that regulatory authorities, such as CAA-Taiwan and Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication (MOTC), were considered not suitable as the best 
agency in the eyes of most respondents. Figure 7.5 clearly presents the distribution of 
the responses 
Research institute or 
school 
Airline Pilot Association 
Flight Safety Foundation 
Civil Aviation 
Administration 
MOTC 
Others 
Figure 7.5 The Responses about the Best Agency of the Incident 
Reporting System 
(Each respondent may have more than one choice. ) 
7.5.3 Discussion 
Creating a new and totally independent agency would be costly. In considering the 
scale of the current aviation industry in Taiwan, a better option is to compromise by 
adding the function of confidential reporting to some already established organisation. 
A suitable receiving agency should have the expertise to operate such a system, and as 
generally agreed, should be independent from the aviation regulatory authorities and 
have credibility within the aviation community. 
There was discussion at an aviation safety meeting about the selection of a suitable 
receiving agency to operate a confidential reporting system in Taiwan. However, no 
consensus was gained over the issue among aviation associations. The survey 
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response indicated that independence from the aviation regulatory authorities was the 
key determinant for both the airline pilots and the ATC controllers on choosing their 
ideal receiving agency. Nevertheless, a few airline pilots and ATC controllers still 
chose CAA or MOTC as the best agency, which could be a result of their lack of 
understanding of the reporting system. Apart from independence, the expertise of the 
staff in the potential agency is possibly another important element to be considered. 
This is discussed later in the chapter. 
No matter what organisation operates the confidential incident reporting system in 
Taiwan, if such a system is to be successful, a number of considerations need to be 
assessed in the receiving agency: 
" Neutrality 
" Aviation expertise 
" The ability to fulfil the goal of the system within its budget 
" Independence from aviation regulatory authorities 
" Credibility with the aviation community 
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7.6 About trust of the potential receiving agency 
7.6.1 Introduction 
As described above, an ideal receiving agency should be like a doctor or a priest, one 
that potential reporters can trust with any sort of problem or secret. In a practical 
environment, such trust must be rooted on the provision of confidentiality and 
immunity. This is where the confidence of the aviation community comes from. 
Without it, invaluable information of incidents would not be uncovered. Thus, the 
success of this system will depend on the trust the aviation community has in the 
receiving agency. 
7.6.2 Results 
Question 9: If the incident report-receivin agency is an independent aviation 
authority/ organisation, which provides guarantee of con identialitx 
and immunity to the reporter, will you voluntarily make an incident 
report? 
When asked about their willingness to make an incident report if confidentiality and 
immunity are guaranteed, 84.2% of the airline pilots and 79.4% of the ATC 
controllers indicated that they "absolutely agree" or "agree" to do it. Whereas 15.8% 
of the pilots and 20.6% of the ATC controllers checked "it depends". It is surprising 
to find out that no one chose negative answers on the question. However, the results 
of the following question draws another picture. 
Question 12: 1 an appropriate agency is chosen, to what extent do you trust that the 
agency can provide confidentiality to the reporter? 
The responses to this question suggest that nearly 40% of the respondents did not feel 
that the receiving agency could provide confidentiality to the reporter. Figure 7.6 
shows that ATC controllers tended to be significantly less worried about the 
confidentiality provision than were the airline pilots (p < . 05, 
df = 1, )2obt = 6.49, n= 
276). In Figure 7.7, it is also apparent that the Captains were less worried than were 
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the First Officerss, and the difference between them was statistically significant at the 
. 
01 level (p < . 
01, df = 1, X2obl = 8.45, n =209). Further analysis indicated that 
experienced pilots were less worried about "leaks" than were inexperienced pilots (p 
< . 
01, df = 4, XZht = 13.66. n= 209, see Appendix L2). 
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Some of the individual points put forward by interviewees are listed below: 
"I am willing to file an incident report, but the price for it is my future. I 
do not trust such complicated human relationship in the aviation 
community. " (fear of bad consequence) 
" The reporter, more often than not, gets hurt at last. " (fear of bad 
consequence) 
"Don't let the CAA utilise the acquired information from the reporting 
system to carry out a safety inspection, in particular aiming at special 
target " (the regulatory authority's underatanding and supporting) 
"I am afraid incident reporting will be used to assess individual 
performance. " (understanding of the system) 
"So far, I have not found any institute that is `independent and credible' to 
be the receiving agency. " (quality of the receiving agency) 
7.6.3 Discussion 
The general view among the respondents was that they would be willing to file a 
confidential report under the condition that confidentiality and immunity were 
guaranteed. Unfortunately the promise of confidentiality was simply not accepted 
by the majority of the aviation community. Some interviewees also doubted that the 
receiving agency could be independent from the aviation regulatory authorities. 
Great care and tact must be exercised in the development of relationships with 
reporters if a reporting system is to be implemented in Taiwan. The receiving agency 
should not only be independent from the aviation regulatory authorities, but be able to 
guarantee confidentiality of reporter identity and promise immunity from punitive 
action. In addition, it needs to correct the impression of distrust by promulgating the 
importance of the system, its method of operation, and disseminating information 
feedback to the aviation community. Otherwise, the aviation community will not 
have faith in the system, and there will be no system. 
256 
Chapter 7 Taiwanese Aviation Community's Reaction to the Introduction of a Reporting System 
7.7 A significant legal hurdle 
7.7.1 Introduction 
In a national-level confidential reporting system, the promise of immunity becomes 
relatively important when the guarantee of complete confidentiality, as described in 
Section 7.6, is not trusted by potential reporters. If no immunity is offered for 
reporters to waive punitive or disciplinary action, the call for voluntarily reporting 
their unintended mistakes is unworkable. 
7.7.2 Legislative penalties to airmen in Taiwan 
In the Civil Aviation Law of Taiwan, the penalties relating to aviation personnel are 
legislated in Article 86 under Chapter 10 Penalties, which enacts that any airman shall 
be liable to a fine from NT$10,000 (approximately £250) to NT$50,000 
(approximately £ 1,250) for any of the following. In serious cases, the offender shall 
be suspended from performing his work or have his airman licence revoked: 
1. Flight beyond the limits of the prescribed standards; 
2. Failure to carry all the documents required of the aircraft while in 
flight; 
3. Landing at or taking off from a site outside an airport without 
justification; 
4. Failure to comply with the designated airway and altitude in flight 
without justification. (wi ful action & negligence ) 
Article 70 under Chapter 8 in Airman Rating and Certification Code enacts that an 
airman who causes hazard or incidents by his technical mistakes shall be suspended 
from performing his work from three months to one year. His certificate of rating 
shall also be withdrawn and not be returned until his suspension is mature. 
The Upgrading Regulations of Commercial Pilot place restrictions on pilot's 
upgrading, if any pilot: 
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" causes aircraft incidents due to his technical mistakes or violation of 
aviation regulations within the past two years, or 
" causes aircraft accidents due to his technical mistakes or violation of 
aviation regulations within the past one year. 
7.7.3 Discussion 
The above articles and regulations account for the reason why pilots are unwilling to 
voluntarily report aviation incidents or accidents. Under the present regulations, their 
fear of the penalties which incident reporting might bring seems to make sense. In an 
area which the industry lacks trust in the system, such as Taiwan, it is advisable to 
apply legislative protection to reporters. It is also a good idea to modify the above 
law, codes and regulations so that they are better served on reporting motivations. As 
some pilots interviewed expressed, they additionally hoped the system could change 
or modify the punishment approach in their airlines. 
To aviation regulatory authorities, the establishment of an aviation confidential 
incident reporting system is likely to demand change on their previous rules or 
procedures as well as their attitude towards using the information. For example, it is 
essential to announce the guarantee for reporters from punitive or disciplinary action 
in order to stimulate reports that reveal of human error and systematic weaknesses. 
They also have to give an undertaking that the focus of incident investigations is on 
assessing the whole aviation safety standard rather than individual performance. In 
essence, the emphasis is to encourage full and candid reporting of incidents and 
unsafe events and to avoid seeking blame and punishment, so that early identification 
of problems and effective remedial action are attainable. 
Experience shows that the primary motivation for reporting to US ASRS is immunity 
not confidentiality. However, a significant portion of reporting is to waive 
disciplinary action rather than to improve aviation safety. This should be given 
consideration if a similar immunity provision is intended to be established in the 
Taiwanese system. 
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Additionally, two of the senior CAA officers interviewed mentioned that although 
they did support the establishment of a reporting system, what worried them most was 
the speed of the enactment of a law. This is because the amendment of law always 
takes a long time to be passed in the Legislative Assembly and MOTC. 
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7.8 About feasibility opinions (the support extent of airline community) 
7.8.1 Results 
Question 8: Do you think a confidential reporting system or its related research 
paper will help to improve aviation safte? 
Question 14: To what extent do you think such a confidential reporting system is 
needed in Taiwan? 
The responses to these two questions suggests that the majority of the pilots and the 
ATC controllers believed that confidential reporting systems would help to improve 
aviation safety (pilots: 92.6%; ATC controllers: 98.5%) and there was a need to 
establish such a reporting system in Taiwan (pilots: 96.8%; ATC controllers: 97.7%). 
Question 13: If an independent incident report-receiving agency is appropriately 
chosen. confidentiality and immunity to the reporter are also 
guaranteed, do you think it is feasible to implement a Taiwanese 
confidential reporting system in the next two years? 
More than 60% of the pilots and ATC controllers indicated that it was "absolutely 
feasible" or "feasible" to implement a Taiwanese confidential reporting system in the 
next two years (see Table 7.12). Several of those interviewed showed their strong 
support by saying that "Such a system should be established quickly and publish its 
feedback magazines. " 
It appears that more Captains (73.7%) than the First Officerss (64.3%) gave positive 
responses on the question. The percentages saying that the system was feasible were 
about the same between military-trained pilots and Ab-initio trained pilots. However, 
the difference of the percentage on negative answers were quite considerable, with 
only 3.8% of the Ab-initio trained pilots but 11.4% of the military-trained pilots 
indicating their disagreement on the question. "No comment" was checked the most 
by the First Officerss, corresponding to 28.6%. 
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Table 7.12 Breakdown of Responses According to the Position and Background 
about the Feasibility of Implementing a Taiwanese Confidential Reporting System 
in the Next Two Years 
Absolutely Feasible No Not Absolutely 
feasible comments feasible not 
feasible 
Pilots (n = 211) 13.3 % 55.5% 21.8% 8.1 % 1.4% 
ATC controller (n = 68) 17.6 % 57.4 % 19.1 % 4.4 % 1.5 % 
Captain (n = 99) 10.1% 63.6% 16.2% 8.1 % 2.0% 
First officer (n = 112) 16.1 % 48.2 % 28.6 % 8.0 % 0.9 % 
Military background (n = 158) 11.4% 56.3% 20.3% 9.5% 1.9% 
Ab-initio background (n = 53) 18.9 % 52.8 % 24.5 % 3.8 % 0% 
Question 11: If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, what are 
the possible reasons that might result in your unwillingness to make an 
incident report? 
When asked their possible reasons for not submitting an incident report, most of the 
respondents expressed their main worries on negative consequences (see Table 7.13). 
Table 7.13 The Possible Reasons Resulting in Respondents' 
Unwillingness to Make a Voluntary Incident Report 
Pilot 
(n=211) 
Freq. Pct. 
ATC Controller 
(n=68) 
Freq. Pct. 
Might cause negative consequences 139 66.5 % 46 67.6 % 
Distrust the confidentiality 88 42.3 % 24 35.2 % 
Too much time on paper work 74 35.6% 33 48.5 % 
Company or unit might not want us to 72 34.6 % 15 22.0 % 
report 
Personnel of the system are not professional 72 34.6 % 34 50.0 % 
Fear of punitive action 67 32.2 % 28 41.2 % 
Do not know what the system can do 36 17.3 % 13 19.1 % 
I am not sure what can be reported 21 10.1% 4 5.8% 
Lose face 17 7.7% 9 13.2% 
Do not think it will help to improve safety 6 2.9 % 5 7.3 % 
Each respondent may have more than one choice. 
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Of the pilots and ATC controllers, more than 35% expressed their doubt about the 
confidentiality provided by the receiving agency as well as their unwillingness to 
spend too much time on paper work. The expertise of staff in the receiving agency 
and the support of the airlines are two other important reasons resulting in their 
unwillingness to report incidents. 
Based on the rank order of importance, the reasons for their unwillingness to make an 
voluntary incident report were: 
1. Might cause negative consequences 
2. Too much time on paper work 
3. Distrust the confidentiality 
4. Personnel of the system are not professional 
5. Company or unit might not want us to report 
6. Fear of punitive action 
7. Do not know what the system can do 
8. Lose face 
9. I am not sure what can be reported 
10. Do not think it will help to improve safety 
Below are some transcripts of the interviews about their opinions towards setting up 
an incident reporting system. Fear of bad consequences or punitive action being 
taken against the individual were mentioned the most. Some interviewees, moreover, 
stressed that the success of the system depended heavily on the positive attitude of the 
aviation regulatory authorities. 
"Although legislative protection can guarantee reporters from disciplinary 
action, it cannot protect the reporters from negative consequences, such as 
receiving threats from the one being reported. " 
"It is likely to be prevented by aircrews, such as the Captain or Flight 
Engineer. " 
"It depends on whether reward is provided appropriately. " 
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"Whether the aviation regulatory authorities give their encouragement and 
support needs to be observed. " 
"Correct concept should be deeply rooted in fundamental education. 
Aviation regulatory authorities also need to have correct concept and 
attitude about the system. " 
"The establishment of a Taiwanese reporting system is like other concepts. 
The idea is good, but there are always discrepancies in translating theoretical 
treatments of the concept into practical action. " 
"Reporting is unnecessary to have too much paper work. " 
7.8.2 Discussion 
This survey of the respondents showed that there was strong support for the 
introduction of a voluntary confidential incident reporting system, but the support was 
conditional. The system was considered to be feasible under the conditions that the 
receiving agency was appropriately chosen, and that confidentiality and immunity to 
the reporter were also guaranteed. 
Existing systems vary in their target populations, but all include airline pilots and 
ATC controllers. From the viewpoint of eliciting safety information, the more the 
target populations are included, the better. Considering the funds a large-scale system 
might need and the complexity it would involve, it is therefore suggested that initially 
the target population of reporters should merely include commercial pilots and ATC 
controllers. Then, other populations can be added if the initial scheme is successful 
and funding increases. 
The findings of the survey show that a few psychological obstacles need to be 
surmounted before implementing a Taiwanese confidential reporting system. The 
potential reporters need to be convinced that submitting an incident report on their 
own performance will not result in any negative consequences. On the contrary, it 
must be seen that the information will be effectively utilised and thus contribute to 
aviation safety. Air carriers, air traffic control providers, and aviation regulatory 
authorities, at the same time, need to form a positive attitude towards the reporting 
system and towards using the information to bring about changes to equipment, 
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procedures, and training that have already been approved, licensed, or authorised by 
them. 
A surprisingly small number of the respondents were worried about losing face for 
admitting their mistakes. The concept of face has long been related to Chinese 
hierarchical social structure. Ho (1976) elaborates the importance of the concept of 
face in Chinese social system: (Chang and Holt, 1994) 
Face is the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for himself 
from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network 
and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that 
position as well as acceptably in his general conduct; the face extended to a 
person by others is a function of the degree of congruence between judgements of 
his total condition in life, including his actions as well as those of people closely 
associated with him, and the social expectations the others have placed upon him. 
It is thus expected that the respondents with higher rank and seniority structure should 
give "lose face" as an important reason for non reporting. However, data gained from 
this survey showed that "lose face" was not the major concern for both the pilots and 
ATC controllers, presumably because the other reasons were likely to influence their 
job security and increase workload. Nevertheless, it is believed that such a cultural 
conflict caused by keeping up face, as described in Section 5.2, can not be ignored 
when reporters make a voluntary incident report. 
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7.9 About sharing safety information via the Internet 
7.9.1 Introduction 
The characteristics of openness, interaction, availability at any time, and user 
friendlyness have made the Internet one of the most powerful media in the world. In 
aviation, it is utilised to check flight numbers, arriving and departing flight 
information, airport information, and meteorological conditions. To aviation safety, 
the facility of electronic mail may offer the aviation community an interactive and 
bilateral channel to exchange their perceptions of safety and experience on hazardous 
events. Internet safety web, moreover, may provide aviation community an access to 
safety information. For example, it may publish a column to introduce a series of 
safety topics, providing aviation community or general public up-to-date or imminent 
aviation information. 
Digital computers are omnipresent. In the flight cockpit, they play an inevitable role 
as the third pilot: The questions in the section are designed to establish how personal 
computers are used by the respondents at home and what they think of transferring 
aviation safety information from the Internet. 
7.9.2 Results 
Question 1: Do you have your own personal computer? 
Question 2: How often do you use computer at home? 
The point of these two question was to assess the usage of a personal computer by the 
selected target groups of the Taiwanese aviation community. 49.5% of the pilots 
owned a personal computer at home. Among them, 59.6% always or often used it. 
Whereas 43.3% of the ATC controllers possessed a personal computer at home, 
55.2% of whom indicated that they "always" or "often" used it. 
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Table 7.14 Breakdown of Responses about the Possession of a 
Personal Computer 
Pilot (n=186) ATC controller (n = 67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 92 49.5% 29 43.3% 
No 94 50.5% 38 56.6% 
Question 3: Is your personal computer connected to the Internet? 
This question was intended to establish how many respondents gained access to the 
Internet. The response indicated that only about one-fourth of the pilots and one-third 
of the ATC controllers had their personal computers connected to the Internet (see 
Table 7.14). 
Table 7.15 Breakdown of Responses about the Connection of 
Personal Computer to the Internet 
Pilot( n= 186) ATC controller (n = 67 ) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 51 27.4 % 23 34.3% 
No 135 72.6% 44 65.7% 
Question 5: Are you willing to receive safte and its related information through 
computer? 
The response suggested that a majority of the respondents favoured the idea of 
receiving safety information by computer, with the ATC controllers slightly 
outnumbering the pilots (see Table 7.15). A relatively small percentage of the 
respondents indicated their unwillingness, and it was noteworthy that no one 
expressed strong objection. 
Table 7.16 
Respondents' Willingness to Access to Safety Information via Computer 
unwilling 
rea. Pct. 
Willing 
Pilots (n = 174) 78 44.8% 90 51.7% 6 3.4% 0 0% 
ATC controller (n = 59) 31 52.5% 27 45.8% 1 1.3% 0 0% 
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Question 6: Are you willing to offer your /Tying experience or safebý suggestions on 
the Internet? 
The question was intended to understand whether the respondents accepted the notion 
of information exchange by computer. It appeared that most respondents tended to 
agree with the notion, with roughly equal support being given by each of the two 
groups surveyed (see Figure 7.8). However, a considerable number of the 
respondents did not take side. 30.5% of the pilots and 23.7% of the ATC controllers 
chose the neutral answer, "it depends". 
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Figure 7.8 Respondents' Willingness to Offer Safety Suggestions on the Internet 
7.9.3 Discussion 
The survey response suggested that the respondents regarded electronic access to 
safety information and information exchange by computer as acceptable. 
Additionally, electronic communications are available through Internet in some 
existing confidential reporting systems. Considering the expectation of electronic 
services in the aviation community, more systems are building up or considering 
building up such a network to cater for the trend of digital revolution. 
it is thus suggested that the CAA-Taiwan and the airlines in Taiwan should consider 
early establishment of an e-mail network for exchange of safety information. The 
FSF-Taiwan (Flight Safety Foundation) maybe is in a good position to facilitate 
establishing such a communications net. There should be established a safety library, 
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electronically accessible by any of the airlines or the CAA. Again, an independent 
agency could facilitate this service for the CAA and the airline community, ensuring 
its growth and currency. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
"Since brevity is the soul of wit, and tediousness the limbs and 
outward flourishes, I will be brief. " 
- Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, 2 
8. Overview 
This chapter outlines the major findings of the whole study, and provides some 
suggestions for further research on airline safety. Recommendations for improving 
safety, based on the information gained from the two studies, are made. 
8.1 Conclusions 
1. There is considerable variation in airline fatal accident records among different 
regions. Australasia, North America, and Europe have the best safety records. 
Unfortunately, safety performance is markedly worse in the other regions, amongst 
which Africa has the worst safety record. Similarly, the chances of accidents 
occurring for foreign aircraft in North America and Europe were comparatively 
lower than in other regions, such as Asia, South America, and Africa. 
2. Geographical or organisational variations in the definition of accidents are likely to 
create misleading analyses and misrepresentation of accident statistics. 
3. From a review of Asian and Taiwanese accidents occurring between 1983 - 1994, 
the most frequently occurring factors contributing to accidents were identified as 
"failure to follow regulations or procedures", "failure to cross-check/co-ordinate", 
"lack of situational awareness" and "omission of action/inappropriate action". All 
of these causal factors were related to failure of human performance. 
4. Most pilot respondents, especially those who were military-trained First Officers in 
regional airlines, were negative about the influence of safety staff and their 
position. Two-thirds of the interviewees stated they would rather report a safety 
concern to someone other than flight safety staff, because they thought that the 
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flight safety staff were not delegated with enough influence to deal with unsafe 
practices. 
5. More than half of the respondents agreed that the policy of their companies 
encouraged voluntary safety reporting, but over half did not agree that crews were 
willing to report hazards or incidents. This was mainly because they worried about 
the negative consequences accompanied by reporting (see List entry 19). Further 
analysis showed that there were wide variations among the comparison groups. 
Approximately two-thirds of the First Officers and Ab-initio trained pilots 
disagreed that crews were willing to report hazards / incidents; however, only one- 
third of the Captains and about half of the military-trained pilots thought so. 
6. With regard to the experiences of working with expatriate pilots, the most quoted 
advantage was the presence of less pressure, whereas the major frustrations 
stemmed from differences of language and culture. 
7. The analysis of the survey data suggested that management commitment to safety 
was voiced at every airline, but the extent to which the commitments are actually 
realised in practice could not be determined from the survey findings. As there is 
no simple or universal solution for resolving cultural conflicts and confusion, actual 
managerial practices require continuous efforts to be applied on reducing the 
impact of discordant culture on safety. 
8. From the survey, more than half of respondents were not satisfied with the reward 
system in their airlines. There was call for abating punishments and enhancing 
rewards for good teamwork rather than individual performance. Also it was 
suggested that rewards should be offered immediately to enhance their 
effectiveness. 
9. The two main reasons for not attending aviation safety conferences were the 
existence of, a language gap and workload increase. Language gaps lead to lack of 
involvement, while workload increases resulted from the requirement for the 
conference participants to file a report immediately after attendance. On the other 
hand, the most common reasons for attending aviation safety conferences were that 
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they helped to increase knowledge, and that there was no detrimental influence on 
flight schedules. 
10. A considerable number of the respondents reported negatively about the allocation 
of greater resources in the area of safety, with regional-airline pilots being less 
enthusiastic than international-airline pilots. 
11. Flight training and operating standards were perceived as being the most important 
factors in airline safety management for both Asian and Taiwanese respondent 
pilots, while top management was viewed as the most important factor in the 
opinion of CAA officer respondents. 
12. Due to fear of punishment or suspension, the respondents would rather not to 
report unsafe acts, if possible, or else would just talk about them' with others in 
private. 
13. Some respondents noted that there was a lack of flight standards and inspection 
personnel in the subject country's CAA. There needs to be some incentive 
established to encourage careers in government civil aviation. In order to augment 
staff numbers, it was advisable to provide better salaries in order to bridge the 
differentials between civil service positions and airline jobs. More safety training, 
in particular accident investigation training, was also suggested to maintain a high 
level of performance and provide updated information to safety professionals. 
14. In many cases limited English language fluency inhibited the acquisition of aviation 
information and was a leading problem when training abroad. More than half of 
the interviewees indicated that communication difficulties hindered them when 
asking questions, and three-fourths admitted that it'influenced their learning speed. 
15. Significant differences were found between the pilots and ATC controllers about 
their experience of incident reporting, with more airline pilots tending to participate 
than ATC controllers. Subsequent analysis revealed that the Captains were more 
likely to report incidents than the First Officers. 
16. Although airline pilots were more inclined to contribute to an incident reporting 
system, they expressed less support than ATC controllers on the possibility of 
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voluntarily reporting incidents under the current situation. This was because the 
pilot's closer involvement in hazardous events made them more likely to suffer 
adverse consequences. 
17. In comparison with the Captains, the First Officers not only contributed less to 
incident reporting systems but also indicated that there was a lower incentive for 
them to report. 
18. The survey responses indicated that details of foreign voluntary aviation incident 
reporting systems and their publications were not well known in the subject 
aviation community. Airline pilots, however, were slightly more aware of them than 
ATC controllers. 
19. The four most important reasons for not reporting incidents were "fear of negative 
consequences", "spending too much time on paper work", "distrust of the 
confidentiality guarantee", and "lack of professional personnel in the system" 
20. The promise of confidentiality is simply not accepted by the majority of the aviation 
community. Nearly two-fifths of the respondents did not feel that the receiving 
agency could provide an adequate guarantee of confidentiality for the reporter, 
with the airline pilots being significantly more concerned than the ATC controllers. 
Further analysis suggested that the First Officers tended to be significantly more 
worried about the confidentiality provision than were the Captains. 
21. The majority of the pilots and the ATC controllers believed that confidential 
reporting systems would help to improve aviation safety (pilots: 92.6%; ATC 
controllers: 98.5%) and that there was a need to establish such a reporting system 
in the subject country (pilots: 96.8%; ATC controllers: 97.7%). 
22. More than three-fifths of the pilots and the ATC controllers indicated that it was 
"absolutely feasible" or "feasible" to implement a national-level confidential 
reporting system in the subject country in the next two years. The survey response 
also suggested that the respondents regarded electronic access to safety 
information and information exchange by computer as being acceptable. 
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23. According to the pilot and ATC controller respondents, the three most popular 
choices for the type of body needed to act as a receiving agency were "research 
institute", "Flight Safety Foundation", and "Airline Pilot Association". 
24. A substantial number of the respondents (more than 90%) were willing to receive 
and exchange safety information via the Internet. 
8.2 Recommendations 
1. To demonstrate the commitment to safety and to create an improved safety culture, 
it is recommended that the airline safety department should be an autonomous 
unit, and it would be preferable for it not coming under the flight operations or 
maintenance departments. 
2. Safety surveys should be conducted to provide the regulator and the regulated 
(airlines) with more information about the underlying safety integrity of 
organisations than inspection-based processes can provide. Their aim should be to 
locate and evaluate problems, so that remedial actions can be taken based on the 
priorities of each problem. 
3. Any excessive concentration on punishment of a pilot's unsafe performance might 
prevent a clear understanding of how other underlying factors cause human error in 
the first place. The overall objective of any safety program should be able to 
identify latent factors early in the process so that the root causes of "human error" 
are not ignored or inadvertently overlooked. It is recommended for both airlines 
and the CAA to review their present punishment procedures and use punishment 
judiciously with the overall objective in mind. 
4. A successful flight safety programme must consider all aspects of anomalous airline 
operations, not just accidents and more serious incidents. 
5. According to the experience of confidential reporting systems in operation, it is 
recommended that continuous education and promotion be provided to increase the 
aviation community's awareness and understanding of any new a national-level 
system. Before the establishment of such a system, it is suggested to actively invite 
the participation of the Airline Pilot Association, Flight Safety Foundation-Taiwan 
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and relevant research institutes to discuss every detail of implementation. In order 
to breed trust and strengthen consensus, it is also suggested that the system be 
introduced for a test period of two years, then its achievements should be fully 
evaluated. 
6. English language fluency should be encouraged as a means to access the abundant 
safety and operations documentation and other literature that is available. At the 
same time, the provision of bilingual manuals, regulations and safety information is 
recommended to avoid misunderstanding. 
7. There is a need for all airlines to include Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 
training in their safety programmes with the purpose of improving cockpit co- 
ordination and communications. 
8. It is important that the concept of sharing safety information in the subject airline 
community should be fostered in order to spot safety problems before they cause 
accidents, as any one accident will affect everyone in the aviation community. 
9. Based on the experience of existing confidential aviation reporting systems, the keys 
to ensure the success of an incident reporting system lie with the guarantees of 
confidentiality and immunity, together with rapid information feedback. At the 
same time, the receiving agency of the system should be independent from the 
aviation regulatory authority and be capable of winning the confidence of the 
aviation community. 
10. Electronic mail and the Internet Safety Web are recommended to be used for saving 
time in report submissions and processing. In addition, a carefully managed 
electronic reporting system may be used to exchange confidential information 
among various safety focal points, and to alert the aviation entire community to 
safety problems within a short period of time. 
11. With a view to establishing regional co-operation and under consideration of the 
personnel and equipment required, a regional aviation safety oversight programme 
is recommended to ensure that civil aviation in Asia-Pacific meets international 
standards. Such cross-boarder co-operation can be practised to improve existing 
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regulations, harmonise regulations among the nations, standardise methods of 
determining airworthiness, share safety information, and train inspectors and 
investigators with same programme to save training cost. 
12. Safety is an endless job. Another survey is recommended to evaluate the 
improvement of safety management after receiving the feedback of the survey. In 
order to increase integrity, it is also suggested that the subjects should be expanded 
to include ground and cabin crew. 
13. A follow-up study is needed to probe more deeply the problems caused by language 
barriers, such as in what situation they usually occur, and how they influence the 
effectiveness of training and flying. Hopefully, a better understanding of the 
language barriers will foster the provision of possible solutions. 
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Asian Airline Accident Data 
Date Aircraft Carrier 
02/06/83 F28 
18/12/83 A300 
19/12/83 B747 
23/12/83 DC10 
27/01/84 F28 
06/06/84 B737 
11/06/84 DC9 
03/06/84 BAC111 
04/08/84 BAC111 
30/12/84 DC9 
08/02/85 B737 
12/02/85 DC9 
19/02/85 B747 
15/04/85 B737 
12/08/85 B747 
20/08/85 BAC1 11 
29/08/85 BAC1 11 
12/10/85 MD80 
15/01/86 B737 
16/02/86 B737 
29/09/86 A300 
02/01/87 F28 
04/04/87 DC9 
31/08/87 B737 
19/09/87 A300 
18/01/88 L1011 
30/05/88 B737 
19/06/88 B737 
09/10/88 B747 
19/10/88 B737 
21/07/89 BAC111 
27/07/89 DC10 
26/10/89 B737 
25/11/89 F28 
14/02/90 A320 
24/03/90 L1011 
07/05/90 B747 
11/05/90 B737 
27/05/90 A300 
05/11/90 A300 
15/11/90 B707 
18/03/91 A300 
13/06/91 B727 
16/08/91 B737 
29/12/91 B747 
10/01/92 B737 
16/01/92 B767 
31/07/92 A310 
28/09/92 A300 
Garuda 
MAS 
JAL 
KAL 
Garuda 
Indian Air 
Garuda 
PAL 
PAL 
Garuda 
Indian Air 
JAS 
CAL 
Thai Air 
JAL 
PAL 
PAL 
Korean Air 
India Air 
CAL 
Indian Air 
Pelita 
Garuda 
Thai Air 
PAL 
All Nippon 
JTA 
Indian Air 
Garuda 
Indian Air 
PAL 
Korean Air 
CAL 
Korean Air 
Indian Air 
Cathay 
Pac 
Air India 
PAL 
Thai Air 
Air India 
PIA 
PIA 
Korean Air 
Indian Air 
CAL 
Air Lanka 
Asiana 
Thai Air 
PIA 
Flight 
Phase 
2 
8 
9 
2 
9 
9 
9 
2 
9 
9 
9 
9 
5 
7 
4 
9 
9 
9 
8 
9 
2 
9 
8 
7 
9 
9 
2 
9 
2 
8 
9 
8 
3 
2 
8 
9 
Location 
Tanjung Karang, Indonesia 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Anchorage, USA 
Anchorage, USA 
Pangkalplnang, Indonesia 
Calcutta, India 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
San Jose, Philipine 
Tacolban, Philippine 
Denpasar, Indonla 
Calcutta, India 
Hanamaki, Japan 
Near San Francisco, USA 
Phuket, Thailand 
Mt Osutaka, Japan 
Tacloban, Philippine 
Manila, Philippine 
Seoul, Korea 
Trichy, India 
Makung Island, Taiwan 
Madras, India 
Pinangkampal, Indonesia 
Medan, Indonesia 
Phuket, Thailand 
Manila, Philippine 
Sapporo, Japan 
Shlmojishima, Japan 
Delhi, India 
Bangkok, Thailand 
Ahmadabad, India 
Manila, Philippine 
Tripoli, Ubya 
Hualian, Taiwan 
Seoul, Korea 
Bangalore, India 
Tokyo, Japan 
Accident Type 
RTO overrun 
Landed short in swamp 
Hit truck on runway 
Collision with light twin 
Veered off runway 
Veered off runway 
Hard LDG-fuselage separation 
The aircraft was overweight 
Overrun into shallow seawater 
Departed runway 
Gear up landing 
Veered-off runway on landing 
Stall, roll, & rapid descent 
CFIT on initial approach 
Control loss-AFT BLKHD failure 
Over runway 
Hard LDG-NLG collapse 
Landing overrun 
Wing tip strike on approach 
Crashed in ocean during G/A 
RTO/ENG. fire-overshot runway 
Landed short 
Fatal crash on approach 
Stall-crashed into water 
Airplane overshot runway 
Veered off runway into snow 
Veered off runway on takeoff 
Gear up landing 
A/C halted too late 
Terrain Impact, final approach 
Landing overrun 
Crashed on final approach 
Flew into mountain after T. O. 
Crashed following rotation 
Crashed short of airport 
Hard landing-fuel leak-evacuation 
g Delhi, India Engine separation after touch down 
j Manila, Philippine Explosion In center fuel tank 
g Manila, Philippine Plane ran off end of runway 
Goa, India Hard landing, veered off runway 
2 Peshawar, Pakistan Rear main wheel axle broke 
9 Islamabad, Pakistan Over runway In heavy rain 
9 Taegu, Korea Gear up landing 
7 Imphal, India Hit hill on VOR approach 
4 Taipei, Taiwan Lost #3 and #4 engines after T. O. 
9 Madras, India Gear Collapse-hard landing 
9 Cheju Island, korea Hard landing-fuselage damage 
9 Kathmandu, Nepa Crash Into mountain-CFIT 
8 Nr. Kathmandu, Nepal Hit high ground on approach 
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APPRENDIX B: Interview List 
Name Job Title Company 
Capt. M. Chen Manager, Flight training centre China Airlines 
Capt. R. P. Tzou Flight safety manger Far Eastern Air Transport 
Capt. M. Y. Yin Executive Secretary FS F-Taiwan 
Capt. K. R Qualls Assistant to Director, Operations China Airlines 
Capt. C. C. Fan Chief pilot China Airlines 
Mr. C. Z. Chao First Officer EVA Air 
Capt. Y. T. Teng Training Captain Makung Airlines 
Mr. S. F. Wen Specialist, Flight operations Formosa Airlines 
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287 
AVIATION SAFETY C$ A iS CAXi - Wi, RCP. QNSrI YY ITýr 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Safety is an endless job. Safety is also an invaluable property of an airline. 
We are conducting research into airline safety management in Asia. As you 
always look for ways of improving aviation safety, it would be greatly 
appreciated if you could complete this questionnaire enclosed and offer us 
YOUR OPINIONS regarding the airline safety management. 
All replies will be treated in confidence. Results of the survey will be calculated 
only in aggregate form so that neither airlines nor persons can be identified. 
We hope you will find time to make a contribution to this research and thank 
you in advance. The summary of the survey will send to you if you request. 
Yours faithfully, 
Hero Ho 
Research Associate 
College of Aeronautics 
A Frank Taylor 
Director 
Cranfield Aviation Safety Centre 
------------- 
............ 
AIRLI N E:: ýý ive, AFETV It ik: ý bot t** 1, tod: 6, Ji I ..... ....... 
288 
Airline Safety Management 
Questionnaire 
Just several minutes of your time could help complete this questionnaire 
which is part of a research study on airline safety management. You will 
receive a summary of the results if you tick the box below. 
11 Please send me a survey summary. 
In answering the questions, please give your personal view, which may not 
necessarily reflect your company's "official view". All information given will 
be treated as strictly confidential. Results of the survey will be counted 
only in an aggregate form so that neither airlines nor persons can be 
identified. 
Name (optional): 
Position in your . Company: S 
Working experience less than 2 years 2-5 years 6- 10 years 
in Aviation : 11 - 15 years 16 - 20 years more than 20 
years 
Flying background : Ali initia<Training" > ': 
If you have) Military 
General aviation 
Airline (optional): 
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Please circle the number as appropriate to indicate your opinion 
I. Organisation structure strongly strongly I don't 
disagree agree know 
1. In the past several*yearrs, your' company ' 1 2- 3 4' 5 6 8 
has undergone a significant expansion 
in the scale of its operations. 
2. Functional responsibility for safety is 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
clearly placed. 
3: The influence of safety staff is strong. 1 2-.. . 3:.:: " .:... '; ,° ,.., 5 6 .. 8.. 
4. The position of safety manager or 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
personnel in your company's hierarchy 
is appropriate. 
II Management styles strongly strongly disagree agree 
L' Ton nianaacmcnt is dedicated to 1' -2 3'45'6 
supporting safety policies and events. 
2. Operations managers are strongly 123 
involved in the safety events. 
3. The safety manager/personnel have 
direct access to top management. 
4. Reward system for safety is well 123 
organised. 
5. The safety inspection program in your:. 1 .'23 
own airline is satisfactory. 
456 
I don't 
know 
8 
8 
:8 
456 
", ,'$ .ý 
III. Organisational climate strongly strongly disagree agree 
1. In general, the awareness of safety is: ` 2 3 :,:..: ' .. " 4 6. 
good in your company. 
2. Channels for communication are 1 2 3 4 5 6 
accessible in your company. 
3. Flight ilnd ground'crews co-ordinate' 1 2" 3 4 6 
well in your company. 
4. The company's policy encourages 1 2 3 4 5 6 
voluntary safety reports from 
flight/ground crews. 
5. Crews are willing. to report :'.:.: 1 2 3 4: :5 . 6'...... . 
hazardsrncidents. 
IV. Operational standards and training strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
1. Your company makes strong efforts to ' 1, "2 ' '3 4 .5 '6 
standardise checklists and manuals in 
accordance with its policy. 
8 
8 
I don't 
know 
8 
8 
8 
8 
I don't 
know 
8 
2. hie selection criteria for blight crews 1234568 
are high. 
3: 'The quality o# recitrteut training is verb :. '. 2: 3: SG8 
good. 
4. The working experience of qualified 1234568 
crew members is high. 
5, ' Human factors training is effective:.. '' '' i23, 
. 
4. ' 5' ' 
,''. 
6' 8 
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PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS. THANK YOU I 
V. Resource availability strongly strongly I don't 
I. Your company responds well in terms 
disagree 
1 23 '4 5 
agree 
6 
Imow 
8 
of changes in policies and procedures 
after any Incident/accident happened. 
2. Your company absorbs safety-related 1 23 4 5 6 8 
information from the industry well. 
3. Your company maintains hazard/ 1"'' 2 5'` 6 8' 
incident/accident data very well. 
4. Your company enthusiastically 1 23 4 5 6 8 
participates in the aviation safety 
organisations and meetings. 
5. Your company provides very good 1 2 3* '4 "5 6' 8 
quality safety-related information. 
VI. Indicate your opinion of the least Important most iniportant 
importance to airline safety of the 
foll owing : 
1. Top management 5 6.: 
2. Organisational structure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. ......:. Organisatiotial"cliinaie ...... "2 '3 4 "5 6 
4. Resource availability 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. andards Opcritioiial st i 1 2 ;' 3 4 5 6 
6. Training 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. The role of Aviation Regulatory"' 1 2: 3. .. :.: 4: 5 :... 6 
Authority 
8. Others (Please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VII. Organisational Effectiveness strongly strongly I don't 
disagree' agree know 
1. Your company has invested a lot in .::.:.: ..:.. 1.: ... .2:;:: '::. 3 .. .....: 4 ..... : 
`: 5.: ..:::; .. '6 ...:..:.. ; ': g 
safety improvement. 
2. The safety criteria in your company are 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
strict. 
3. Your company handles emergency 1 2 :3 4 S 6". 8 
situations effectively and efficiently .. 4. Your company is proud of its safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
record. 
5. Image of your company's overall 1 2 3 4 :5 6 8 
service is very good. 
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VIII. The role of Aviation Regulatory 
Authority and the investigation 
agency 
1. Its pace of response to tecluiological 
change is good. 
2. Its follow-up to check compliance with 
its safety standards is good. 
3. Its capacity to guide effectively the 
adequate training of airlines is good. 
4. It provides adequate safety information 
to airlines. 
5. Its investigators are qualified to'the 
level of advanced technology aircraft 
strongly strongly I don't 
disagree Agree know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
1 2 3 4: :. 5, . S. ., 8 
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
1 2 3 4. `s 6 '` 8 
IX. Information on your company Yes No i don't know. 
1. Is there a written statement of policy on .''1'2: 3 
aviation safety? 
2. Is there a written airline safety 123 
program? 
3. Is there a writtcn'iirliüc crisis. 2: ' 3 
management plan? 
4. Is there a language gap for receiving 123 
safety-related information? 
Please offer any suggestions or comments that you wish. If you prefer, you may answer 
in your native language. ) 
Comments and Suggestions : 
Thank you for your time ! 
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NO SAFETY, KNOW PAIN ! KNOW SAFETY, NO PAIN! 
AIRLINES NEED YOUR HELP, 
WE NEED YOURS, TOO ! 
Questionnaire 
Just several minutes of your time could help complete this questionnaire 
which is part of a research study on airline safety management. You will 
receive a summary of the results if you tick the box below. 
Q Please send me a survey summary. 
In answering the questions, please give your personal view, which may not 
necessarily reflect your organisation's "official view". All information given 
will be treated as strictly confidential. Results of the survey will be 
counted only in an aggregate form so that neither organisations nor 
persons can be identified. 
Name (optional): 
Position in your 
Organisation: 
Working experience less than 2 years 2-5 years 6- 10 years 
in Aviation : 11 - 15 years 16 - 20 years more than 20 
years 
Working Pilot Air Traffic Officer 
background 
Engineer Other 
Country (optional): 
I 
AVIATION SAFETY IS ----- A SIIARED RESPONSIBILITY !I 
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From your observation, please circle the number as appropriate to indicate your 
opinion on airlines in your country. 
1. Organisation structure strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
1. In the past several years; most airlines 1 2:.. .3' "4 "5' 6 
have undergone too fast expansion in 
the scale of its operations. 
2. Functional responsibility for safety in 1 2 34 5 6 
most airlines is clearly placed. 
3. The influence of safety staff in most 1 2 3"4 
airlines is strong. 
4. The position of safety manager or 1 2 34 5 6 
personnel in most airlines' hierarchy is 
appropriate. 
11 Management styles strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
I. Most airlines' top management is 1' 2:: 4::. . ':. '5 ''6 dedicated to supporting safety policies 
and events. 
2. Most airlines' operations managers are 1 2 34 5 6 
strongly involved in the safety events. 
3. Most airlines' safety 1 :' 2 3''4 5" '6 
manager/personnel have direct access 
to top management. 
4. The safety inspection program in most 1 2 34 5 6 
airlines is satisfactory. 
I don't 
know 
8 
8 
8 
8 
I don't 
know 
8 
8 
8 
8 
III. Organisational climate strongly strongly I don't 
disagree agree know 
1. In gcncral, 'tlie awareness of safety in 1 2 3' - 4* '.. '5 6 8 
most airlines is good 
2. Channels for communication in most 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
airlines arc accessible. 
3. Flight and ground crews co-ordinate 1 2 3 4` " 5: "-- 6' ' 8' 
well in most airlines. 
4. Most airlines' policy encourages 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
voluntary safety reports from 
flight/ground crews. 
S. Most airlines' crews are willing to -1 ' '2 3'. 4'. 6 g 
report hazards/incidents. 
IV. Operational standards and training strongly strongly I don't 
disagree agree know 
1. Most airlines make strong efforts to 1 '2 3 "4 . `5" 6 8 standardise checklists and manuals in 
accordance with its policy. 
2. Most airlines' selection criteria for 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
flight crews arc high. 
3. Most airlines' quality of recurrent'' -1 " 2 3 ' -4 5' 6 '8 
training is very good. 
4. Most airlines' human factors training is 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
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effective. 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANS WERED ALL THE QUESTIONS. THANK YOU I 
VI. Indicate your opinion on the 
importance of the following to airline 
safety : least important most important 
1. Top managemenf "' 1 2' 3 4 5 6 
2. Organisational structure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. Organisational climate ` 1>.. ':.. 2 :... .,:.,.... 3:.. 
*::. ý. 4 . 5.. .. 
6 
4. Operational standards 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. Training.. ... 
' 
.....:....: ''. 
'.; 
..:.. 
;. : 
.: 
1 2 : '. 3 :.. ..:.. 4..:.. .. 5. '. 6 
6. The role of Aviation Regulatory 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Authority 
7.. Others (Please specify):. >.:.:. 6 
VIII. Self- evaluation of your strongly strongly I don't 
organisation 
disagree Agree know 
1. Its pace of response to technologicäl 1 2 3' 4 6 8" 
change is good. 
2. Its follow-up to check compliance with 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
its safety standards is strict. 
3. Its capacity to guide effectively the 1 2 3'. 4' 5' '6' 8 
adequate training of airlines is good. 
4. It provides adequate safety information 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
to airlines. 
5. Its investigators are independent and- 1 2 .3 
4- 5 --6 8 
not influenced by the authorities during 
the accident/incident investigation. 
6. Its investigators are qualified to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 
level of advanced technology aircraft. 
7. It is necessary to set up an independent `1 2 3` 4 5 '6 $ 
aircraft accident investigation agency 
in your country. 
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Please offer any suggestions or comments on airline safety management that you 
wish. (If you prefer, you may answer in your native language. ) 
Comments and Suggestions : 
Thank you for your time ! 
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NO SAFETY, KNOW PAIN! 
KNOW SAFETY, NO PAIN! 
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Survey Questions for Taiwanese Airline Pilots 
Dcmogräphcs 
Your position: Captain First Officer 
Your flying background: Military pilot Ab-initio 
How long have you worked for this company? 
What aircraft type do you fly for your airline at present? 
Compaüy'management 
What is the flight safety personnel's position in the company? 
To whom does this/these personnel report? 
Who in the company investigates accidents, incidents, deviations, and violations? 
Does your company have a policy about pairing new Captains with new First Officers? 
yes no 
Does the company have a flight standards committee or designated flight standards 
personnel? 
yes no 
Pilot selection, träining'and operation Standard: 
Does your airline impose minimum standards for: 
New-hire pilot qualifications? yes no 
Captain upgrade qualifications? yes no 
Use of simulator? yes no 
CRM training? yes no 
What are the minimum qualifying standards for pilot employment in your company? 
Are professional references requested and verified? 
yes no I don't know 
Do you use contract flight training ? 
yes no 
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When contract training is used, which types of training do you contract out? 
Initial yes no 
Recurrent yes no 
Upgrade yes no 
Transition yes no 
Instructor/clºeck pilot yes no 
Does the company provide fonnal CRM training? 
ycs_ no 
When is CRM provided? 
initial training recurrent training 
upgrade training transition training 
Who receives formal CRM training? 
New-hires? yes no 
Captain upgrade candidates? yes no 
Is joint CRM training conducted with both cockpit crewmembers and flight attendants? 
yes no 
Is LOFT training conducted? 
ycs no 
Company resource management; ' 
Does your company have a formal incident reporting system? Please describe: 
Will you voluntarily make an incident report? 
yes no it depends 
Is there an active accident prevention program? 
yes no 
Who do you report to if you have something about safety event? 
flight operation manager chief pilot flight safety staff 
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others Why ? 
Is there any flight safety or accident/incident database in your company? 
yes no I don't know 
The role of CAA: 
Do you feel that your CAA inspectors are sufficiently familiar with the operation of your 
aircraft type? 
yes no 
Do you think you can be assisted on flight training by the CAA? 
yes no 
Do you think you can be assisted on safety by the CAA? 
yes no 
Do you think it is necessary to contact the CAA concerning airline safety matters? 
yes no Why? 
Do you agree that the contents of CAA's pilot licensing test are appropriate to the practical 
aviation environment? 
absolutely agree agree disagree disagree absolutely 
Do you think that CAA should offer appropriate references and material for the licensing 
test? 
yes no 
Language communication gap: 
During your type/simulator training abroad, do you agree that the language gap influenced 
your learn speed? 
absolutely agree agree disagree absolutely disagree 
During your type/simulator training abroad, have you ever experienced that due to the 
language gap you don't know how to ask the questions you had? 
yes no 
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Have you ever experienced that due to the language gap you misunderstood the meaning of 
the flight manual? 
ycs no 
Flying with expatriate crews: 
How does flying with expatriate (multinational) crews differ from flying with crewmembers 
of your own nationality? Is your performance changed by working with expatriate crews? 
What is the best thing about flying with expatriate (multinational) crews? 
What is the most frustrating thing about flying with expatriate (multinational) crews? 
Comimunication: in the cockpit: 
What is your special communicaton experience in the cockpit due to initial training 
background? 
What is your special communicaton experience in the cockpit due to crew position? 
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Appendix G: Participating aviation regulatory authorities 
and Asain airlines 
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Participating Aviation Regulatory Authorities: 
Civil Aviation Department, Hong Kong 
Ministry of Transport, Japan 
Civil Aviation Administration, Korea 
Department of Civil Aviation, Malaysia 
Air Transportation Office, Department of Transportation, Pilippines 
Civil Aviation Authority, Singapore 
Department of Aviation, Thailand 
Civil Aeronautical Administration, Taiwan 
Participating Asian Airlines: 
All Nippon Airways, Asiana Airlines, 
Dragon Air, Garuda Indonesia, 
Korean Air, 
Singapore Airlines, 
Malaysia Airlines, 
Thai International, 
Cathay Pacific, 
Japan Airlines, 
Philippine Airlines, 
Meerpati Airlines, 
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Table 1I-1 Repeat Measures Analysis of Vatiance Summury Table of 
Perceived Important Factors to Airline Safety by Position and Initial 
Training Background of the Pilot (Taiwanese pilots) 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Variation 
Within cells 874.32 1374 . 64 
Factors 198.83 6 33.14 52.08 . 000 
Background 2.54 6 . 42 . 64 . 568 by factor 
Position by 3.72 6 . 62 . 97 . 441 factor 
Position by 2.66 6 . 45 . 67 .. 565 background 
by factor 
Table I. 1-2 Post hoc t-test Paird Analysis of Perceived Important Factors to 
Airline Safety 
Factors Mean No of 
cases 
t value DF 2-tail 
probability 
Top management 5.52 233 5.56 232 . 000 Training 5.79 233 
Top management 5.52 233 11.88 232 . 000 Organisational structure 4.64 233 
Top management 5.52 233 7.09 232 . 000 Organisational culture 5.03 233 
Top management 5.52 233 3.45 232 . 001 Operating standard 5.72 233 
Top management 5.52 233 8.74 232 . 000 Resource management 4.80 233 
Top management 5.52 233 11.11 232 . 000 The role of CAA 4.34 233 
Training 5.79 233 17.53 232 
. 000 Organisational structure 4.64 233 
Training 5.79 233 11.97 232 . 000 Organisational culture 5.03 233 
Training 5.79 233 2.45 232 . 015 Operating standard 5.72 233 
Training 5.79 233 14.15 232 . 000 Resource management 4.80 233 
Training 5.79 233 14.46 232 . 000 The role of CAA 4.34 233 
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Factors Mean No of 
cases 
t value DF 2-tail 
probability 
Organisational structure 4.64 233 5.58 232 . 
000 
Organisational culture 5.03 233 
Organisational structure 4.64 233 15.66 232 . 000 Operating standard 5.72 233 
Organisational structure 4.64 233 2.66 232 . 
008 
Resource management 4.80 233 
Organisational structure 4.64 233 3.42 232 . 
001 
The role of CAA 4.34 233 
Organisational culture 5.03 233 11.15 232 . 
000 
Operating standard 5.72 233 
Organisational culture 5.03 233 3.01 232 . 003 Resource management 4.80 233 
Organisational culture 5.03 233 7.11 232 . 000 The role of CAA 4.34 233 
Operating standard 5.72 233 13.38 232 . 000 Resource management 4.80 233 
Operating standard 5.72 233 13.70 232 . 000 The role of CAA 4.34 233 
Resource management 4.80 233 5.95 232 . 
000 
The role of CAA 4.34 233 
Table H-3 Repeat Measures Analysis of Vatiance Summury Table of 
Perceived Important Factors to Airline Safety (Asian pilots) 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Variation 
Within cells 114.42 270 . 42 
Factors 46.43 6 7.79 18.38 
. 000 
Table H-4 Repeat Measures Analysis of Vatiance Summury Table of 
Perceived Important Factors to Airline Safety (Asian CAA officers) 
Source of SS DF MS F Sig of F 
Variation 
Within cells 36.61 1105 . 35 
Factors 6.06 5 1.21 3.48 . 006 
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APPENDIX I: Qualitative information gathered 
from the airline safety management survey 
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The following comments of the postal questionnaires and interviews carried out with 32 
airline pilots consists of an identification of the key themes mentioned by the interviewees. 
These themes are supported by quotes given by the pilots. 
These areas arc as follows: 
Organisational structure, management style, organisational culture, operational standards and 
training, resource availability, language barriers, the role of CAA, and flying with expatriate 
pilots. 
1. Organisational Structure 
Any policy or regulation should consider its feasibility and acceptability, and it would 
rather be little and simple to ensure its effectiveness. 
The Flight Safety Office or Department should be placed at a level higher than Flight 
Operations Department to ensure its neutrality. Safety-related personnel should be 
qualified and capable of practising their specialities without being restrained by the 
Flight Operations Department. 
Safety-related personnel should be competent individuals with professional experience 
and credentials to ascertain and certify their fitness for their jobs. 
The Flight Safety Office should be fitted in a position where it may override the other 
departments in the organisation structure. 
The Flight Safety Office should include both flight and maintenance personnel 
2. Management Style 
Basically the company knows the importance of safety, but sometimes top management 
just don't know how to apply it in the airline management system, resulting in a different 
perception towards safety. 
Increasing employee's involvement and assimilation. 
A basic application for top managers should be an open mind to new thoughts. Their 
personal subjective opinions should not be so strong so as to refuse to accept any other 
suggestions that are different from their own. 
The extent of collaboration among departments determines an airline's safety 
performance. 
Changing current severe punishment policy. 
The major mission of our company is the pursuit of profit, so there are no budgets 
available to enhance flight safety. 
Although our company has strict regulatory safety requirements, these requirements are 
not fully carried out in actual practice. 
3. Organisational Culture 
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Each country should Honour its own cultural traditions and characteristics, which not 
only helps constitute more pragmatic rules, easier operative codes, and more efficient 
regulations for itself, but also facilitates the integration of international safety knowledge 
and information. 
Our company gives small reward and severe punishment. 
Flight and ground crews do not co-operate well enough. When problems come up, they 
either cover them up or lay the blame on each other. 
To both airlines and CAA, the constitution and operation of policies should be fair, 
reasonable and open. It is especially necessary to get rid of the burdens from the culture 
of Air Force. The hiring of personnel should be based on their competence for the job 
rather than an arrangement of reciprocal agreement. 
Although aircrews may agree training on CRM, their thinking styles and personality are 
unlikely to completely co-operate with it. Besides, once an accident or incident occurs, 
ground crews tend to guess its causes by the pilot's performance and attitude on the 
ground rather than objectively judge the actual causes. 
Overall safety depends not only on the efforts of pilots but on the support and assistance 
of flight attendants. 
There should not be any disciplinary action taken on refusing to fly aircraft for safety 
reasons. 
4. Operational Standards and Training 
Flight engineers are reluctant to read abnormal and alternative procedure checklists from 
OPS manual. 
Simulator programs should be LOFT orientated. 
Operation procedures not only are not unified because everyone does not practise SOP, 
but also are altered to follow the standard of the one with highest rank. 
The arrangement of flight schedule should be more humanised and not exceed pilots' 
workloads. 
Our company has to clearly define `Captains Authority' relating to safety items. 
The top managers not only do not have aviation experience, but merely take into 
consideration how much money is going to be spent on training and running the system. 
Under the direction of laymen, the occurrence of accidents is not beyond expectation. 
There is a lack of professional training on safety personnel and CAA safety officials as 
well. 
Our company publicly recruits new employees to be trained abroad for 300 hours as first 
officers. The problem is that civil training is short of complete and effective flying 
training, and the 300-hour training are not enough to complete overall F/O training. 
During an emergency, they are apt to cause fatal accidents, which is something that 
needs to addressed. 
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Pilots should be encouraged to follow standard operation procedures. 
Flight safety education to ground crews needs strengthening. Horizontal communication 
is necessary and should be promoted. 
5. Resource Availability 
I sincerely recommend top managers to focus their attention on dealing with the 
problems of flight and cargo operations. Especially when treating flight operations, 
never try to save little money and result in losing more money. 
T7ie safety staff just like to complete the investigation process as soon as possible, 
seldom try to do further action. 
As learning from past accidents was almost impossible, how could leaning from past 
incidents be expected! 
6. The Role of CAA 
Civil Aviation Regulations should be revised and modified in time to meet up-to-date 
needs, and the emphasis should be placed on overall needs rather than specific 
requirements of a company. What is easily open to be criticised is the different 
interpretations to the same code. 
Civil Aviation Regulations should be revised to meet current needs. (x 2) 
Airport facilities, such as the navigation system, should be improved. 
Civil Aviation Regulations should be continuously revised to cope with the requirements 
of modern civil aviation safety. (x 2) 
The CAA should have more budgets to enhance the salary of civil aviation officials, 
renew airport navigation facilities, and reinforce necessary training. 
Expediting professional training for accident investigators. 
The CAA officers are seriously incompetent in carrying out its surveillance and 
oversight functions. Professional training is needed for inspection staff. 
CAA should assist Flight Control to renew its facilities and reinforce the training of 
flight control personnel. 
Civil Aviation Regulations should be revised and updated. 
7. Language Barriers 
Crew often discuss technical problems in Mandarin, leaving the English-speaking 
captain out of the loop. 
English reports and documentation regarding aviation safety need to be abstracted into 
Chinese in order to have its causation and corrective actions known to all the pilots in a 
short time. 
Affiliated organisations, such as the CAA and airlines, should make the effort to 
translate foreign languages into Chinese to ensure understanding and effectiveness, 
because the language proficiency of most aviation personnel is not good enough to 
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comprehend aviation-related reports and documentation written in languages other than 
Chinese. 
Mastery of aviation English is the most important requirement. Safety managers here 
seldom place emphasis on it. 
Foreign reports and documentation cannot be thoroughly understood due to lack of 
language gap. In addition, the safety policy in the airline is not clear enough, resulting 
in slow reaction to the change of international aviation standards. 
Establishing an ad lioc translation unit to translate international safety information is 
needed to reach the purpose of unification. 
8. Flying with Expatriate Pilots 
" Advantages: 
Less pressure is felt when I work with expatriate pilots. (x 3) 
Expatriate pilots divide PF and PNF clearly, so when working with them, first officers 
can focus on PF and do their best. (x 2) 
My performance will be better to fly with multi-national crew because I will feel more 
free to question captain's decisions and give more advice. 
Though a language barrier exists, expatriate pilots are easier to communicate with. On 
the contrary, native pilots are more stubborn and have stronger hierarchical concept. 
It is more relaxing to work with them, and I fly better. 
I can pay less attention on socialising with the crew and working on crew co-ordination 
more. 
Native pilots tend to be more authoritative and harder to communicate with. Native 
pilots value cockpit ethics, but expatriate pilots value co-operation. 
The majority of native pilots will treat us like the second auto pilot and train us like 
trained pilots. I will be more aggressive when flying with multi-national crews, but 
definitely not with our own national crews. 
It is better to fly with foreign pilots. They have more knowledge that we can learn from, 
and they follow SOP precisely. 
The cockpit atmosphere is more open and comfortable when flying with a foreign 
captain. You can make your decision freely and discuss with the captain reasonably. 
The native captain will use what he calls experience by himself to disregard all decisions 
you make. Sometimes, you wonder what he knows about aviation except flying the 
aircraft. 
Expatriate pilots explain clearly during takeoff and landing. They value crew co- 
operation to complete each mission. 
Easy to communicate. They follow standard procedures and regulations. 
They value communication. CRM concept is better. Flying knowledge is better. 
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They fully follow the SOP and FCOM. If they have a different view, they will raise the 
question and seek advice and discussion. 
Expatriate pilots value first officers' responsibilities. They respect our viewpoints. Thus, 
our performance improves and confidence is consequently built up. 
They have more professional knowledge, and their operations fully follow standard 
procedures and regulations. 
Really listen to each other. Less poker faces. They are more patient when working with 
others. 
Working with them is simpler because they seldom talk about personal topics. 
Expatriate pilots are more willing to share their knowledge and experience with other 
crew members. 
You can learn surprisingly different ways of doing things. You can mirror your culture 
against other cultures and sec the weak point of your own culture. 
I must be extremely clear with my communications with regard to the other crew 
members. 
" Disadvantages: 
Language barrier 
During long haul flight, it often seems that no topics of conversation are found except 
talking about flying the airplane. Long haul flight is boring. (x3) 
People from different countries will try harder to communicate with each other. 
Because I am not able to express opinions freely in English, language communication is 
limited to flying, and there is no chance to get to know each other more. The language 
barrier seems to distance us. 
The English accent of those who come from non-English speaking countries is not easily 
understood. 
I need to listen carefully when I converse with expatriate pilots with strong accent. 
We'll try to speak out and let them know what we are going to do and how we shall co- 
ordinate in the cockpit. 
Expatriate pilots speak too fast to understand, especially at the first contact. 
Due to the language barrier, it is difficult to get along well with them. Not always 
understanding fully. 
It is better to use plain English in the cockpit than slang. 
I must be extremely clear in my communications with regard to the other crew members. 
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My performance may be decreased. There was more communication between crew 
members because of language barriers. 
Racial discrimination 
Racial discrimination and cultural gaps between east and west mostly come from "X" 
crews. Generally, "XX" crews are more understanding and easier to work with. 
Some expatriate pilots have inexplicable sense of superiority: they rebuke other aircrews 
due to language problems. 
Language barrier causes the difficulty to form close friendship with them. (x3) 
Due to communication problems, we talk less in the cockpit. 
It takes time to understand their operations and attitudes. It is necessary to use different 
expressions to avoid misunderstanding. 
Language, social, cultural barriers. Military mentality which deters good CRM. 
Misunderstanding with specific regard. Synergy is lacking. 
Crew communication must be emphasised strongly to cockpit management. In other 
words, SOP and FCOM (Flight Crew Operation Manual) must be fully understood to 
maintain the effectiveness and safety of flight. 
Communication in emergency 
Failure to recognise deterioration flight, weather or system problems which will cause 
bigger problems or a later emergency situation. (x4 ) 
I have a rauch higher sense of awareness of all switch positions, aircraft configuration 
and clearances to prevent problems due to misunderstanding or lack of proficiency on 
system knowledge. 
Different background and life style 
A few misbehaving pilots like to put the blame on bad communication to cover up their 
own misconduct. 
You receive a diverse view of ideas and operational procedures based on different 
backgrounds. 
Some expatriate pilots still adopt the operational procedures of their previous airlines. 
Expatriate pilots still follow the previous company's policy on operation. Some 
expatriate pilots do not know the company's regulations. 
Expatriate pilots care less about the company's policy, and that easily causes 
misunderstanding. Besides, they seldom participate in group activities. 
Misunderstandings happen due to different culture. 
It is not about the problem of language. It is about the way they talk, which is very 
different from what natives are used to. 
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It looks like they are doing summer jobs rather than their careers. He kept on asking me 
whether I would like to share coffee with him. 
It is difficult to understand their personalities due to language and culture problems. 
They have crew concept, but no company concept. 
Due to different background, it takes time to communicate. I do not understand their 
jokes. 
Others 
To all appearances native pilots work harmoniously together. 
I have to be and learn to be very abstemious. 
Expatriate pilots like to fly manually, which adds to the workload. 
The authority should continuously assist airlines to locate their shortcomings and 
improve them. 
Airlines consider commercial benefits more than aviation safety, so it is necessary for 
CAA to reinforce inspection to balance each other. 
Insurance companies can play a more effective role in promoting aviation safety. They 
can access each airline's safety management program to estimate the amounts of 
premiums and maximum recovered payment. 
More safety-related information is needed. Language is a problem. 
Because the standard of operation and training in the airlines is set up based on the 
documentation of aircraft manufacturers, the provision of adequate manuals to meet the 
needs of a variety of people all over the world should be encouraged. 
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APPENDIX J: Questionnaire for the feasbility study of implementing a 
confidentiality aviation incident reporting program in Taiwan 
( airline pilot survey ) 
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Dcar Sir/Aladam, 
The confidential aviation incident reporting systems have been running for many years 
in many countries, such as CHIRP in the UK, ASRS in the USA, CASRP in Canada, and 
CAIR in Australia. All of them have made great contributions to improve their air 
safety. 
By distributing this questionnaire to you, I would like to know your opinions about the 
feasibility of setting up a confidential aviation incident reporting system in Taiwan in the 
next two or three years. 
Such a system would be an independent agency which will provide guarantee of 
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter, channels for sharing flying and safety 
experience, information to prevent human errors from happening again, and chances to 
improve the system's effectiveness. 
All information given will be treated strictly confidential. I will appreciate if I can 
contact you by phone should I require additional information. If possible, please leave 
your phone number and address as well as the dates and time convenient for contact on 
the second page of the questionnaire. 
Your opinions will be the most important treasure in this feasibility study. I do hope you 
can spend a little time to fill out the three-page questionnaire. After reading the 
attached references, would you please complete the questionniare and place it in the self- 
stamped envelop enclosed and return it to me. Thank you for your co-operation. 
Wish you a pleasant and safe flight. 
Hero IIo 
Research Associate 
Department of Air Transport 
Enclosure: 1. ROCARE questionnaire 
2. Three cases of CHIRP, ASRS reports 
3. Brief introduction of CHIRP, ASRS, CASRP, and 
CAIR. 
Up Syndrome" 
4. Translated research paper with the title of "Hurry 
5. Draft of propaganda leaflet of ROCARE 
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AVIATION INCIDENTREPORTING SYSTEM 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(A possible Taiwanese Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting System: ROCARE) 
"A uniform with four rings on the sleeve and 20,000 flying hours do not 
make us immune from these human limitations. " 
The ROCARE system is designed to improve aviation safety and help 
you, we need to know what your expectation is. 
Name (optional): 
Position in your organisation: Q Captain 
DFirst Officer 
(Please specify) 
Working experience in 
Q 6-10 years 
Airlines: 11 
Q Other 
2-5 years 
11 -15 years 
Q more than 15 years 
Flying background :Q Military.. 
Q Ab-initio 
(Please Specify) 
Airlines (optional): 
Ci Other 
1. Are you willing to share your flying or safety experience with others? `. '...... ' 
Q Yes Q No QI don't 
know 
=2. Do you encourage others to share their flying or safety, experience?, 
13 Yes 13 No QI don't 
know 
3. Have you ever voluntarily reported I lightincidents or hazard events?.. 
Q Yes Q No QI don't 
know 
4. Under the current situation in Taiwan, do you think it is possible for pilots to:;. , 
voluntarily report and share pilot performance incidents? 
Q Absolutely possible Q Possible Q Impossible Q Absolutely impossible 
5. Have you heard of any foreign voluntary aviation incident reporting system, such as 
CHIRP in the UK or ASRS in the USA? 
Q Yes Q No 
6. Nave you ever read any research papers or reports from aviation incident reporting 
systems? 
Q Yes (Please go to No 7) Q No (Please go to No 8) 
Q less than 2 years Q 
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7. If so, are these papers or reports written in ...? 
Q Chinese Q English 
8. Do you think such reporting systems will help to improve aviation safety? 
Q Absolutely agree Q Agree Q Disagree Q Absolutely disagree 
9. If the incident report-receiving agency is an independent aviation authority 
/organisation, which provides guarantee of confidentiality and immunity to the 
reporter, will you voluntarily make an incident report? 
Q Absolutely agree Q Agree Q It depends Q Disagree Q Absolutely disagree 
10. 'If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, which do you think is 
the best agency to administer the system? 
Q ALPA Q FSF Q School 
Q CAA Q MOT Q 
Research institute 
Q Other (Please specify) 
11. If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, what are the possible 
reasons that might result in your unwillingness to make an incident report? 
Q Too much time on paper work Q Company might not want us to report 
Q Distrust the confidentiality Q Might cause negative consequences 
Q Don't think it will help to improve safety Q Lose face 
Q Don't know what ROCARE can do Q ROCARE personnel are not 
professional 
QI am not sure what can be reported Q Fear of punitive 
action 
Q Other (Please specify) 
12. If an appropriate agency is chosen, to what degrees do you trust that the agency can 
provide confidentiality to the reporter? 
Q Absolutely trustful Q Trustful Q Distrustful Q Absolutely 
distrustful 
13. If an independent incident report-receiving agency is appropriately chosen, 
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter is also guaranteed, do yoü think it is 
feasible to implement ROCARE in the next two years? 
Q Absolutely feasible Q Feasible Q No comments Q 
Not feasible 
Q Absolutely not feasible 
14. To what extent do you think the confidential reporting system is needed in Taiwan? 
Q Absolutely necessary Q Necessary Q Unnecessary Q Absolutely unnecessary 
Please briefly comment the reasons you think why your colleagues are not willing to 
report aviation incidents or hazards: 
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Please offer any additional comments or suggetions to ROCARE in the space below: 
Please turn to the third page. Thank you ! 
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INTERNET SAFETY WEB 
"Through a better channel of sharing information, we 
can continue our progress on aviation safety. ý, 
Computer has been the inevitable third pilot in our flight 
cockpit. It not only flies with us but also providesus with a lot of global 
information. In the near future, you can use your personal computer at 
home and easily gain aviation safety information all over the world. The 
following questions are designed to know what you think of transferring 
aviation safety information from the Internet. 
1. Do you have your own personal computer?., 
Q Yes (Please go to No 2) Q No (Please go 
to No 4) 
, 2., How often do you use computer at home? 
Q Always QSometimes 
QOccasionally Q Never 
3. Is your personal computer connected to the Internet? 
Q Yes Q No QI 
don't know 
4. Is it possible for you to purchase your own personal computer in the next two 
years? 
Q Yes Q No QI 
don't know 
5. Are you willing to recieve safety and its related information through 
computer? 
Q Absolutely willing Q Willing Q Unwilling 
Q Absolutely unwilling 
6. Are you willing to offer your flying experience or safety suggestions on the 
Internet? 
Q Willing Q It depends Q 
Unwilling 
Thank you very much for your assistance. Wish you a nice and safe flight! 
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Your name: Telephone: (Office) (Home) 
Dates and Time available to be contacted: 
APPENDIX K: Questionnaire for the feasbility study of implementing a 
confidentiality aviation incident reporting program in Taiwan 
( air traffic controller survey ) 
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Dear Sir, 
The confidential aviation incident reporting systems have been running for many years 
in many countries, such as CHIRP in the UK, ASRS in the USA, CASRP in Canada, and 
CAIR in Australia. All of them have made great contributions to improve their air 
safety. 
By distributing this questionnaire to you, I would like to know your opinions about the 
feasibility of setting up a confidential aviation incident reporting system in Taiwan in the 
next two or three years. 
Such a system would be an independent agency which will provide guarantee of 
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter, channels for sharing flying and safety 
experience, information to prevent human errors from happening again, and chances to 
improve the system's effectiveness. 
All information given will be treated strictly confidential. I will appreciate if I can 
contact you by phone should I require additional information. If possible, please leave 
your phone number and address as well as the dates and time convenient for contact on 
the second page of the questionnaire. 
Your opinions will be the most important treasure in this feasibility study. I do hope you 
can spend a little time to fill out the three-page questionnaire. After reading the 
attached references, would you please complete the questionniare and place it in the self- 
stamped envelop enclosed and return it to me. 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
Hero Ho 
Research Associate 
Department of Air Transport 
Enclosure: 1. ROCARE questionnaire 
2. Three cases of CHIRP, ASRS reports 
3. Brief introduction of CHIRP, ASRS, CASRP, and 
CAIR. 
Up Syndrome" 
4. Translated research paper with the title of "Hurry 
5. Draft of propaganda leaflet of ROCARE 
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AVIATION INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(A possible Taiwanese Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting System: ROCARE) 
The ROCARE system is designed to improve aviation safety and help 
you, we need to know what your expectation is. 
Name (optional): 
Position in your organisation: Q Senior or Supervisor Q Air Traffic Controller 
Q Assistance 
Air Traffic Controller 
(Please specify) 
Working experience in 
6- 10 years 
Air Traffic Control: 
more than 15 years 
Original training 
background: 
13 Other 
Q less than 2 year Q2-5 years Q 
Q 11-15 years Q 
Q,, Military 
Q Other 
Unit :Q Tower Q 
Area Control Q Approach Control 
]. Are you willing to share your safety experience with others? 
Q Yes Q No QI don't 
know 
2. Do you encourage others to share their safety experience? 
Q Yes Q No QI don't 
know 
3. Have you ever voluntarily reported aviation safety related incidents or hazard 
events? 
Q Yes Q No QI don't 
know 
4. Under the current situation inyour organisation, do you think it is possible for you 
to voluntarily report human performance related incidents? 
Q Absolutely possible Q Possible Q Impossible Q Absolutely 
impossible 
5. Have you heard of any foreign' voluntary aviation incident reporting system, such as, 
CHIRP in the UK or ASRS in the USA? 
Q Yes Q No 
6. Have you ever read any research papers or reports from aviation incident reporting 
systems? 
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Q Yes (Please go to No 7) Q No (Please go to No 8) 
7. If so, are these papers or reports written in ..:: 
0 Chinese 13 English 
8. F Do you think such reporting systems will help to improve aviation safety? 
Q Absolutely agree Q Agree Q Disagree Q Absolutely disagree 
9. If the incident report-receiving agency is an independent aviation authority 
/organisation, which provides guarantee of confidentiality and immunity to the 
reporter, will you voluntarily make an incident report? 
Q Absolutely agree Q Agree Q It depends Q Disagree Q Absolutely 
disagree 
10. If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, which do you think is 
the best agency to administer the system? 
Q FSF Q School Q CAA 
Q MOT 
Q Research institute 
Q ALPA 
Q Other (Please specify) 
IL If the confidential reporting system is established in Taiwan, what are the possible 
reasons that might result in your unwillingness to make an incident report? 
Q Too much time on paper work Q Organisation might not want us to 
report 
Q Distrust the confidentiality 
Q Don't think it will help to improve safety 
professional 
Q Don't know what ROCARE can do 
Q1 am not sure what can be reported 
action 
Q Other (Please specify) 
Q Might cause negative consequences 
Q ROCARE personnel are not 
Q Lose face 
Q Fear of punitive 
'12. If an appropriate agency is chosen, to what degrees do you trust that the agency can 
provide confidentiality to the reporter? 
Q Absolutely trustful Q Trustful Q Distrustful Q Absolutely 
distrustful 
13. If an independent incident report-receiving agency is appropriately chosen, 
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter is also guaranteed, do you think it is 
feasible to implement ROCARE in the next two years? 
Q Absolutely feasible Q Feasible Q No comments Q 
Not feasible 
Q Absolutely not feasible 
14. To what extent do you think the confidential reporting system is needed in Taiwan? 
Q Absolutely necessary Q Necessary Q Unnecessary Q Absolutely unnecessary 
15. Please briefly comment the reasons you think why your colleagues are not willing to 
report aviation incidents or hazards: 
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Please offer any additional comments or suggetions to ROCARE in the space below: 
Please turn to the third page. Thank you ! 
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INTERNET SAFETY WEB 
"Through a better channel of sharing information, we 
can continue our progress on aviation safety. '° 
Computer has been the inevitable third pilot in our flight 
cockpit. It not only flies with us but also providesus with a lot of global 
information. In the near future, you can use your personal computer at 
home and easily gain aviation safety information all over the world. The 
following questions are designed to know what you think of transferring 
aviation safety information from the Internet. 
1. Do you have your own personal computer? 
Q Yes (Please go to No 2) Q No (Please go 
to No 4) 
2. Now often do you use computer at home? 
Q Always QSometimes 
QOccasionally Q Never 
3. Is your personal computer connected to the Internet? 
Q Yes Q No QI 
don't know 
4. ' Is it possible for you to purchase your own personal computer in the next two 
years? 
QYes QNo QI 
don't know 
5. Are you willing to recieve safety and its related information through , 
'-computer? 
Q Absolutely willing Q Willing Q Unwilling 
Q Absolutely unwilling 
6. Are you willing to offer your flying experience or safety suggestions on the 
Internet? 
Q Willing Q It depends Q 
Unwilling 
Thank you very much for your assistance! 
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APPENDIX L : Qualitative information collected 
from the questionnaire 
(A survey for a possible Taiwanese confidential aviation incident reporting system) 
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The following analysis of the survey consists of an identification of the key themes mentioned 
by the questionnaires. These themes are supported by quotes given by the pilots and air traffic 
controllers. 
These areas are as follows: 
1. Positive 
It should be widely propagated in order to build up consensus. 
The confidential reporting system should be set up immediately. The receiving agency 
should produce and distribute a regular publication to the aviation community. (x 3) 
Confidential procedures need to be kept strictly scrupulous. 
The confidential reporting system is absolutely in need, but it should not become the 
security of the military or a cover-up of the hypocrite. 
A propagating manual is recommended to be published as reference material and 
distributed to all the personnel in the field. 
Military and civil air traffic controls do not co-operate well enough. Hopefully, the 
system can find a solution to the problem. 
It is worth trying. (x 6) 
I strongly agree to set up the system. However, its effects might not be as good as 
expected because of custom and practice. 
Immunity and confidentiality should be guaranteed. (x 5) 
First of all, the agency should take an example of a successful system to propagate its 
advantages. (x 3) 
Flight safety courses should be employed to propagate the system. The acquisition of top 
management's support is also important. 
The system is needed in our country. It would be better if more models can be provided. 
To senior flight or maintenance personnel, the confidential reporting system has a 
function of vigilance. Whereas to junior personnel, it gives them an education and offers 
them information of accumulative experience. 
The system allows us to report what used to be unspoken and unattended matters of flight 
safety. 
Besides immunity and confidentiality, why not add `reward' for a worthy report? (x2) 
The concept of incident reporting should be gradually introduced through stages of 
initial, transition, and recurrent training. 
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2. Negative 
" Confidentiality: 
Many people seem too curious to let anything pass unnoticed, and are apt to spread 
incorrect news. 
If confidentiality is not kept strictly, reporters will be like the informants of the police. 
Absolute neutrality and confidentiality are needed. (x 3) 
" Objectivity: 
The idea seems very grand, but there may be a deviation when it is put into practice. 
There is no adequate receiving agency. 
Political factors should be eliminated to ensure absolute professionalism. 
Based on past experience, it is unlikely to make amendments of aviation regulations in 
two years. 
Receiving agency should not hire personnel with military background in order to avoid 
problems of rank. 
Current regulations need to be improved. 
I don't know if there is a non-military background, independent, and trustful research 
institute. 
" Consequence: 
It may influence the assessment of individual performance. 
It is impossible to get rid of follow-up trouble, such as revenge from the person being 
reported. 
I will agree only if it is possible to report anonymously. (x 2) 
We always discuss incidents in private. 
Never let CAA use the channel to carry out special inspections rather than assist 
improvement. 
Sorry, I am a junior first officer. I cannot afford to be a martyr. (x 3) 
Fear of ostracising by other crew members. 
" Others: 
I doubt whether CAA encourages or supports the establishment of the confidential 
reporting program. 
The situation of military-trained pilots and the support of the company should be 
considered. 
Reporting should not involve a great deal of paperwork. The agency should also give 
reporters the convenience to place verbal reports. 
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It depends on the support of top management in the airlines and CAA. (x 2) 
The system's staff should be professionals who understand the regulations of ICAO, the 
CAA- Taiwan and other aviation authorities. 
Its success depends on the teamwork of the CAA, airlines, and pilots. 
Building up the senses of assimilation and trust. 
Please design a complete and simple reporting form. 
Your instruction paper is very worth reading. I hope we can read more of this kind of 
paper and examples. 
Building up a sense of trust between CAA and airlines. 
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APPENDIX Ml and M2 
333 
Appendix Ml: 
The possibility for Repondents to Voluntarily report human performance incidents 
QA4 possible to report incidents? 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
absolutely possible 162.8 2.8 2.8 
possible 2 48 22.7 22.7 25.6 
impossible 3 147 69.7 69.7 95.3 
absolutely possible 4 10 4.7 4.7 100.0 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 211 100.0 100.0 
Valid cases 211 Missing cases 0 
QA4 possible to report incidents? by WORXZXP working experience in aviation 
WORXZXP Page 1 of 1 
Count 
Exp Val 
Row Pct "less tha 2-5 year 6-10 yea 11-15 ye more the, 
Col Pot On 2 year a ra are n 15 yea Row 
Tot Pct "1°2"3"4°5° Total 
QA4 NNMNNMNNýNNNNNNNNýNNNNNNNNýNNNNNNNNýNNNN\\NNNýNNNNNNNNý 
1"6" 15 " 23 °4"6" 54 
possible  10.0 " 19.2 " 19.5 " 2.8 " 2.6 " 25.69 
0 11.1% " 27.8% ° 42.6% " 7.4% ° 11.1% 
" 15.4% 20.0% " 30.3% n 36.4%  60.0% 
M 2.8% ° 7.1% " 10.9% H 1.9% " 2.8% 
a .... NNhN NNNNN NN N NNNN NNNN NN N .............. 
2" 33 ° 60 ° 53 "704" 157 
impossible  29.0 55.8 M 56.5 8.2 7.4 " 74.4% 
" 21.0% ° 38.2% ° 33.8% " 4.5% " 2.5% n 
" 84.6% N 80.0% 0 69.7% " 63.6% 0 40.0% " 
M 15.6% " 28.4% ° 25.1% " 3.3% ° 1.9% " 
_NNNNN NNNýN NNN NNNNý Np NN NNN 
Column 39 75 76 11 10 211 
Total 18.5% 35.5% 36.0% 5.2% 4.7% 100.0% 
Chi-Sauare Value DF Significance 
-------------------- ----------- ---- ------------ 
Pearson 11.12365 4 . 02521 
Likelihood Ratio 10.39649 4 . 03425 
Mantel-Haenszel teat for 10.10790 1 . 00148 
linear association 
Number of missing observations: 0 
---------------------------------- 
QA4 possible to report incidents? 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
absolutely possible 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
possible 2 27 39.7 40.3 41.8 
impossible 3 37 54.4 55.2 97.0 
absolutely possible 4 2 2.9 3.0 100.0 
1 1.5 Missing 
--- 
Total 
---- 
68 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
100.0 
Valid cases 67 Missing cases 1 
QA4 possible to report incidents? by WORKEXP working experience in ATC 
WORXEXP 
Count " 
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Zxp Val " 
Row Pct "less the 2-5 year 6-10 yea 11-15 ye more tha 
Col Pct 'a 2 year a ra are a 15 yea Row 
Tot Pct w1N203w 4" 5N Total 
9*4 wwwwwwwwýwwwwwwwwýwwwwwwwwýwwwwwwNwýwNNNNNNNýwNNNNNNNý 
10"298"9" 28 
possible " 1.7 ' 5.4 " 9.2 6.7 ^ 5.0 " 41.8% 
. 0% " 7.1% " 32.1% " 28.6% " 32.1% 
. 0% " 15.4% " 40.9% 0 50.0% " 75.0% 
3.0% - 13.4% " 11.9% " 13.4% 
iMMMMNNwwýwwwMMMMwýMNNNNNNwýMNNNNNNNýNNNNNNNNý 
24" 11 "' 13 8'3 ^' 39 
impossible 2.3 " 7.6 12.8 9.3 ° 7.0 0 58.2% 
10.3% o 28.2% " 33.3% " 20.5% ° 7.7% " 
100.0% 0 84.6% ~ 59.1% - 50.0% 0 25.0% ~ 
6.0% " 16.4% " 19.4% 11.9% "' 4.5% 
wwwwfNwN, wwNwMwfwtwwwwNNNw"wwwNNNwNýwNNNNNNw- 
Coluaýa 4 13 22 16 12 67 
Total 6.0% 19.4% 32.8% 23.9% 17.9% 100.0% 
Chi-Sauare Value Dr Significance 
-------------------- ----------- ---- ------------ 
Pearson 12.48870 4 . 01406 
Likelihood Ratio 14.46126 4 . 00596 
riantel-Haenssel test for 11.92086 1 . 00056 
linear association 
Number of Missing observations: 1 
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Appendix M2: 
The extent of trust to the potential receiving 
QA12 do you trust it provide confidentiality? 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
absolutely trustful 1 12 5.7 5.7 5.7 
trustful 2 111 52.6 53.1 58.9 
distrustful 3 83 39.3 39.7 98.6 
absolutely distrustf 4 3 1.4 1.4 100.0 
2 .9 Missing 
Total 
------- 
211 
------- 
100.0 
------- 
100.0 
Valid cases 209 Missing cases 2 
QA12 do you trust it provide confidentiality? 
by WORKSXP working experience in aviation 
WORKEXP 
Count 
Rxp Val "' 
Row Pct "less tha 2-5 year 6-10 yea 11-15 ye more the 
Col Pct ^n 2 year s rs are n 15 yea Row 
Tot Pct 123"4^5" Total 
QÄ12 NNNMNNMNýFFFNFNNNýNNFNFNFNýNFNNFFNN . NNNNNNN\\ý\\F\\FNFNNý 
1 23 38 42 " 11 9° 123 
trustful 23.0 ° 43.6 ° 44.1 " 6.5 " 5.9 " 58.9% 
N 18.7% " 30.9% 34.1% " 8.9% ° 7.3% 
59.0% ° 51.4% ° 56.0% "100.0% " 90.0% 
" 11.0% ° 18.2% " 20.1% " 5.3% " 4.3% 
ýFMNNNNNNýNFFFFFFFýN\\FFNNF ............ NN FNN FF> 
2" 16 n 36 ° 33 0"1° 86 
distrustful N 16.0 " 30.4 " 30.9 ° 4.5 4.1 ° 41.1% 
" 18.6% " 41.9% " 38.4% " . 0% H 1.2% " 
M 41.0% " 48.6% ° 44.0% " . 0% " 10.0% 
M 7.7% " 17.2% N 15.8% " . 0%  . 5% 
ýNNNFFFFNýFFFFNNNNýNNNN\\ %I "M .NN NNNNNN. NN NN NNNN"' 
Column 39 74 75 11 10 209 
Total 18.7% 35.4% 35.9% 5.3% 4.8% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Value DF Significance 
-------------------- ----------- ---- ------------ 
Pearson 13.66861 4 . 00843 
Likelihood Ratio 18.42554 4 . 00102 
Mantel-Haenszel test for 5.11948 1 . 02366 
linear association 
Number of missing observations: 2 
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